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Abstract 
As social media becomes an integral part of our daily lives, and groups seek to utilize 
this medium to facilitate activism, understanding the nature of these communications and 
the impact of the content on the individual user becomes a valid area of interest.  When 
one then considers that extremist and terrorist groups have found social media to be an 
inexpensive and effective means for communication, radicalization, recruitment and 
member mobilization, the need for this understanding becomes critical.  This research 
seeks to provide just such an understanding in its examination of Far-Right English 
Defence League and their use of Facebook during a period of increased activism and 
online growth.  Important elements of this work include an understanding of the legal and 
ethical issues surrounding the collection of online content, particularly in extremist 
environments; the role of traditional media in their coverage of the group and whether the 
comments of the members reflect the group’s mission statement of the characterization of 
traditional media; the ability to enhance data segregation and analysis through the 
development and use of specialized software; and most importantly the findings from the 
data analysis.  Contained within these findings is an understanding of the intricacies of 
online participation in extremist social media.  These include insights into overall traffic 
generation, the use of links within communications and their impact on the member 
traffic, and how the group narrative put forth by the administrator is reflected in the 
dialogue of the users.  The most important finding was an understanding of individual 
user participation within the group and how, even with such an inexpensive and pervasive 
media outlet, activist groups still struggle to overcome the problem of participation.  That 
this knowledge can be applied in a meaningful way in counter extremist and 
counterterrorism efforts was an interesting and satisfying development. 
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1 
Introduction 
“The vigor of a mass movement stems from the propensity of its followers for 
united action and self-sacrifice.  When we ascribe the success of the movement 
to its faith, doctrine, propaganda, leadership, ruthlessness and so on, we are 
but referring to instruments of unification and to means used to inculcate a 
readiness for self-sacrifice.  It is perhaps impossible to understand the nature 
of mass movements unless it is recognized that their chief preoccupation is to 
foster, perfect, and perpetuate a facility for united action and self-sacrifice.  
To know the processes by which such a facility is engendered is to grasp the 
inner logic of most of the characteristic attitudes and practices of an active 
mass movement.”  (Eric Hoffer in The True Believer, 1951, p. 43)  
Being in the right place at the right time is likely the wish of every person who 
seeks knowledge or has a penchant for exploration.  Certainly researchers dream of 
that moment when they might be witness to a significant event or a new discovery 
that will provide them the opportunity to make a substantive contribution to their field 
of study and possibly to mankind.  While there will be no such grandiose claims 
regarding the outcome of this research project, the desire to conduct research into the 
characteristics of online social networking in extremist environments coupled with the 
birth and growth of the far-right extremist movement known as the English Defence 
League (EDL), who sought to use Facebook as their primary mode of communication, 
did indeed place this researcher in the right place at the right time.    
However, this research is not just about an extremist group or data collection and 
analysis.  It also offers a unique opportunity to explore new methods for collecting, 
segregating, and analyzing social media traffic in the search for the next step forward 
2 
in an emerging and very important field of inquiry. Several of the challenges that 
were faced during this project could have, in themselves, become the focus of a full 
thesis.  From the desire to engage in an interdisciplinary effort of investigation, the 
legal and ethical issues that surrounded the project, the collection and transformation 
of the social media traffic, and the on the ground fieldwork that was done to provide a 
real world perspective on the virtual phenomenon; each would have made for an 
interesting and substantive thesis. However, put together they tell the story of a 
process that was difficult yet fascinating, often reclusive yet sometimes quite 
adventurous.  And in the end, there are real findings that provide a unique glimpse 
into what is perceived as the power of social media.  Even still, the true value of this 
work is to be found in the compilation of questions, experiences, and answers that 
have fused together as a result of this research project; all toward the goal of 
understanding the nature and use of social media by the English Defence League and 
determining the effectiveness of this medium as a tool for garnering widespread 
support and recruitment, facilitating the members identification with the EDL 
narrative, and the mobilization of its membership.   
Following the Arab uprisings and the Occupy Movements that captured the 
attention of the world and the media, academics have begun to query the nature of 
social media and the true power of this medium to recruit and mobilize members to a 
cause (Morozov, 2011; Alterman, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  It is clear that 
the changes that took place in Tunisia and Egypt were sparked by events first reported 
online, precipitating public action.  Further, there is no doubt that the Occupy Wall 
Street (OWS) movement had an online presence on Facebook early in their formative 
days.  However, there are questions as to the true power of these online movements 
and the capacity of social media to promote and facilitate the growth of these 
3 
movements (Morozov, 2011; Alterman, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  Given 
the interest of governments and academics in the linkage between social media and 
radicalization (Casciani, 2009; Williams, 2012; Weimann, 2006; Hoffman, 2006b), 
resulting in considerable speculation, this research seeks to provide some clarity 
regarding the true nature of this relationship via an empirical examination of social 
media traffic. 
It is widely accepted that the video of the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi 
on 17 December 2010, first played on YouTube, sparked the uprising in Tunisia and 
was the first link in the chain of events that led to the Arab Spring and the fall of 
oppressive regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and the still ongoing conflict in Syria.  
However, this perception is now being challenged by researchers (Morozov, 2011; 
Alterman, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012; Dalacoura, 2012; Lim, 2012) who are 
pointing to and suggesting that the coverage by traditional media was responsible for 
the growth of these movements into the agents of change in the region.  While it is 
clear that these movements began online in social media environments that include 
blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, it seems that critical mass by these 
movements was not achieved until they were picked up and reported on television 
stations like Al-Jazeera (Lim, 2012; Alterman, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  
This mass media coverage then allowed for the dissemination of the movement to a 
larger audience thereby promoting mass participation.  Comparing the movements to 
a campfire, new media can potentially be viewed as the spark that is then fanned by 
traditional mass media to create the firestorm that then becomes a fully involved 
social-political movement.   
This phenomenon can be also seen in the data available from the early days of the 
Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement that was collected and analyzed by this 
4 
researcher for a future project.  A movement that eventually garnered an online 
membership of over 350,000 Facebook members, OWS began its Facebook page in 
August 2011.  Having followed the traffic from the birth of the OWS Facebook page 
it seems, anecdotally, that while there was interest in the dialogue, the tipping point of 
this movement came on 1- October 2011 when the group marched on the Brooklyn 
Bridge, which led to the arrest of 700 demonstrators.  The spark of this pivotal event, 
fanned by mass media coverage from across the country, led to the increase in traffic 
and support that fueled the growth of the OWS movement.  With continued mass 
media coverage, and the inclusion of this coverage in OWS posts via URL links of 
news articles and YouTube videos of media coverage, the activity seems to suggest 
that while the Movement had an online component, the national support was 
precipitated by traditional mass media where it was brought into the homes and minds 
of millions of viewers.  An examination of this phenomenon as it relates to the EDL 
will be provided with this study. 
What is unclear is how or whether this ability to mobilize large numbers of people 
translates into social media and computer mediated communication participation in 
extremist environments.  While social media and computer mediated communication 
are viewed as facilitators of democracy, it must also be acknowledged that these same 
fora provide a semi-secure environment for those who wish to spread messages of 
hate and violence to like-minded individuals.  Therefore, it should be expected that as 
a result of this self-selection, participation in extremist environments will likely look 
very different from more popular and socially acceptable movements where media 
support is expected. 
Following the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the 
attacks in London on 7 July 2005, western countries have sought to combat extremist 
5 
radicalization by outlawing the public promotion of Jihadist/extremist messages.  
Additionally, efforts were undertaken by law enforcement and the intelligence 
community to identify known recruiters in their communities and either arrest or 
deport these individuals to prevent further terrorist radicalization and recruitment.  
While these efforts are laudable, the result has been that while these activities have 
been taken off the street where they were in the full view of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, they have been driven underground onto the largest public 
forum ever to exist, the Internet.  The proliferation of extremist websites, blogs, 
Facebook pages, and YouTube videos is staggering.  Estimates indicate the number of 
terrorist websites increased during the decade prior to 2008, from just a few hundred 
to nearly 5,000 (Weimann, 2008).  More recently, before they were moved to the al-
Qaeda media site, the recently deceased Anwar al Awlaki had hundreds of jihadi 
videos on YouTube (Burns & Helft, 2010) were he promoted Islamist messages and 
had a significant influence in radicalizing westerners like Faisal Shahzad (the Time 
Square Bomber), and Nidal Hasan (The Fort Hood Shooter) toward committing acts 
of terror.  With this proliferation of online activity by extremists on Facebook, 
YouTube, and  numerous websites and blogs referred to as computer mediated 
communication (CMC); governments are concerned about the nature of these 
communications and the influence they may have in the radicalization, recruitment, 
and mobilization process (Weimann, 2008; Hoffman, 2006 ).   
While there is a growing body of research in this area, most of the work published 
on extremist use of the internet and online radicalization is focused on the media 
outlet and not on the individual.  While there are projects like the Arizona Dark Web 
Project (Chen, 2012) that examine the content of websites used by terrorists, 
noticeably missing, and to be explored herein, is any investigation that provides a 
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statistical analysis of the use of social media and other forms of computer mediated 
communication by extremist groups and the techniques that are used to promote the 
groups agenda or narrative.  Further, while there has been considerable focus on the 
number of groups and the number of ‘members’ in these groups (Chen, 2012; 
Weimann, 2008), it appears there has also been no investigation into the actual level 
of participation by individual group members, how this participation may change over 
time, and if there are externalities that may impact the viability of the group.  Finally, 
while some work has been done on the content richness of extremist websites and user 
satisfaction with those sites as it relates to other sites without rich content (Chen, 
2012); there has been no real analysis of the use of rich content in the development of 
a group narrative toward radicalization, recruitment and/or mobilization. 
This research seeks to provide a more detailed investigation into the true nature of 
participation in social media and CMC in one of these extreme environments.  For 
legal reasons that will be discussed later, it was decided to focus on an extremist 
group that was not classified as a terrorist group, but was of significant interest and 
was very active during the research period.  The English Defence League, which is a 
far right anti-Muslim and anti-immigration group in the United Kingdom, was chosen 
as the focus for this research as they were an active movement with a consistent and 
growing presence on Facebook which facilitated the collection of Facebook traffic for 
analysis.  As a fledgling movement in the summer of 2009, the EDL made its 
Facebook debut with only a few hundred members but quickly grew to have tens of 
thousands of followers on Facebook and were able to mobilize thousands to their 
demonstrations throughout the United Kingdom.  By early 2011, the EDL boasted a 
membership of over 60,000 on Facebook and were able to, at times, put 
approximately 3,000 demonstrators on the ground.  This research project focuses on 
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the collection and analysis of Facebook traffic during a forty five day period that 
arguably represents the most active phase of recruitment by the EDL, beginning in 
February 2011.  Augmenting this virtual fieldwork and analysis are an analysis of the 
traditional print media stories associated with the EDL, and observations which were 
made while conducting on-the-ground fieldwork that involved attending and filming 
two key EDL demonstrations in February and September 2011.  Additionally, data 
from a secondary collection on the EDL will be examined to support the findings 
from the analysis of the initial collection.   
The overarching goal of this research is to provide a more detailed understanding 
of the role social media played in the growth of the EDL by examining various 
aspects of this phenomenon to determine if Facebook can promote recruitment and 
mobilization (Morozov, 2011; Alterman, 2011; Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  Some 
of the pieces to this puzzle include understanding the role traditional print media 
played in the characterization of the EDL, how the growth of the Facebook group is 
tied to increased mobilization, and whether the growth of the EDL’s Facebook page is 
an accurate representation of the overall growth of the movement and exploring the 
true nature of member participation in this social media outlet.  By putting these 
pieces together, a fuller picture of the EDL and the power of social media will appear. 
Approach to the Investigation 
It was important that this research not be seen as an ad-hoc combination of 
observations presented as a thesis on participation in extremist environments online.  
Therefore, it was decided that a systematic approach to data gathering and analysis 
would be developed toward examining this phenomenon within the framework of 
well-established social science theory.  While the understanding of online 
participation and literature in this area is sparse, there is a growing body of this 
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literature that was useful to understanding the online phenomenon (Caren, et. al., 
2012; Wojcieszak, 2012; Ackland & O’Neil, 2011; Wu et al., 2011; Morozov, 2011) 
in addition to traditional terrorist theories related to radicalization and recruitment 
(Hoffman, 2006; Weimann, 2008; Nacos, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007; Conway, 2012, 
Klausen et al., 2012).  These approaches were used to examine the online activity of 
the EDL, the methods that were used by the group administrators or leaders to 
promote the group agenda/narrative, and the participation of the ‘members’ within the 
group. 
Data collection was performed through passive covert observation resulting in the 
collection of 19,312 Facebook administrator posts and member comments on those 
posts.  The material collected was then coded into the variables to be examined by 
using specialized software, specifically developed for this project, which reduced the 
coding process from what would have been hundreds of man hours to less than one 
minute.  Details of this effort will be discussed within the methodology chapter.  The 
analysis of the coded data provided findings that were revealing and heretofore 
undocumented in academic research and literature regarding participation in extremist 
social media, social media associated with activism, and other CMC environments. 
Presentation of Chapters 
While this research provides a quantitative analysis of the online phenomenon of 
the EDL, it would be a mistake to focus only on the numbers.  Therefore, the 
presentation of this research also includes qualitative analysis that provides insight 
into the media characterization of the EDL as well as observations from within the 
user traffic to examine how the dialog correlates to the public rhetoric.  The 
compilation of qualitative and quantitative methods and findings allows for the 
presentation of a more holistic approach to understanding not only the online 
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phenomenon, but the group which became the focus of this research.  Therefore, the 
following chapters will be provided in support of this approach: 
Chapter One begins by examining the literature related to the English Defence 
League, providing a basis from which to consider the nature of the group and their 
activities.  This will include the EDL’s perception of themselves, external perceptions 
by the media and government, and how academics who have written about the EDL 
characterize the group.  This is followed by a discussion of how extremists use the 
internet and the literature that addresses what are developing concepts regarding the 
power of the internet and social media to facilitate activism (Margetts et al., 2013; 
Morozov, 2011; McCorkindale, 2012; Barnett, 2012). Following this overview, the 
review moves on to an examination of the social science literature pertaining to the 
development of an online social identity as a part of this process (Sherif et al., 1988; 
Spears et al., 2007; Cole, 2012).  The most current work on terrorist/extremist 
radicalization and recruitment in online environments is included to review the key 
factors/methods that are used promote radicalization (Weimann, 2008; Hoffman, 
2006b; Caren,et al. 2012 ).  These would include the development of a consistent 
group narrative that incorporates a message of victimization and an us-versus-them 
dynamic that pits the members of the group in an ongoing battle against ‘the other’.  
Next, the literature related to the influence of new media toward the promotion of 
extremist movements will be examined (Conway & McInerney, 2008; Bartlett & 
Littler, 2011; Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Breuer, 2012; Goodwin, 2013).  This is 
followed by an examination of literature associated with the use of social media and 
other CMC by far-right extremists like Stormfront (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Caren, et 
al., 2012).   Finally, the literature on the EDL will be examined to consider if/how the 
subject of CMC participation is addressed within these studies and why understanding 
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the characteristics of social media and CMC within extreme environments is 
important. 
Chapter Two is the examination of the methodological approach that was used to 
perform the online research, the details of the collection and coding processes 
including the development of specialized software for the coding of Facebook page 
captures that was instrumental in compiling the data set that was used for analysis.  
Integral to this chapter is an explanation of the early trials and tribulations of 
collecting online content, efforts to automate the collection and coding process, the 
ramification of collecting and storing user information/data that is identification 
sensitive, and the considerable efforts that were undertaken to ensure the security of 
the collection effort and the dataset, and how to mitigate these issues.  Finally, the 
analytical framework is discussed as it relates to the previous theoretical discussion.  
Included is an extensive examination of the development and use of specialized 
software that was used to segregate the EDL Facebook collection into usable 
variables.  Additionally, the variables selected and their usefulness to the analytic 
process are presented.   
This chapter is also a journey through the interesting ethical issues that were 
encountered as a result of doing online collection.  Some of the areas that are 
addressed include the determination of the information to be collected as private or 
public access, the issue of engaging in passive covert observation while collecting 
Facebook traffic without informed consent, and insuring compliance with the UK 
Data Protection Act.  
Chapter Three provides an examination of the rise of the English Defence League 
and the role social media played in these efforts.  Additionally, this chapter examines 
the birth and growth of the EDL, reviews the leadership and organizational structure, 
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and provides an on the ground view of this group, its message, and how the UK 
government and law enforcement have had trouble dealing with a growing anti-
immigration/anti-Muslim movement that seemed to be gaining mass appeal.  It will 
also chronicle pivotal events that had significant positive and negative impacts on the 
English Defence League and its members.  Also included in this chapter is an 
accounting of the field work that was conducted on 5 February 2011.  This fieldwork 
proved invaluable to understanding the real world impact of the virtual phenomenon 
that was being studied.  This narrative is useful in understanding much of the activity 
that takes place online and how much of that online content is targeted toward 
promoting the offline activities of the group as pre-demonstration mobilization and 
post demonstration propaganda.  
Chapter Four examines the impact of offline and online events on the English 
Defence League.  Central to this exploration is the analysis of a collection of news 
stories obtained through LexisNexus to consider the characterization of the EDL by 
traditional media, how the pattern of these new stories correlates with the EDL key 
events and/or demonstrations, and the effect of pivotal events on the news cycle.  
Some of the key events examined include the attack in Norway by Anders Breivik, 
who claimed to have an affiliation with the EDL; the hacking of the EDL Facebook 
page; and the murder of Lee Rigby.  Each of these events had a different but 
significant impact on the group and their Facebook page/traffic.  This chapter also 
includes a narrative from a second field observation; the 3 September 2011 EDL 
Demonstration in Tower Hamlets.  Finally, this chapter returns to the Lexis/Nexus 
collection to examine the use of key words and phrases that are used by traditional 
media in their effort to characterize the EDL as a far-right, anti-Muslim extremist 
group. 
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Chapter Five builds on the findings in the previous chapter regarding the 
characterization of the EDL by traditional media by examining the rhetoric of the 
EDL membership, as espoused within the group’s mission statement, and comparing 
this to the reality of the comments made within the EDL Facebook page.  Using 
NVivo to perform key word searches of the Facebook collection it was possible to 
obtain a sampling of comments related to various issues including Muslims, Islam, the 
Mosque, and other terms associated with the group and their public and private 
narrative.  The results of this exploration offer considerable clarity when one 
considers how/if the human rights-democratic-inclusive values rhetoric of the EDL 
leadership is reflected in the comments made by the online members. 
Chapter Six covers the findings from the analysis that was performed on the data 
set developed from the page captures of the EDL’s Facebook page.  That these 
findings represent the first of its kind analysis of this type of online traffic cannot be 
overlooked.  The analysis of the Facebook traffic during the collection period 
provided an understanding of various phenomena that have proven invaluable.  
Included within the findings are an analysis of the traffic patterns as it relates to 
administrator and member posts; the relationship between the various categories of 
administrator posts and the traffic that was generated by those posts; an understanding 
of the impact of the Uniform Resource Locator links contained within the 
administrator posts and the member secondary posts;  the development of the online 
narrative by the English Defence League as presented by its Facebook administrators; 
the use of this social media outlet to create the us-versus-them dynamic that is known 
to be common in facilitating terrorist/extremist recruitment; an examination of the key 
words and phrases by members that provides an indicator of acceptance and/or 
identification with the group narrative; and, most importantly, an analysis of the 
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actual traffic by the members, during the study period, to determine the real level of 
participation by the membership.  This chapter will also include an examination of a 
second EDL dataset that was collected due to the original EDL Facebook page being 
corrupted by a hacking group.  This post hack data offers some insight into the impact 
of the hack on the page as well as those who participate on the EDL’s Facebook page. 
Chapter Seven will discuss the importance of the findings of this project as they 
relate to the understanding of the online phenomenon within extreme environments, 
summarize those findings, and examine an additional case to support the findings 
within this analysis that can also be applied outside extreme environments.  This will 
include a brief examination of additional data, collected while this work was ongoing, 
from the Occupy Wall Street Movement from August to November of 2011.  The 
initial findings from these groups help to understand that what is seen within this 
investigation is not an isolated incident.  Additionally, there will be further discussion 
on the role of traditional mass media as it relates to the formation and promotion of 
online movements.  
Additionally, suggestions for future research in the area of social media and mass 
movements is discussed within this chapter, including a discussion of the importance 
of the interdisciplinary approach that was used during this project, and the importance 
of seeking out and embracing the skills of other researchers and practitioners toward 
providing a more in-depth understanding than might otherwise be possible.  While 
traditional political scientists and social science scholars have a long history of 
research and literature to draw from, the development of new media and computer 
mediated communication provides the opportunity for social science researchers to 
partner with computer scientists in the development of previously unknown tools and 
methodologies to explore the importance of this new phenomenon in exciting ways.  
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This research is truly a testament to what is possible when such an approach is 
embraced. 
The Research Question(s) 
As this project was unarguably a venture into somewhat uncharted territory, with 
no social media theory to test against, it began with a desire to answer several 
research questions that then evolved over the life of the project and drove this 
research; questions to which answers were being sought throughout the design, 
collection, and analytical phases of this research.  By utilizing a bottom up, otherwise 
known as inductive approach, it was possible to ask open ended questions, explore 
various avenues, and seek meaning from the data that was collected toward providing 
a narrative based analysis that would help move this burgeoning field forward in the 
development of theory as it pertains to the impact/role of social media in extremism.  
By its nature, this type of research offers no causality as to the impact or effectiveness 
of the EDL’s use of social media, but provides considerable insight into the 
characteristics of this online activity and the true nature of participation within this 
environment.  As this research was being conducted into a new organization and its 
use of new technology, there were many unknown aspects as they related to the 
research topic.  While there was adjacent theory (for example, social movement 
theory) there was a relatively small body of scholarly and policy work that spoke 
directly to this project.  In one area, gaining authorization to conduct online research 
that might include material considered illegal under the Terrorism Acts, this project 
was on the forefront of helping establish policy (see Appendix 3).   
Primarily, the big question was and continues to be, “What are the characteristics 
of the online communications of the English Defence League, and how do they 
compare to what has previously been speculated regarding online participation in 
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extremist social media environments and CMC?”  Answering this, and many other 
questions that will be discussed following, required focusing on the exploratory 
process to build a solid foundation from which to construct the qualitative analysis 
and, while driven by data, the resultant narrative findings.  Although the project was 
inductive and findings-led, it operated according to social science strictures in the 
sense of having a firm research question and being bound by a code of research ethics.  
First, and not inconsequential, was determining whether this type of investigation 
would be feasible.  Obtaining approval for this research project from the University 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC), as well as overcoming the legal 
and ethical challenges that were associated with this research required considerable 
effort.  Primary among these considerations was the need to ensure the anonymity of 
the users within the study.  Once it was determined that this project would be allowed 
to move forward, the question quickly shifted from ‘can’ to ‘how’.  Following 
UTREC approval, the second question was related to whether it would be possible to 
collect this online content in such a manner as to facilitate coding and analysis.  Once 
a target group was determined, and this issue was addressed through the establishment 
of a methodology for the collection of the Facebook traffic of the EDL, the question 
changed once again.   
Faced with the vast amount of traffic that was acquired during the collection 
period, the challenge to be addressed at this point was the coding of the collection into 
a viable data set.  While this would have traditionally been done using manual 
methods of data input, the question arose as to the possibility of developing software 
that could identify the key variables within the electronic collection and code them in 
such a way as to facilitate a statistical analysis of the online phenomenon.  That this 
effort was successful has far reaching implications for the ability of future researchers 
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to engage in the investigation of social media generally, and extremist activity in 
online social networks specifically. 
With a viable data set, the research questions now turned to acquiring a basic 
understanding of the phenomenon with the purpose of providing a foundation that can 
be built upon in future efforts.  As will be discussed later, one of the issues with big 
data is the inability to seek causality as a result of the size and messiness of the data.  
But, what is possible with big data is developing an understanding of the relationships 
that exist within the data.  For this project, these relationships proved to be 
enlightening.  The analysis of the EDL Facebook traffic provided answers to 
questions pertaining to the traffic patterns of the group and how this traffic related to 
various forms of administrator driven communications; what impact the links 
contained within the posts have on the traffic generation and whether certain 
administrator driven content precipitated larger responses than other content; how the 
group narrative, as expressed by the administrator, is reflected in the comments of the 
members; and likely the most important question to be asked and answered dealt with 
the characteristics of individual participation within the group and how that was 
reflected in not just simple quantities of participation but with the assimilation of the 
group narrative by different groups of users based upon participation rates.  This last 
question, on its own, offers more insight into the use of social media than has been 
provided to date in any literature or other research dealing with online social 
movements including extremist movements that utilize social media.   
Undertaking the task of investigating the Facebook traffic of the English Defence 
League, as a function of the nature of the medium used and the group being studied, 
began with a set of questions that had to be addressed before the quantitative analysis 
that became the final product could be considered.  As discussed above, there were 
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multiple areas of inquiry that became a part of this project that are each deserving of 
mention and coverage as a part of this study.  These include the question of whether 
the collection of the Facebook activity from the EDL Facebook page would be 
allowed; questions of ethics and legality; and the decision to engage with computer 
science experts to investigate solutions to these problems.  In addition to resolving the 
issues related to the online collection, there was the decision to perform on-the-
ground field work to put a real world face on what had, until that point, been simply a 
virtual phenomenon.  Observing and recording this real world activism provided 
insights that would not have been available otherwise.  These experiences and how 
they relate to the online phenomenon are important to understanding the findings from 
the analysis of the data collection and are very important in understanding the need 
for social media intelligence capabilities. 
Finally, the analysis of the collection data was performed in a manner so as to 
provide understanding rather than seek causality.  With the vast amount of 
information that was collected on so many users, seeking to establish causality would 
likely have proven fruitless.  Instead, the analysis that was performed sought to 
answer some very important questions regarding the characteristics of the social 
media phenomenon that is such a large part of the EDL movement.  Some of areas of 
inquiry included: 
1. Measuring the traffic patterns between the group administrators and the  
 members. 
2. Identifying the various types of messaging used by the EDL in their  
 communications.  Are there themes within the collection and if so how do  
 these various themes serve to drive user comments? 
3. Understanding the various messaging that was used by the EDL and the appeal  
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of this messaging to the users as reflected in the measure of their responses.  
How is this messaging expressed within the comments of the users, and do the 
expressions of the users coincide with the lofty rhetoric of the EDL leadership 
as it relates to human rights, democratic, and inclusive values?   
4. Examining the use of links to outside information provided through the 
Facebook page.  This includes links to YouTube videos, news articles, and 
other content.  Do these links figure prominently in the collection?  Further, do 
the administrator posts that contain links garner significantly more traffic than 
those without? And finally, do certain root links (YouTube, Facebook, etc.) 
appear more frequently than others? 
5. Examining, through content analysis, the primary words that are used by the 
group administrator and how this messaging translates into usage of these 
words by the members. Does the administrator messaging influence users 
equally or is there a concentration of usage among different bodies of users? 
6. Understanding the relationship between membership on the EDL Facebook 
page and actual participation in the online dialogue. Do all members 
participate in the online dialog or does the participation rate suffer from 
disinterest as suggested by Morozov (2011)? 
7. Measuring the patterns of participation among the various users.  Is the user 
traffic evenly distributed or is the majority of the traffic attributable to a small 
minority of power users (McCorkindale, 2012)? 
It is important to note that the processes that were employed during this research, 
particularly as they relate to the collection and coding of the data were, at the time, 
considered by some to be on the cutting edge.  Since 2011-12, new application 
programming interfaces (API’s) have been developed to facilitate more substantive 
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research in social media and other CMC than was commercially available at the time.  
Even so, the detail of this collection is still beyond what is possible using the current 
Facebook API.   Certainly, the results from these research efforts provide an 
understanding of online activism and the use of social media by groups seeking to 
engage in activism that was previously unavailable in published literature.  The 
primary goal of this research was to move toward a more statistical understanding of 
social media engagement and as such it is hoped that the findings contained herein 
will not only inform those interested in investigating the characteristics of computer 
mediated communications, particularly related to extremism or terrorism, and 
reinforce the notion that the reward in acquired new skills and knowledge is well 
worth the extra effort. 
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Chapter One: A Review of Literature Associated with the English Defence 
League, Online Extremism, and the Impact of Social Media 
When considering a literature review it was necessary to include several 
perspectives that impacted this research.  First, was to understand the nature of the 
English Defence League and how they perceive themselves as a movement and more 
importantly how they are categorized within the broader literature.  Key to this 
examination was gaining a clearer picture of the EDL as a right-wing or far-right 
extremist group.  As the thrust of this research was the examination of the online  
activity of the EDL on Facebook, it was also important to examine the various aspects 
related to online activism, online extremism, and the literature that addresses the use 
of social media by the EDL.   
  As will be discussed herein, the internet and social media have arguably changed 
the way terrorists/extremists communicate, disseminate their ideology, and seek to 
recruit and mobilize members; and academics continue to seek to understand this new 
phenomenon (Alterman, 2011; Diani, 2000; Wojcieszak 2009; Harlow & Harp 2012; 
Ackland & O’Neil 2011; Spier, 2011; Margetts et al., 2013; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002; 
Conway, 2012; Bowman-Grieve & Conway, 2012, Weimann, 2011; Klausen et al., 
2012).  What is unclear is the total impact of this new media, and whether the use of 
the internet and social media has resulted in increased effectiveness and participation 
in violent extremism or other extremist activity.  The rise of the EDL and their use of 
social media provides an opportunity to consider the impact of their use of social 
media and how the participation by the “members” might help answer other questions 
about the group and the way they communicate, particularly as it relates to the issues 
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the EDL considers important; how they define themselves; and how what they say 
provides illumination as to their true motive. 
The EDL as Extremists 
One of the more interesting questions when looking at the English Defence 
League is trying to decide what they are.  Are they a social movement, a political 
movement, a hate group, right wing extremists, a mash of more than one of these, or 
something else entirely?  The English Defence League suggests that they be viewed 
as a human rights movement, seeking to be the ‘protectors of Britishness’ in the 
United Kingdom.  And while the rhetoric of the EDL suggests they seek to be a 
benign force within UK society, a closer look at their motives and actions provides 
ample evidence to support classifying the EDL as a group that holds very extreme 
views.   The growth of the EDL and the milieu out of which they arose will be 
covered extensively in Chapter Three, but this section will focus on whether or not the 
EDL should be considered a right wing extremist group (RWE).   
The EDL Mission 
The following statement appeared on the EDL Facebook page in February 2011 : 
EDL MISSION STATEMENT 
(1) HUMAN RIGHTS: Protecting And Promoting Human Rights 
The English Defence League (EDL) is a human rights organisation 
that exists to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest 
against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non Muslims. It 
also recognises that Muslims themselves are frequently the main 
victims of some Islamic traditions and practices. The Government 
should ensure the individual human rights of members of the Muslim 
community to openly criticise Islamic orthodoxy, to challenge Islamic 
community leaders without fear of retribution, to receive full equality 
before the law (including equal rights for Muslim women), and to leave 
Islam if they see fit and to do so without fear or censure. Muslims have 
the right to demand reform of their religion to make it more relevant to 
the needs of the modern world, including the need to fully respect other 
groups in society without fear of retribution. It calls upon the 
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Government to repeal legislation that prevents effective freedom of 
speech that is essential if the human rights abuses that sometimes 
manifest themselves around Islam are to be stopped. 
The EDL believes that radical Islam has a stranglehold on British 
Muslims. It keeps them fearful and isolated, especially the women that 
it encases in the Burqa. It misrepresents their views, stifles freedom of 
expression, and radicalises their children, whilst continually doing a 
discredit to those who do wish to peacefully co-exist with their fellow 
Britons. 
(2) DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: Promoting Democracy 
And The Rule Of Law By Opposing Sharia 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that “sharia is 
incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy”. We have 
seen in recent years a great deal of accommodation with sharia norms 
based on the premise that sharia rules can be simply attached to our 
existing traditions and customs. In reality sharia is an alternative to 
our legal, political, and social systems. Encouragement of halal food, 
Islamic courts, and the demand to respect Islam are all aspects of 
sharia designed to undermine our established way of life on the road to 
the crystalisation of the full sharia alternative. Sharia law makes a 
fundamental distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and the 
EDL will never allow this sort of iniquitous apartheid system to take 
root in our country. The EDL will therefore oppose sharia 
appeasement in all its forms. 
(3) PUBLIC EDUCATION: Ensuring That The Public Get A Balanced 
Picture Of Islam 
A central part of the EDL’s mission is public education. The British 
political and media establishment have, for a long time, being 
presenting a very sanitised and therefore inaccurate view of Islam 
shaped by the needs of policy makers rather than the needs of the 
public. This has acted as a barrier to informed policy making and 
made the solution of real problems impossible. In pursuing this self 
defeating and destructive policy, the Government has effectively been 
acting as the propaganda arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The EDL is committed to a campaign of public education to ensure 
that all aspects of Islam that impact on our society are brought into the 
open so that they can be debated in an open and honest way. It 
believes that only by looking at all the facts can society be most 
effectively and humanly governed. If there are aspects of Muslim 
tradition that encourage the activities of Islamic radicals and 
criminals then these need to be properly addressed without fear of 
accusations of racism or xenophobia. The public must have a more 
balanced and less sanitised view of Islam that allows it to ensure that 
decision makers are held to account for their policy making choices, 
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choices that affect the harmony and security of the nation. 
The EDL promotes the understanding of Islam and the implications for 
non Muslims forced to live alongside it. Islam is not just a religious 
system but a political and social ideology that seeks to dominate all 
non-believers and impose a harsh legal system that and rejects the 
democratic process. It runs counter to all that we hold dear within our 
British liberal, democracy. 
(4) RESPECTING TRADITION: Promoting The Traditions And 
Culture Of England While At The Same Time Being Open To Embrace 
The Best That Other Cultures Can Offer 
The EDL believes that English Culture has the right to exist and 
prosper in England. It recognises that culture is not static and that 
over time natural change takes place and other cultures make 
contributions that make our culture stronger and more vibrant. 
However, this does not give license to policy makers to deliberately 
undermine our culture and impose non-English cultures on the English 
people in their own land. If people migrate to this country then they 
should be expected to respect our culture, its laws, and traditions and 
not expect their own cultures to be promoted by agencies of the state. 
The best of their cultures will be absorbed naturally and we will all be 
united by the enhanced culture that results. 
The EDL is therefore keen to draw its support from all races, all faiths, 
all political and lifestyle persuasions. Under its umbrella all people in 
England, whatever their background, or origin can stand united in a 
desire to stop the imposition of the rules of Islam on non believers. In 
order to ensure the continuity of our culture and its institutions, the 
EDL stands opposed to the creeping Islamisation of our country 
because that presents itself as an undemocratic alternative to our 
cherished way of life. 
Our armed forces stand up and risk their lives every day in order to 
protect our culture and democratic way of life. They, also, are 
inclusive of all England’s diversity and are a shining example of what 
a people can achieve in unity. The EDL is therefore committed to 
opposing any and all abuse that our men and women in uniform are 
subjected to and will campaign for legal remedies to ensure that those 
working within these important institutions are not exposed to abuse or 
aggression from within our country. 
(5) INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK: Working In Solidarity With Others 
Around The World 
The EDL is keen to join with others who share its values, wherever 
they are in the world, and from whatever cultural background they 
derive. It believes that the demand for sharia is global and therefore 
needs to tackled at a global as well as national level this demand is 
never realised. The EDL will therefore have an international outlook 
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to enhance and strengthen its domestic efforts. (EDL Facebook 
information, accessed 31 January 2011) 
While the EDL views itself as a humanitarian, pro-democracy movement that 
seeks to promote the rule of law, a more balanced education where it pertains to 
Muslim extremism, English culture, and a global outlook to combat the growth of 
sharia law; this rhetoric contrasts sharply with the actions and statements of the 
members and leaders, as will be documented within this research, and more 
importantly by academics who have sought to provide understanding about the EDL, 
their motivations, and the potential influence they might have on the broader socio-
political environment in the UK (Allen, 2010; Jackson, 2011; Richards, 2013; Busher, 
2013; Alessio & Meredith, 2014; Goodwin, 2013; Bartlett & Littler, 2011Meleagrou-
Hitchens & Brun, 2013).  Key to this discussion is the characterization of the English 
Defence League, by the media and elements within the UK government, as a far right 
extremist group.  While this messaging has been consistent, and will be discussed in 
Chapter Four, the academic literature on the EDL is less definitive in its assessment.   
The External Perception of the EDL 
From the early days of its formation, and as will be covered in detail in Chapter 
Four, the EDL has been publically characterized as “facists”, “right-wing thugs”, 
“hooligans”, “neo-Nazi’s”, and “Islamaphobic”.  While the leadership of the EDL 
sought to combat these characterizations, the media persisted and often the statements 
and actions of EDL members supported such an image.  While the EDL claimed to be 
a peaceful movement, there were numerous instances of violence associated with 
EDL meetings and demonstrations (Jackson, 2011).  Reports of targeted attacks on 
minorities and immigrants followed most significant EDL events, and vandalism to 
Mosques and Islamic schools/study centers were also highlighted.  Early media 
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images captured EDL members raising their arms in the Nazi salute (Booth, Taylor, & 
Lewis, 2009).   These images became so alarming that the EDL leadership went on 
Facebook to condemn the action and insist that members refrain from such expression 
in the future and engage in what has become an active campaign to distance 
themselves from those movements that were seen as representing the extreme far-
right (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013; Jackson, 2011).  Further, in interviews for 
newspaper and on television, the EDL leadership had to spend a considerable amount 
of time explaining why they weren’t right wing thugs, neo-Nazis’s, or an extension of 
the British Nationalist Party (Jackson, 2011; Alessio & Meredith, 2014; Richards, 
2013).  Even with all of the protestations from the EDL leadership, the British 
media’s portrayal of the EDL as being a far right extremist group resonated with the 
much of the public and is exemplified in the following segment: 
“ The English Defence League, which started in Luton last year, has become 
the most significant far-right street movement in the UK since the National 
Front in the 1970s. A Guardian investigation has identified a number of 
known rightwing extremists who are taking an interest in the movement – 
from convicted football hooligans to members of violent rightwing splinter 
groups” (Taylor, 2010). 
The UK government has certainly come to see the EDL as a threat and has 
indicated they feel they are in fact a right wing extremist group (Solomos, 2013).  
Prime Minister David Cameron commented on the EDL during Parliament on 11 
August 2011: 
“The hon. Gentleman speaks not only for his constituents, but, frankly, for the 
whole House in deprecating the English Defence League and all it stands for. 
On its attempt to say that it will somehow help to restore order, I have 
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described some parts of our society as sick, and there is none sicker than the 
EDL” 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110811/de
btext/110811-0001.htm#1108117000958).    
In November 2013, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom hosted the 
Symposium on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism.  During this event, 
which was conducted under Chatham House Rules, an entire panel dealt with the 
issue of right wing extremism (RWE) particularly in the UK.  Portions of this research 
dealing with the EDL and their use of Facebook was presented as a part of the 
programme.  What was clear from the panel presentations was that the researchers and 
the government viewed the EDL and similar groups as right-wing extremists and 
represented a threat to stability as it related to the Muslim diaspora population in the 
UK 
1
.  This characterization is reinforced in the print media coverage of the EDL 
which is discussed in Chapter Four herein. 
Interestingly, academic work that examines the EDL provides a more objective, 
accurate, and substantive characterization of the group.  The focus of much of this 
work is on the stated mission or nature of the group, how their actions and the 
statements of their members differ from this preferred perception, and whether the 
EDL actually qualifies as being viewed as a right wing extremist group, are they what 
some have come to describe as a member of a counter jihadi movement, or even part 
of a “new far right”  (Jackson,  2011; Alessio & Meredith, 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens 
& Brun, 2013).   
                                                 
1
 2013 Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Symposium, Shrivenham, UK.  As this event 
was held under Chatham House rules, specific attribution is not possible.   
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Defining the EDL 
When considering the disposition of the EDL, some look first to their connection, 
through its leadership with the “traditional reactionary right-wing groups such as the 
British National Party (BNP) (Treadwell & Garland , 2011, p. 623).  Alessia and 
Meredith (2013) consider this pedigree to be reinforced by the fact that the EDL is 
supported by “current and former members of other UK extreme right groups 
including the BNP, the National Front, the Racial Volunteer Force, Blood and 
Honour, and Combat 18” (p. 116).  As such, they consider the EDL as part of a 
growing tradition of far-right extremism in the UK “with fascist or quasi-fascist 
tendencies and traits” (Alessio & Meredith, 2013, p.116).  Further, they suggest that 
the self- proclamations of the member should be viewed with extreme caution and 
more importance be given to the actions and practices of the members which “lend 
themselves to a more coherently fascist ideology” (p.110).   
Goodwin (2012), however, posits that the EDL are not overtly racist but are 
instead xenophobic.  He states that their “immigration-related concerns should not be 
dismissed as crude racism” (p. 10).  He points out that in his survey of EDL members 
58% agreed that non-white citizens were just as British as whites and that few of the 
respondents expressed sentiments of racial superiority (p.10).  However, other 
findings support his xenophobic characterization.  When compared to the findings 
from the general survey, EDL respondents scored higher in several areas that provide 
insight into such a determination.  First, he found that 84% of EDL supporters 
expected relations between different societal groups to worsen while only 54% of the 
full sample held these views.  Further, 79% of the EDL supporters felt there would be 
a clash between Muslim and white British citizens compared to 49% of the full 
sample.  Finally, 72% said that it was inevitable that there would be violence between 
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the two groups while only 46% of the full sample shared this outlook (Goodwin, 
2012, p.11).  Goodwin (2012) goes on to state that “the seeds of support for counter-
jihad groups such as the defence leagues lie among the citizens’ profound concern 
over immigration, ethnic minorities and their impact on the native group and nation.  
They feel intensely anxious about these issues and about the future direction of 
society, and are profoundly pessimistic” (p.14).  
Bartlett and Littler (2011) agree that the EDL cannot be viewed one-
dimensionally and that “the group is probably best described as a populist movement 
that contains some extreme right-wing and sometimes Islamaphobic elements” (p. 7).  
This is supported by the findings of their survey where 41% of the EDL members 
indicated the reason they joined was to oppose Islam. While some of these 
respondents “directed at all Muslims, others made more nuanced criticisms, 
condemning ‘political Islam’ and Muslim extremists” (Bartlett & Littler, 2012, p.27).  
Following this 31% of the respondents indicated their joining the EDL was linked to 
identity.  Within this group of respondents they referred to their love of England and 
“commitment to preserving traditional national and cultural values, and belief in 
representing the interests on ‘real’ countrymen” (p.27).  Allen (2010) also noted how 
the EDL talked about “Muslims ‘spreading’ across ‘our country’ whilst referring to 
the ‘patriotic people’ of the English nation being besieged and overwhelmed” (p. 
228). Although he does go on to include the EDL with the BNP, Allen (2010) points 
out that, as for the far right, whilst they continue to play upon the embedded sense of 
fear to create, speculate, and exaggerate about the threat of Muslims and Islam, it will 
be the future direction that will be interesting, not least because of the relative 
nullification of the BNP compared to the rapid growth of the EDL” (p. 223).    
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Busher (2012) considers the concept of a culturally defined nationalism as an 
impetus for activists to engage and articulate “exclusivist group boundaries” that do 
not “carry with them the kind of public sentiment associated with traditional far right 
discourses of race” (p.8).  By appealing to the perceived threat posed by Muslims and 
Islam, coupled with their separating themselves from the “Muslim threat” by referring 
to themselves ‘patriots’ and ‘infidels’, the EDL activists have tapped into “a pervasive 
and social discourse about a “clash of civilizations” and the threat posed by (militant) 
Islam to Western national cultures” (Busher, 2012, p.12).  But absent the overt racism 
or perceptions of racial supremacy that is associated with the far-right, can the EDL 
be legitimately viewed as a far-right extremist group? 
It is clear that by disassociating itself from known far-right entities, condemning 
neo-Nazi and other openly fascist ‘extreme right wing’ groups (Jackson, 2011; Allen, 
2010; Goodwin, 2013), the EDL has sought to be viewed as a ‘new far right’ populist 
group “that genuinely wants to distance itself from a legacy of neo-Nazi extremism” 
(Jackson, 2011, p.8).  Jackson (2011) points out that the ‘new far right’ movement is 
different from the traditional far right in that it does not engage in illegal activity; 
promote anti-Semitism or other neo-Nazi themes.  The ‘new far right’ then can be 
seen as a movement that “combines ultra-patriotism with a tendency to present 
mainstream politics as in a critical state of decay and disorder – themes commonly 
found in the EDL’s materials” (Jackson, 2011, p. 8).  But how different is the message 
of the new far right from those of the traditional far right?  The replacement of anti-
Semitism and anti-Afro Caribbean prejudice with “nativist” or culturally racist views 
toward Muslims seems merely a shift in target, not an overall change in thinking. 
The creation of an ultra-patriotic national identity against which the cultural and 
religious aspects of Muslims and Islam are viewed as the “alien other” provides an 
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avenue for the new far right to “define a clear, patriotic sense of ‘our way of life’ and 
evokes a sense of a safe ‘us’ and a dangerous ‘them’” (Jackson, 2011, p. 9).  Some of 
the ways this manifests itself within the messaging of the EDL includes issues related 
to new Mosque construction or Mosque expansion, the introduction of halal practices 
in local restaurants and schools, the rape and “sex grooming” of non-Muslim 
girls/women (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013, p.63).  While these issues will be 
covered in more depth in later chapters they provide a glimpse into how the EDL 
seeks to characterize the broader Muslim community as having a fixed set of cultural 
and religious values that are “diametrically opposed to those of the national 
community, as well as being inferior and dangerous (Jackson, 2011, p.9).  Jackson 
(2011) goes on to point out that the Koran is often at the center of these arguments 
whereby adherence to the Koran, which is a tenet of Islam but viewed by the new far 
right as “the antithesis of European values”, places the Muslim in a paradigm where 
they must either reject the Koran or by default they are rejecting the west (p. 9).  As 
such, the EDL’s ‘new far right’ ideology is rooted in this ultra-patriotic sense of 
nationalism, where Islam is the target and essentially all Muslims are viewed as the 
dangerous ‘other’.  From this perspective, the thin veil of humanitarianism and 
democratic values that the EDL seeks to hide behind is pierced and they are found to 
be not dissimilar from the traditional far-right groups in their ideology, the only 
difference being the target of their animus. 
A recent paper published by The International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalization and Political Violence, authored by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens 
and Hans Brun (2013) examines the EDL within the broader context of what they see 
as Europe’s Counter-Jihad Movement (ECJM).  In their view the EDL is part of an 
“identifiable pan-European far-right movement that has emerged since the late 
31 
2000’s” (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Bruns, 2013, p. 1).   Central to this movement is the 
idea of a cultural nationalism that seeks to ensure the survival of ‘European culture’.  
Drawing on much of the literature cited previously herein, and acknowledging the 
difficulty in categorizing a group such as the EDL and even the broader counter-Jihad 
movement that espouses a position of democratic and liberal enlightenment, their 
report shows that the “ECJM’s cultural nationalism does indeed manifest itself as a 
form of far-right extremism in its portrayal of Muslims as a threat to European 
culture, an “enemy within”, and in its proposed, highly illiberal response to this 
perceived threat” (p. 1).  Importantly, the EDL is viewed as the original root of this 
new European counter-jihad movement that has spread across the continent in the 
formation of national defence leagues in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, France, 
and even outside Europe to Australia and the United States.  Their assessment is the 
EDL and the ECJM is “without a doubt” a far right movement that is growing 
throughout Europe.  They also feel that casting this movement as an extreme form of 
cultural nationalism provides a clearer perspective and “helps to accurately place 
groups like the EDL within the ranks of Europe’s far-right” (Meleagrou-Hitchens & 
Bruns, 2013, p. 67).   
While the literature lacks consensus on whether the EDL is a part of the far right, 
the new far right, a Muslim hate group or a ultra-nationalist movement, one thing 
most of the authors agreed on was that the EDL represented a threat to civil society 
and should be studied and taken seriously (Allen, 2010; Richards, 2013; Alessio & 
Meredith, 2014; Busher, 2012; Busher 2013; Jackson 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens & 
Brun 2013).  Several also agree that the EDL has used the internet, social media, and 
more specifically Facebook to its advantage in disseminating its message, mobilizing 
its members to engage in demonstrations, and promote the position that the growth of 
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the online membership is representative of broader support within British society 
(Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013; Jackson, 2011; Allen, 2011; Bartlett & Littler, 
2011).  While the EDL has taken advantage of the low cost and high visibility of 
various internet and social media to build its membership numbers into what is seen 
as a large virtual army, what is less clear from the literature is just how much impact 
the online activity of the EDL has on the membership and their willingness to engage 
beyond that of being keyboard warriors.  The collection, segregation, and analysis of 
the Facebook traffic of the EDL will provide some answers to this central research 
question. 
Extremism in the Age of the Internet 
One of the most significant changes to the communication capabilities of various 
terrorist and other violent extremist movements has been the cost savings and the 
ability to disseminate information more broadly via the internet (Shirky, 2008, p. 157; 
Boyle & Schmierbach, 2009, p. 5; Morozov, 2011, p. 189; McGrath, 2011, ; McGrath 
et al., 2012, p. 241).  Moving from emails to blogs to social media, groups engaged in 
extremist action have embraced these new technologies to recruit and mobilize large 
groups of people to their cause.  Now groups can overcome the impediments to mass 
communication, and engage in what can be viewed as one-to-many and many-to-
many communications (Shirky, 2008, p. 87).  It is, however, important to note that 
this change in communication technology is part of a broader societal change and not 
unique to the far-right and their use of the internet.  Earl and Kimport ( 2011) argue 
that “actions that are, in our terminology, ‘more virtual’ better leverage the cost 
affordance for participants because these actions usually require the least time and 
effort to complete” (p. 77).  But has this ability to communicate more effectively and 
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at almost no cost actually increased the effectiveness of these groups?  This is one of 
the primary inquiries of this thesis. 
Fortunately, there is a growing body of literature that seeks examine this question.  
Much of the quantitative work in this area involves using computational studies to test 
behavioural models related to social media, CMC, and social movements offering 
algorithmic models for cyber movements (Agarwal et al., 2011, p. 236; Effing et al., 
2011).  Studies to consider the impact of social media and other CMC have sought to 
test various theories but provide varied outcomes.  Janssen (2011) examined the 
process of “nudging” users to engage by establishing a behavioural model/simulation 
to determine who would be the most susceptible to influence.    While the simulation 
provided “some initial results to catalyze action in social networks” it was revealed 
that the researcher made “simplistic assumptions about the underlying distribution of 
the attributes of the agents” (Janssen, 2011, p. 8).  Janssen went on to acknowledge 
that performing these tests in large artificial networks brings to light the challenge of 
testing this model on empirical data (Janssen, 2011, p.8).   
It appears that in reality, most groups that seek to utilize social media and other 
CMC as their primary source of communication for recruitment and mobilization fail 
(Margetts et al., 2013, p. 1; Morozov, 2011, p. 194).  Margetts et al., (2013) examined 
movements that sought to utilize social media and how the thresholds for joining 
might determine the success or failure of the movement.  In their examination of the 
petition drives in the UK, they found; 
“The collection of transactional data from 8,000 electronic petitions to the UK 
government shows that 95 per cent fail to attain even the 500 signatures 
necessary for an official response, a modest criterion for success.  Use of the 
internet for collective action increases the ratio of unsuccessful to successful 
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collection initiatives.  Low start-up costs mean that mobilization that in offline 
environments would have failed to get off the ground may achieve some sort of 
presence, but quickly wither away” (Margetts, et al., 2013, p. 1-2).   
While this study sought to understand the personality traits and social value 
orientations that might make one more likely to become a member of a group engaged 
in an online movement, and they were able to identify a ‘type’ of person that would 
be more likely to consistently engage in such activity, there was no real measurement 
of participation.  In this regard the question becomes whether membership has 
meaning? 
To consider the value of membership, Morozov (2011) and Spier (2011) cite the 
example of the popular Facebook cause, Saving the Children of Africa.  With over 1.7 
million members, the group seems very impressive, however when one considers that 
the total amount raised in this effort was approximately $12,000.00, this equals less 
than one one-hundredth of a penny (US) per person in donations (Morozov, 2011, p. 
190).  Budish (2013) provides the example of the Save Darfur Coalition Facebook 
group which achieved a membership of 1,282,339 members that, on average, donated 
only nine cents each to the cause (Budhish, 2013, p. 750-751).  Morozov goes on to 
question the value of this online phenomenon stating that “if psychologists are right 
and most people support political causes simply because it makes them feel happier, 
then it’s quite unfortunate that joining Facebook groups makes them as happy as 
writing letters to their elected representatives or organizing rallies without triggering 
any of the effects that might benefit society at large” (Morozov, 2011, p. 190).   If this 
is the case, how effective is this low cost mode of communication?  And if the cost of 
joining a group is so reduced due to the ease of simply clicking join, what do online 
social movements have to do to get their members to do any work?  Interestingly, the 
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answer to this question is the same for online as well as offline groups; the 
development of a collective/group. 
The Development of an Online Social/Group Identity 
It is easy, when considering the interactions of individuals within online groups, to 
discount them as harmless and “not real”.  But, the degree of reality one places on 
computer mediated communication is dependent upon the experiential view of the 
participant.  Thomas Ploug (2009) offers a rather complex theoretical analysis of this 
issue by examining several hypotheses of reality and trust in relation to 
communication between a participant and a virtual ‘patient.’  By questioning the 
notion of presence or proximity as a necessary requirement for the creation of moral 
agency, he offers that it is the “belief in the reality of a particular patient” that is 
central to extending moral concern to the other.  Additionally, in interactive situations 
like chat rooms, the moral requirements that the participant is faced with “will partly 
be constituted by the particularities of the person to whom they are directed (Ploug, 
2009, p. 195).”  These two concepts are essential to understanding the impact of 
extremist chat rooms on the individual participant.  If one accepts these premises, as 
an individual participates in computer mediated communication on extremist web site 
chat rooms, by the nature of their continued participation they begin to identify with 
and accept the ‘reality’ of the other and therefore will frame their interactions so as to 
conform to the moral guidelines that are considered acceptable within the group, even 
if this morality is one of hate or holy war.   
How is it that a medium that offers such an opportunity for anonymity can also 
facilitate the development of a social identity?  And how is it possible, given the 
radical views of terrorist and extremist groups, that individuals can come to identify 
with the other members within these computer mediated environments?  Addressing 
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these questions is the Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) 
(Douglas, 2007; Spears, Lee, & Postmes, 2007).  This model suggests that the 
anonymity afforded in computer mediated communications can actually “facilitate the 
enactment of social identity” (Douglas, 2007, p. 159).  In the context of online chat 
rooms, with closed or in-group audiences, the SIDE model proposes that 
‘identifiability’ can be facilitated as a result of engagement with like-minded 
individuals and can often lead to the “heightened expression of in-group normative 
views” (Douglas, 2007, p. 159).  The development of the group identity then reduces 
the persons awareness of the self (de-individuation), allowing them to suspend the 
regulation of their ‘actions’ so as to meet the obligations of participation in the group.  
This is supported by Cole (2012) when he states, “Continuous exposure to visual and 
auditory stimuli can cause a person to self-identify with an extremist group’s views.  
It can even provide the means by which individuals become indoctrinated supporters 
through financial donations, moral support or technical assistance.  It is possible that 
this process could lead an individual to become an evangelist or even a violent actor” 
(P.78). 
 Therefore the internet, while offering a vast array of ideas and a high degree of 
anonymity, actually allows people to self-select the groups they wish to engage with, 
socialize in, and begin the process of self-segregation that is key to identifying with 
the group.  Once this identification occurs, “the depersonalizing effects of anonymity 
are likely to lead to a range of group-related outcomes including heightened group 
salience, self-stereotyping in group terms, group cohesiveness, and conformity to 
group norms” (Spears et al., 2007, p. 58).   
In an examination of the online activities of the far right extremist group 
Stormfront (Caren,et al., 2012), the creation of a collective identity was an essential 
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part of this SMOC, or Social Movement Online Community (p. 68).  They point to the 
consistency of the online-offline white nationalist messaging:  “That they are 
“awakened” to the truth; that an objective analysis of the facts will show they are 
correct; use of jargon such as “sheeple” (for those whites who conform to dominate 
political ideology) and ZOG (“Zionist Occupied Government”)” (Caren, et. al., 2012, 
p. 179).  These ideas and others seek to create a distinct identity existing outside 
mainstream political views, which potentially “increase the collective identity of the 
members” (p. 188).  This virtual community is also a very important support structure 
for the user, often helping to compensate for the lack of critical mass in any 
geographic location (Simi & Futrell, 2010, p.97).  Geographically isolated, the 
participants within this virtual community have the opportunity to be part of a larger 
body of believers. 
Wojcieszak (2012) suggests that such a closed loop of identity creates “false 
consensus”, where continued engagement within an ideologically homogenous group 
will create the perception that the general public shares in their extremist views 
(P.529).  As online participation increases, extremism increases, “likely due to the 
informational and normative influences operating within the online groups” 
(Wojcieszak, 2012, p. 637).  These informational and normative influences encourage 
the individual to modify their opinions in alignment with the expectations and views 
of those within the group.  This effect is potentially enhanced by the anonymity of the 
interactions which can “minimize the differences among individuals and foster 
identification within a group, ultimately inciting polarization toward more extreme 
positions” (Wojcieszak, 2010, p. 641).  Within such an environment, informational 
influence can manifest in the acceptance of other’s arguments as being “valid 
evidence of reality” (p. 641), regardless of the merit of the content (Sobkowicz & 
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Sobkowicz, 2012). These anonymous/depersonalized online interactions, according to 
Wojcieszak (2010), “enhances argument recall and results in more positive argument 
evaluation” (p. 640).  This effect is enhanced when participants in the extremist online 
environment interact with friends, family, and acquaintances that hold differing views 
(p. 641).   
Enhancement of online group identity with in-groups can also be achieved 
through the practice of sanctioning anyone whose communications are considered at 
odds with the ‘ideology’ or purpose of the group.  While the anonymity afforded by 
online communication would seem to deemphasize the effect of online sanctioning, 
the de-individuation that occurs as a part of identification with the online group 
actually makes one more susceptible to the influences of the other participants thereby 
increasing the likelihood of compliance with group norms and attitudes (Sassenberg 
& Jonas, 2007, p. 283).  This is particularly true within terrorist/extremist chat rooms 
or social media groups where solidarity of thought is essential to maintaining 
ideological continuity and reinforcing group identity.  Visitors to these sites who 
express views not within the group norm are often chastised to conform to the 
ideological principles of the in-group with the threat of being ‘locked out’ from 
further interaction.  Research of compliance to group norms due to real or perceived 
threats of sanctions shows that “recipients of social pressure are quite likely to give in 
to the demands and express their identity on dimensions that most likely do not lead 
to sanctions” (Sassenberg & Jonas, 2007, p. 283).  But even with the pressure to 
conform, users do get sanctioned.  Caren, Jowers and Gaby (2012), in their research 
on Stormfront found that 6% of the 6,868,674 posts within the collection were no 
longer available for reasons that included being deleted by the forum administrator.  
They go on to suggest that these posts were likely deleted either due to “trolling” 
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activity (unwelcome/argumentative activity within the strings by non-members or 
posers), or users violating Stormfront’s ban on certain racial epithets or posts that 
promote violence (P.175).   
The Power of the Internet and Social Media 
The growth of, and the threat posed by extremist websites, forums, and chat rooms 
is reflected in the literature as it pertains to the spread of extremist ideology, and 
fundraising, as well as the communication of operational details, the use as a virtual 
library of terrorist training manuals that includes instructions for the manufacture of 
explosive devices, and more recently as a potential recruiting tool in the search for 
new members (Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2007; Weimann, 2011; Conway, 2012, 
Klausen et al., 2012).  While there is agreement among scholars regarding the 
growing use of the internet by extremist and terrorist groups, the true value of these 
websites, forums and chat rooms for the purposes of radicalizing and recruiting new 
members to the cause is a source of debate (Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2007; Weimann, 
2006; Conway, 2012) and this thesis seeks to add some imperical clarity to this 
debate.  Sageman (2004) states there was “no evidence to suggest that the internet is 
persuasive enough” to develop allegiances that would support the demands of joining 
the jihad, and in his sample of 150 al Qaeda members he found no support for internet 
recruitment (Sageman, 2004, p. 136).   
Brigitte Nacos (2008) sees the internet as “the most effective recruiting tool for 
terrorists and hate groups” (Nacos, 2008, p. 254).  Recognizing the transition from 
“one-directional and text based” communications to interactive platforms like 
Facebook, YouTube, and others, Weimann (2010) states that “not only can the 
terrorists promote global paranoia, share messages with sympathizers, and obtain 
donations, but they can also create more terrorists.  The internet has provided 
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terrorists with a whole new virtual realm to conduct their sinister back-alley 
transactions” (Weimann, 2010, p. 53).  By providing a venue for the spread of their 
propaganda and chat rooms for like-minded individuals to meet and reinforce their 
extremist views and create a virtual community, extremist websites have become an 
important tool in the effort to recruit new members (Nacos, 2008; Smith, 2008; 
Weimann, 2006; Zelin & Borow, 2013; Hoskins, 2009; Weimann, 2010).  The 
proliferation of extremist online social media as recruitment and training tools has 
served as a replacement for face-to-face interaction (Blanquart & Cook, 2013).   In the 
United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (Pursue, Prevent, 
Protect, Prepare), the Home Office expressed concern regarding the impact of 
extremist activity on the internet, stating that “The communication revolution also 
facilitates a dialogue between organizations and their actual perspective members.  
That dialogue enables fundraising, recruitment, and some training and operational 
planning: to a limited extent the internet has superseded the terrorist training camp.” 
(Prevent Strategy, Home Office, March 2009. p. 41.)   This is reflected in the fact that 
12% of European 11-17 year olds report having accessed online hate sites, with 20% 
of the 15-16 year olds within this cohort (Conway, 2012).  Violent extremists, 
therefore, seek to take advantage of these trends and have moved to expand the 
venues for their content to include social network and sharing sites like Facebook,  
Bebo, YouTube, and Twitter (Conway, 2012, p.2).   
As western counter-terrorism efforts have limited the various person to person 
avenues for the spread of extremist ideology by outlawing ‘hate-speech’ in public 
forums, mosques, and in print, as well as identifying and arresting known terrorist 
recruiters, these communications have been driven underground and the investment 
by extremist groups in on-line forums and websites, and the level of participation 
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within these websites, has grown substantially (Weimann, 2010;  Conway, 2012; 
Soriano, 2011; Amichai-Hamburger, 2005).  In the United Kingdom, Mohammed 
Irfan Raja and four accomplices were arrested in 2006 for downloading and sharing 
extremist material.  It was found that the five young men had spent hours online in 
extremist chat rooms talking to other radicalized youths, and downloading jihadi 
material including an Al-Qaeda training manual (Casciani, 2007).  While some may 
claim that on-line activity cannot, on its own drive one to engage in jihad (Sageman, 
2004, p. 163), others would argue that when an individual purposely seeks out and 
visits an extremist site he/she is on the road to becoming radicalized (Jenkins, 2007). 
The potential danger of online radicalization is highlighted in the United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (March 2009).  Noted 
within this document is the threat posed by “self-starting networks, or even lone 
individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to that of Al-Qa’ida, but with no 
connection to that organization; and terrorist groups  that follow a broadly similar 
ideology as Al Qa’ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda” (p. 9).  
Further, the document goes on to acknowledge the role and impact of the internet in 
the “two way dialogue between their organizations and their actual or prospective 
members…that enables fundraising, recruitment, and some training and operational 
planning” (p.41).   Previous action by far-right/anti-immigration groups and recent 
calls by extremist Islamists to move out of their password protected chat-rooms and 
expand onto social network sites like Facebook and Twitter in order to ‘appeal to the 
masses’, just as they have used YouTube to spread extremist propaganda, is a 
disturbing development given the trend of online radicalization seen in recent arrests.  
Recent cases where it is clear that online participation either contributed to or was 
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directly responsible for the radicalization and/or mobilization of an individual seem to 
reinforce the premise that it is possible to become radicalized via online participation. 
Online Radicalization  
There has considerable debate among scholars regarding the concept of “self-
radicalization’ vis-à-vis online engagement with extremist content, and Conway 
(2012) argues effectively that while “the Internet can play a significant role in violent 
radicalization processes” there is a need for further research in this area (p.9).   This 
said, there do exist cases where individuals claim that their radicalization and decision 
to engage in violent extremist activity was facilitated, if not inspired, by their 
engagement with online extremist content.  One person who influenced many 
individuals online was Anwar al-Awlaki.  Born in the United States and having gone 
to college in the US, Awlaki is believed to have provided spiritual support to two of 
the 9-11 hijackers (9-11 Commission Report), and has, since fleeing to Yemen, had 
significant influence in the spread of jihad online and is credited for influencing 
several individuals toward jihadi activity as a result of his online interactions with 
them, including the Time Square bomber Faisal Shazzad, and the Christmas Day 
“underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Miller and Hsu, 2010, p. 1).  One 
of the most well-known cases is the Fort Hood Shooter Major Nidal Hassan, who 
murdered 13 and wounded more than 30 people following his online interactions with 
Awlaki (Nasaw, 2009).  This case is most interesting as Hassan’s transformation took 
place without having visited any terrorist training facility or traveling to an insurgent 
area as has been the case with others who were influenced by Awlaki.  Others who 
were moved to commit terrorist acts or provide material support to Al-Qaeda 
following their interaction with Awlaki include, but are certainly not limited to, 
Carlos Eduardo Almonte, Mohamed Mahmood Alessa, and Barry Walter Bujol.  In 
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the UK, this phenomenon was thrust to the forefront by the knife attack on 14 May 
2010 of a Member of Parliament (MP)  Stephen Timms by Roshonara Choudhry. 
Following the attack on MP Timms, it was first thought that his attacker was 
suffering from some mental disorder.  However, it was discovered by UK law 
enforcement that Ms. Choudhry had been driven to commit this attempted murder as a 
result of having spent hundreds of hours viewing online video sermons by Anwar al-
Awlaki.  The result of this online activity was the self-radicalization of Ms. Choudhry 
and the determination that she must kill Mr. Timms for his 2003 vote in favor of UK 
participation in the war in Iraq (Burns & Helft, 2010, p. 2; Dodd, 2010; Ibrahim, 
2010, p. 1).  In a November 2010 article titled “The Lesson of Roshonara Choudhry’s 
Radicalization”, the author Azeem Ibrahim (2010) points out that,  
“She was, it transpired, a wannabe Islamic extremist terrorist, who believed 
her actions were vengeance for her MP’s vote for the Iraq war.  She had been 
motivated by watching online videos of a man she described as a scholar, 
Anwar al Awlaki, who had also helped motivate, directly or indirectly, the US 
Army psychiatrist who killed thirteen people, the Nigerian student responsible 
for the Christmas Day bomb attempt, John Walker Lindh, the man known as 
the “American Taliban”, and two of the 9-11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and 
Nawaf al-Hamzi” (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 1).   
The impact of Awlaki and his online presence was finally realized and acted upon 
by the US and UK governments, who requested that YouTube remove over 4,000 of 
his jihadi videos from their server.  It was recognized that individuals were seeking 
out and watching his extremist sermons and calls to jihad on YouTube and being 
influenced by them toward becoming self-radicalized.  A representative for YouTube, 
responding to the requests to remove the Awlaki videos, indicated that they violated 
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the sites policies prohibiting “dangerous or illegal activities such as bomb-making, 
hate speech, and incitement to commit violent acts,” but that “These are difficult 
issues and material that is brought to our attention is reviewed carefully.  We will 
continue to remove content that incites violence according to our policies.  Material of 
a purely religious nature will remain on the site “ (Burns & Helft, 2010, p. 1).  
However, prior to their being removed, the media wing of al-Qaeda, Al-Sahab 
(Arabic for “The Cloud”), was able to download most of the video’s to their own 
server, so while they are harder to access, they do still exist and are viewed and shared 
by Islamist extremists.   
The record of arrests and prosecutions in the UK provides further evidence of this 
phenomenon.  In 2006 Aabid Khan was arrested and found in possession of material 
on computer drives that indicated he was engaged in promoting violent jihad in the 
UK and in the broader English speaking world via the internet.  He was recruiting 
others and helping to facilitate training trips to Pakistan.  He was convicted of three 
counts of possession of an article for a purpose connected with terrorism 
(http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecutions/ctd_2008.html). In August 2008 Ishaq Kanmi 
was arrested for posting to an online pro-jihadi discussion forum where he claimed to 
have assumed the leadership of Al-Qaeda in Great Britain (AQ-GB).  He utilized this 
forum to promote large scale attacks against the west and the execution of all 
individuals who opposed this effort.  Specifically he named Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown as targets for assassination.  Following his arrest he pled guilty to belonging to 
a proscribed organization, inviting support for a proscribed organization (via his 
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online activities), one count of collection and four counts of dissemination of terrorist 
material (CPS 2010)2. 
It is important to note, particularly given the focus of this research, that the 
practice of promoting violent extremism online is not unique to pro-Islamist/jihadi 
groups.  In June 2009 Police arrested Ian and Nicky Davidson, members of the Aryan 
Strike Force (ASF).  According to the 2010 Counter-Terrorism Division of the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) report the ASF was “a neo-Nazi organization that 
promoted violence against Jews, Muslims, black people, Asians, and anyone 
associated with the British Government.” The ASF operated a website and it was 
through the online forum within this site that they offered various ideological and 
terrorist materials for download.  Following their arrest in June 2009, police 
discovered computer files with bomb making instructions and recovered a jar 
containing a quantity of ricin large enough to kill nine people.  Another case 
involving the ASF resulted in the arrest and conviction of Michael Heaton and Trevor 
Hannington as they were found to be posting comments on the forum that promoted 
hatred of ethnic minorities and solicited murder.  Hannington was also found to be in 
possession of and having had distributed online an instructional video for the making 
of an improvised flamethrower which he suggested could be used to burn black 
people (CPS, 2010). 
More recently, arrests have been made in connection with individual participation 
in more traditional social networking fora.  In 2011 Phillip Burgess pled guilty to 
promoting violence on Facebook during the August 2011 riots.  He was found to have 
                                                 
2
 The Counter-Terrorism Division reports from the Crown Prosecution Service were accessed 
online and have no page numbers.  These reports are a list of closed cases for the year of the annual 
report. 
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made posts calling for riots on King Street, Manchester which happened later that day 
and posted offensive racial comments where he suggested “bring in the kkk”, in an 
effort to incite racial hatred.  Similarly Martin Hortshorn was arrested and pled guilty 
during this same time period of the riots for posting on Facebook his calls for the 
burning of “paki shops, takeaways, and Islamic Centers” (CPS, 2011). 
In the UK, several extremist blogs and social network sites have come under 
scrutiny by the government and some have been shut down for their extremist 
activity.  The EDL site has been closely monitored and sometimes interrupted because 
of the pseudo-violent messages it contains, and some groups like Islam4UK and most 
recently the Muslims Against Crusades have had their groups and their internet sites 
proscribed by the UK government for their pro-jihadi messages.
3
  While there have 
certainly been cases of individuals who become radicalized and driven to commit 
violent acts, the question still remains as to how influential these online venues are in 
facilitating this transformation and how much influence these sites have on the 
broader membership who is participating in these activities.  Conway (2012) suggests 
that caution is called for when considering the direct link between online content, 
radicalization, and violent extremism; otherwise known as self-radicalization.   This is 
supported by Klausen et al. (2012) in their assessment of YouTube Jihadists when 
they warn about assumptions of self-radicalization in the cases they present within 
their study.  They state clearly that, “Terrorist actions rarely occur without some 
personal contact with extremist facilitators” (Klausen et al., 2012, p. 6). 
Many scholars agree that extremist websites pose a continuing and growing threat 
(Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2008; Weimann, 2006 & 2010; Smith, 2008; Sageman, 2004; 
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 Pursuant to discussions with the ACPO Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit 
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Klausen et al., 2012, Conway, 2012).  These concerns are rooted in observations of 
the growth of the medium and the increased use of the internet by extremist groups to 
communicate ideas and information, and the ways they have adapted to new and more 
interactive fora like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.  Recently, researchers have 
begun to consider the nature of the material being presented or the impact these 
websites have on the participants as reflected in participations and engagement (Caren 
et al., 2012; Klausen et al., 2012; Bowman-Grieve, 2009) .  Are these websites and 
chat rooms a real threat, providing an opportunity for individuals to self-radicalize 
toward extremist violence; or are they merely a venue where ‘terrorist or extremist 
wanna-be’s’ go to spout their bravado and play lip service to the cause?   
Slacktivism 
While the development of a group identity and the institution of methods to ensure 
group conformity can work to present a consistent and targeted message, there still 
exists within online groups a problem that has come to be known as “Slacktivism” 
(Gladwell, 2010; Budhish, 2013; Morozov, 2011).   Morozov (2011) points out that 
the Internet has driven the cost of online participation to zero (p. 189).  As such, 
“those charmed by the promise of digital activism often have a hard time 
distinguishing it from “slacktivism”, its more dangerous sibling, which too often leads 
to civic promiscuity-usually the result of a mad shopping binge in the online identity 
supermarket that is Facebook—that makes the online activist feel useful and 
important while having precious little political impact” (Morozov, 2011, p. 190).  
Budish (2013) suggests that, “One of the strongest criticisms of online activism is that 
it has primarily led to slacktivism or “arm-chair activism” at the expense of personal 
sacrifice and result-oriented activism” (p. 750). This is seen often where online 
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“activists” will respond to a call for direct action by indicating that they are “with you 
in spirit”.  This phenomenon was observed often within the EDL collection. 
What is unclear is whether this slacktivist tendency exists in more extremist 
groups where members self-select into a non-traditional group that is viewed as 
undesirable to the larger population.  Ackland and O’Neil (2011) suggest that direct 
control over the means of communication will “favor the preeminence of expressive 
behaviour leading to the formation of collective identity” (p. 187).  While their model 
is not able to quantify this phenomenon, they were able to identify the potential of 
digitally tracing online activities toward the development of empirical data sets for 
analysis (Ackland & O’Neil, 2011).  This is important as the EDL made a decision to 
control the dialog on their Facebook page by limiting the amount of time the members 
were able to communicate with each other outside administrator controlled posts.  An 
examination of  use of online social networks in the May 15 Movement in Spain 
(Borge-Holthoefer et al, 2011) shows that within the twitter network for this 
movement roughly 10% of the active subjects generated 52% of the total traffic.  
Further, less than one percent of the “members” received more than 50% of the 
information posted and that “while the delivery of information is shared by a 
relatively large number of users that keep the “social temperature” of the movement, 
most of the information is simply directed towards a few highly connected targets that 
might not pass the voice any longer (i.e., that are not active spreaders)” (Borge-
Holthoefer et al., 2011, p. 5).   
This same phenomenon was observed by Berger and Strathearn (2013) in their 
measuring of influence in extremist online social networks.  In their observation of 
white nationalists on Twitter that included 3,542 users, they found that the majority of 
influence was “disproportionally concentrated at the top” (p. 39).  They found these 
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findings in line with the 90-9-1 rule “which states that 90 percent of the users in most 
online social networks are passive, nine percent are somewhat engaged and one 
percent drives most of the engagement and discussion” (Berger & Strathearn, 2013, P. 
39).  They found that the top 50 users (1.4%) were responsible for nearly 46% pf the 
influencing activity and the  top ten most influential users (0.3% of the users) 
accounted for 24.8% of the traffic and influenced 3,554 Twitter accounts which 
comprised followers plus followers of followers (p.39).   
Power Users 
The Pareto Principle was put forth by Vilfredo Pareto, and dates back to 1906 
(Matties, 2012).  More commonly known as the 80/20 rule, he described land 
ownership/wealth in Italy at the turn of the 20
th
 century, where 80% of the land was 
owned by 20% of the population.  Recently it has become a “rule of thumb” in 
various aspects of business.  As such, 80% of the work is done by 20% of the 
workers, 80% of a business’s revenue comes from 20% of its customers, and 80% of 
the profit comes from 20% of the sales (it can go on to describe many more aspects 
where 80% of the effect is generated by 20% of the participants).  It seems, according 
to studies done by Pew Research (Hampton, Goulet, Marlow, & Rainie,  2012), this 
phenomenon extends to social media as well.  In a recent study of Facebook users 
titled, “Why most Facebook users get more than they give: The effect of Facebook 
‘power users’ on everybody else”, Pew states that: 
“Our findings suggest that while most Facebook users in our sample were 
moderately active over a one-month time period, there is a subset of Facebook 
users who are disproportionately more active. They skew the average.  These 
power users, who, depending on the type of content, account for 20%-30% of 
Facebook users in our sample (Hampton et al., 2012, p. 12).  
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These findings are made even stronger when examining the user characteristics within 
the second most popular social media venue, Twitter.   
Researchers at Yahoo!, conducted an analysis of Twitter traffic generated from 
July 28, 2009 to March 10, 2010 (223 days) which equaled five billion tweets.  The 
researchers chose to examine tweets that contained URLs as they were found to 
“provide a much richer source of variation than is possible in the typical 140 character 
tweet providing a data set of 260 million tweets (Wu et al., 2011, p.3). What they 
determined was: 
“Based on this classification, we find a striking concentration of 
attention on Twitter-roughly 50% of tweets consumed are generated by 
just 20,000 elite users.” (Wu et al., 2011, p. 1) 
And within the conclusions: 
“In particular, we find that although audience attention has indeed 
fragmented among a wider pool of content producers than classic 
models of mass media, attention remains highly concentrated, where 
roughly 0.05% of the population accounts for almost half of all posted 
URLs.” (Wu et al.,  2011, p. 9) 
These same 20,000 elite users making up just 0.05% of the user population at the time 
(2011) also attracted nearly 50% of all attention within twitter (Wu et al., 2011. P.5). 
This concept is supported by findings from an examination of the French-speaking 
jihadisphere by Benjamin Ducol (2012).  Ducol found that the level of 
participation/online involvement of the 2,517 registered users observed, was “neither 
consistent nor homogenous” (p. 58).  He goes on to state that those engaged with the 
online forum “is clearly divided between a huge majority of passive users and a small 
minority of active users who are nevertheless extremely effective in maintaining a 
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continuous flow of discussions and dissemination of jihadi content” (Ducol, 2012, p. 
59).  This phenomenon is also observed in the online activity of right wing extremist 
groups (Caren et al., 2012).     
The Internet, Virtual Communities, and Right Wing Extremism  
The English Defence League is certainly not the first group, and will not be the 
last, to utilize social media as a communication medium in their group’s efforts.  The 
literature on the use of the internet and specifically social media in these efforts, while 
fairly new, is developing and offers some significant insights as they relate to this 
project.  Some of the first groups to take advantage of social media as an integral part 
of their messaging were far-right extremist hate groups.  However, groups ranging 
from local political groups to worldwide environmental groups have found that the 
internet and certainly social media is an efficient and cost effective way to get their 
message out to the largest audience possible. What is less known, even with the 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of these communications, is just how effective these 
efforts actually are.  Morozov (2011) suggests that,  
“The challenge for anyone analyzing how the Internet may affect the overall 
effectiveness of political activism is, first, to determine the kind of qualities 
and activities that are essential to the success of the democratic struggle in a 
particular country or context and, second, to understand how a particular 
medium of campaigning or facilitating collective action affects those qualities 
and activities” (Morozov, 2011, p. 198). 
Research in areas of far-right movements has shown that the use of the internet 
provides a very effective way to develop a virtual community where individuals of 
like mind can come together and share their thoughts and experiences (Bowman-
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Grieve, 2009).  In her examination of the online development of virtual communities 
in the radical right group Stormfront, Lorraine Bowman-Grieve (2009) found,  
“from the perspective of the supporter the Internet serves the important 
function of providing a link with the movement they support; it provides access 
to information on ideology and goals and has the potential to facilitate 
involvement either online (by setting up support websites or interacting in the 
virtual community) or offline.  What is central to the creation and 
maintenance of these discourses of support is that they provide the necessary 
justification, validation, and encouragement that may in time function as a 
catalyst for further involvement or action in support of the movement” 
(Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 996).  
As discussed previously, the development of the collective identity in groups 
engaged in activism is important to the success of a movement that seeks to utilize the 
internet and/or social media to forward their cause (Della Porta & Diani,  1999; 
Breuer, 2012).  The nature of the communications within the virtual community of the 
far-right Stormfront movement was found to facilitate the sharing of ideas, 
experiences, and information in such a way as to be conversational.  This is important 
in how people perceive this interaction, and as has been discussed, can be just as 
powerful as face to face communications.  It is important at this point to consider that 
Stormfront has members all over the world that come together in this virtual 
community to engage with fellow “believers”.  Again, the power of the virtual 
community is seen in this interaction where disparate individuals can come together to 
form a community and develop a shared identity (Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 997).  
Additionally, this virtual community was used to provide and share movement 
literature, personal accounts of individual involvement in the group, personal 
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experiences and personal grievances of individual members, and information on 
activities where participation is encouraged.  It is acknowledged that while there are a 
great many members within this virtual community (over 159,000 in 2009), with five 
and a half million posts on four hundred and fifty thousand threads, the level of 
participation varies from limited engagement of new members who are engaged in a 
period of social learning and “Older members who take the time to contribute, 
sometimes on a daily basis and on a personal level to the discourses being created 
online” (Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 1005).  But how does this online participation 
translate into real world activism?  Magdalena Wojcieszak (2009) examined this 
question and found: 
“Engagement in various political activities increases with increased 
participation in neo-Nazi and radical environmentalist online discussion 
groups.  Importantly, this relationship persists when controlling for each 
theoretically crucial confounders as ideological extremism, political 
discussion, and news media exposure.  This relationship is especially 
pronounced with regard to actions aimed at supporting a given movement” 
(Wojcieszak, 2009, p. 576). 
However, one area that was not addressed in these examinations of far-right 
movements is the frequency of participation among the members and just how many 
users actually engage on a regular basis, and how the membership numbers actually 
translate into real world activism. 
From a recruitment perspective, virtual communities are being seen as key to 
enhancing recruitment efforts, particularly among extremist or terrorist groups 
(Hoffman, 2006; Weimann, 2006; Nacos, 2008; Smith, 2008).  Within her study 
Bowman-Grieve (2009) found that social networks are important to the development 
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of political socialization, especially when seeking to influence an individual’s 
behavior and desire to engage in activism.  Further she goes on to state that “In this 
respect virtual communities can be seen as important social arenas for the formation 
of interpersonal bonds, with the potential to contribute to individual involvement 
processes” (Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 1003).  She also makes the point that,   
“the virtual community of Stormfront is aware of the importance of social 
networking online, with community members effectively using this online 
service to make contact with other supporters within their localities, forming 
both online and offline communities and networks in support of the radical 
right” (Bowman-Grieve, 2009, p. 1003).  
 
More recently published work on Stormfront by Caren, Jowers and Gaby (2012), 
offers a more detailed examination of their use of the internet spanning a period of 
nine years.  Their study of Stormfront’s online presence, in what they call a Social 
Movement Online Community (SMOC), seeks to understand various aspects of this 
online activity to include the use of the SMOC in the development of a collective 
identity; the broad based participatory nature of the site; the open nature of the SMOC 
where no membership is required to visit or participate in most of the discussions; the 
geographic diversity of the users; the questions of online anonymity; and the ability of 
the SMOC to rapidly expand and contract (p. 187).   
Within this study, they collected 6,868,674 posts covering the period from 
September 11, 2001 to August 6, 2010 (Caren, et al., 2012, p. 174), that span the 
globe including supporters from “Australia, the Baltics, Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland” (Daniels, 
2009, p. 42).  What is unique about this study, beyond the volume of data that was 
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collected, is the ability to examine user frequency and identify groups of users 
according to the frequency of participation.  The results of this analysis showed that 
the majority of the users posted fewer than 1,000 times over the 3,252 day collection 
period (Caren, et al., 2012, p 176).  As can be seen in the graph below, out of the 
66,507 users whose posts were collected, 65,076 (98%) posted fewer than 1,000 times 
over the entire 3,252 day collection period.  Those 1,431 users who posted over 1,000 
times represent 2.16% of all active users.  Finally, the group of highest frequency 
users, posting more than 10,000 times, represents only .06% of the active users.  It 
would appear that this activity is a reflection of the “power user” paradigm discussed 
previously. 
 
Stormfront Users Grouped by Their Total Number of Posts. Data are Based 
on the Authors’ Analysis of Site Usage, 2001–2010 (Caren, et al. p.177). 
This is of particular interest given the number of visitors to the site (400,000 in 
2010) and how it relates to the number of users who actually post to the page and the 
frequency of those user postings (Caren, et al., p. 175).  As stated previously, this 
study allowed the researchers to examine several aspects of SMOC participation.  
They found that the Stormfront SMOC did facilitate the development of a collective 
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identity by being able to receive messages and participate in discussions that support 
that identity (Caren, et al., p. 179).   
Daniels (2009) considers the role of participation in Stormfront.org by pointing 
out: 
“Some may participate actively and be true believers or passionate resisters; 
others may only lurk and may be supportive, non-supportive, or fall 
somewhere else on a rubric of possible types of online participation.  In 
general the relationship between the multifaceted dimensions of online 
participation and active social movement involvement are not widely 
understood.  While the potential exists for a multinational white-pride social 
movement that organizes across national and geographic boundaries, this 
potential has thus far been unrealized” (Daniels, 2009, p. 55). 
 
These examples provide an opportunity to examine the growing body of literature on 
the English Defence League and how the authors perceive the EDL’s utilization of the 
internet and virtual communities in their efforts to recruit and mobilize members. 
The EDL and online extremism  
A search for academic articles on the English Defence League revealed a growing 
body of literature examining various aspects of the group and their cause.  Treadwell 
and Garland (2011) considered the impact of masculinity and marginalization in their 
consideration of the EDL’s propensity to violence.  Chris Allen (2011) offers insights 
into the EDL and asks whether their efforts are truly in opposition to The 
Islamification of the United Kingdom or are they actually promoting Islamaphobia.  
And Jamie Bartlett and Mark Littler (2011) offer a more comprehensive evaluation of 
the EDL in their paper published by Demos titled “Inside the EDL.”  While each of 
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these papers and others discussed previously offer interesting perspectives on the 
agenda and actions of the EDL, only two consider the online phenomenon that is seen 
as an integral part of the EDL’s communication and mobilization strategy.   
Chris Allen (2011) in his section on Facebook Friends: building a diverse and 
multicultural movement, briefly discusses the use of Facebook by the EDL.  While he 
acknowledges that membership in the EDL Facebook page had reached 85,000 users 
by April 2011, and goes on to question “whether or not these are all active 
supporters”, he quotes the EDL leader Tommy Robinson who said, “Many if not most 
of them certainly are: The EDL has ‘more activists…than any political party here [in 
the UK]” (Allen, 2011, p. 286).  From here his coverage moves on to the various EDL 
divisions (both local and issue related) that could be found online and the seemingly 
“multicultural” nature of the group.  However, missing from this coverage is any 
quantitative analysis of the real nature of this Facebook participation and a legitimate 
challenge to the claims put forth by Robinson. 
The more substantive examination of the EDL performed by Bartlett and Littler 
(2011) was done using an online survey where they sought respondents on Facebook 
to answer questions about the EDL and gather demographic data on those individuals 
who responded to the call for participants.  Interestingly, the survey was completed in 
September 2011 which is important given that the EDL Facebook page was hacked in 
July 2011, and membership dropped from over 98,000 in July 2011 to 38,200 in 
September 2011 (Bartlett & Littler, 2011, p. 16).  The data for this study was 
collected in two phases by placing adverts on Facebook at two different times.  From 
5-11 May they placed 969,592 adverts on Facebook, recruited 674 participants, 
resulting in the completion of 544 surveys with a final sample size of 502.  Similarly 
from 5-19 September the advert appeared 985,649 times on Facebook, recruiting 
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1,162 participants, resulting in the completion of 804 surveys (Bartlett & Littler, 
2011, p. 33).  The final total sample size was then reduced to 1,295 respondents.  
Unfortunately the only question asked regarding the online activity of these 
individuals was related to how they engaged in activism where 52% indicated they 
had participated in online activism in the past six months.  And this was only asked of 
the second sample group where N=804 (Bartlett & Littler, 2011, p. 19).   
Their decision to use Facebook is expressed as follows: 
“We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is the most popular 
mode of communication among EDL supporters.  The group is one of a 
growing number of organizations and movements that use their online 
presence to recruit, organize, and communicate with their own membership, 
as well as to demonstrate the size of their public pronouncements”(Bartlett & 
Littler, 2011, p. 34). 
Bartlett and Littler (2011) indicate that the online membership in September 2011 was 
38,200 users.  From this N=38,200, they go on to speculate that the real membership 
level of the EDL was somewhere between 25,000-35,000 supporters across the UK 
(p. 16).  However, while acknowledging the value of the internet for the development 
of the group’s identity (p. 18), they do make the equivocation that “the relationship 
between hardcore members, affiliates, and broader supporters is opaque” (Bartlett and 
Littler, 2011, p. 14).   
The Chatham House briefing paper titled, “The Roots of Extremism: The English 
Defence League and the Counter Jihad Challenge” by Matthew Goodwin (2013), 
which examines the issues related to this movement and the associated costs to the 
government as a consequence of the activities of the group, focuses on the 
sociological and political concerns regarding the growth of the EDL, but offer no 
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insights into the use of social media by the EDL or how the government might combat 
the influence of the EDL within this online environment.  The only mention of the 
EDL and Facebook appears in a single sentence where Goodwin (2013) cites Allen 
(2011) and his assessment that the EDL had “attracted over 80,000 Facebook 
followers” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 6).   
Research by O’Callaghan et al. (2013) provides an examination of the 
connectivity found within far-right networks, showing that not only do groups like the 
EDL use various social media platforms, but that even within these fora  there are 
associations with other far-right groups like the British Freedom Party, the BNP, 
splinter Infidel groups, and the British Resistance (p.5).  While the EDL Facebook 
node was included in the analysis in connection with other nodes, no specific 
examination of Facebook activity or traffic was presented.  They did observe, 
however, that the measurement of individual step networks, providing a snapshot of 
the community at a given time, “tended to exhibit a considerable amount of volatility” 
and that this may have been a result “in part by data incompleteness” or that “such 
volatility may be a simple feature of the online extremist presence” (O’Callaghan et 
al., p. 9).   
Finally, the paper by Paul Jackson (2011) titled, The EDL: Britain’s ‘New Far 
Right’ Social Movement, provides the best overview of the EDL’s use of social media 
in its various forms.  Jackson suggests that Facebook has been “crucial to the EDL’s 
ability to develop scattered anti-Muslim attitudes into a more coherent and sustained 
movement” (Jackson, 2011, p. 32).  However, he does point out that, “Although tens 
of thousands of people are registered as supporters on Facebook (over 90,000 at the 
time of writing) this ever-growing figure does not necessarily translate into an ever 
growing number of supporters attending EDL demonstrations” (Jackson, 2011, p. 32).  
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While Jackson goes on to provide a rather extensive discussion of the various new 
media outlets used by the EDL, its local divisions, and affiliate groups, he agrees that 
Facebook is the primary venue for communications and mobilization.  Again, as with 
the other works on the EDL, there was no traffic collection or analysis performed to 
delve deeper into the real impact of social media on the EDL movement and its 
membership. 
Conclusion 
The growth of the English Defence League since its ‘birth’ in 2009 has provided 
opportunities for investigation into the nature of the group and the methods used to 
motivate and mobilize the membership toward action.  While some have little doubt 
that the EDL is a far-right extremist group (Alessio & Meredith, 2013), others seek to 
frame the EDL as a xenophobic group focused on issues related to immigration 
(Goodwin, 2012).  At the same time the EDL has sought, though its mission statement 
and public rhetoric to distance itself from the characterization of the media and 
government that they are a far-right, neo-Nazi extremists (Jackson, 2011; Allen, 2010; 
Goodwin, 2013).  One of the important issues to be considered within this research is 
just how the EDL has been portrayed in traditional media and whether the statements 
made within the social media traffic, which is the focus of this research, support the 
rhetoric of the group or the perceptions of the media.   
The value of social media is one of the primary questions to be considered as a 
part of this research.  Anecdotally, we are led to believe that social media can be a 
significant driver in activism.  However, as we see in the literature, the real power of 
social media to drive social change (Margetts, et al., 2013), or to promote donations to 
humanitarian efforts (Morozov, 2011) causes one to questions the true value of social 
media as such a driver.  Further, the ability of social media to create a broader 
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group/social identity comes into question when the nature of online participation and 
“slactivism”  are considered ” (Gladwell, 2010; Budhish, 2013; Morozov, 2011).  
While the EDL sought to enhance the development of a group identity by controlling 
the dialog, the literature suggests that such an identity might reside within only a 
small segment of those who are participating in the online dialogue (Borge-Holthoefer 
et al., 2011; Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Ducol, 2012).  
This research then provides an opportunity to examine the EDL’s use of Facebook 
as their primary source of communication with its members, and to seek a more 
granular understanding of this phenomenon.   For example, how does the EDL work 
to develop a collective/group identity within the framework of Facebook, and is this 
mechanism effective in evincing participation among its members?  Does the traffic 
generated by the EDL administrator and the members reflect the ‘democratic’ and 
‘humanitarian’ vision as put forth in their mission statement or do they reflect the far-
right, ultra-nationalist sentiments as discussed previously, using Facebook to develop 
the concept of the Muslim/immigrant population as ‘the evil other’?  How does the 
online activism that takes place on Facebook translate into real world activism when 
there is a call for demonstrations?  Does certain administrator content have a stronger 
impact on the membership than any other?  How is the narrative of the group 
transmitted by the administrator and how is this reflected in the user dialogue?  And, 
what are the characteristics of participation within the Facebook group and how do 
they relate to what is already known about online extremist participation?  The desire 
herein is to add to the growing body of knowledge about the English Defence League 
and how they utilize social media, and more generally understand how the findings of 
this research fit within the broader context of online extremism.     
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Chapter Two:  Methodology 
Introduction 
One of the unique aspects of this research was the opportunity to collect, 
segregate, and analyze the Facebook traffic of the EDL in a way that had not been 
done previously.  While some had examined this phenomenon generally to consider 
how Facebook was used and the number of members (Allen, 2011; O’Callaghan et al., 
2013; Jackson, 2011), others had either administered traditional surveys (Goodwin, 
2013) or online surveys to the users through the EDL Facebook page (Bartlett & 
Littler, 2011) to garner insight into the membership of the EDL. However, what was 
missing was a systematic collection and analysis of the EDL’s Facebook traffic.  This 
is likely due, in no small part, to the lack of automated collection tools to perform a 
comprehensive collection of the traffic and coding tools to take the bulk traffic and 
convert it into usable variables for analysis.  As will be discussed herein, this research 
sought to overcome these obstacles to provide a detailed analysis of the Facebook 
traffic of the EDL during a critical growth cycle that occurred February/March 2011.  
Additional Facebook traffic was collected following two simultaneous and critical 
events in May 2011 that will be covered in Chapter Four which had a significant 
impact on membership and traffic.  This allowed for a comparative analysis of the two 
data sets to examine the impact of these events.  Augmenting this virtual field work, 
that involved daily collection, was on the ground field work that consisted of 
observing and filming two EDL demonstrations on 5 February 2011 and 3 September 
2011, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
  The data that was collected and the observations from the demonstrations allows 
for both a quantitative statistical analysis of user activity and traffic analysis, as well 
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as a qualitative examination of the EDL, its online and offline activity, their 
messaging, and how their online efforts translated into real world activism/extremism 
during this time.  Additionally, since the content of the individual posts were 
collected, it is possible to consider to what degree the “mission statement” of the EDL 
is reflected in the member comments or whether they are actually an indication of the 
ultra-nationalist/far right proclivities of the membership.   This chapter examines the 
ethical and security issues that had to be dealt with prior to and during the online 
collection process, the methods that were used during the collection process, the 
development of the automated tool that was used to segregate the raw collection into 
variables, the manual methods that were used to provide additional granularity to the 
automated segregation, and the importance of the variables to the overall analytic 
process.    
Ethical and Security Challenges    
Researching how terrorist/extremist groups utilize online social network sites 
(SNS) and other forms of computer mediated communication (CMC) to further their 
radicalization and/or recruitment efforts, it became immediately evident during the 
research design phase there were substantial ethical and legal issues that would need 
to be considered and worked through.  Having originally developed a collaborative 
relationship with the Computer Science Department at the University of St. Andrews, 
the quantity and quality of the data we anticipated would be collected was greatly 
increased as compared to what would have otherwise been possible using 
conventional manual or semi-automated collection and coding processes.  
Unfortunately, due to the implementation by Facebook of a policy forbidding the 
automated tracking and collection of traffic via web-bots or other automated tracking 
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devises, the Computer Science Department chose to disengage from this effort 
thereby putting an end to the possibility of automated data collection and segregation.   
The Policy published by Facebook is as follows: 
Date of Last Revision: April 15th, 2010 
Automated Data Collection Terms 
1. These terms govern your collection of data from Facebook through 
automated means, such as through harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or 
scrapers ("Automated Data Collection"), as well as your use of that data. 
2. You will not engage in Automated Data Collection without Facebook's 
express written permission. 
3. By obtaining permission to engage in Automated Data Collection you agree 
to abide by these Automated Data Collection Terms, which incorporate by 
reference the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
4. You agree that your use of data you collect through Automated Data 
Collection will be confined solely to search indexing for display on the 
Internet unless granted separate approval by Facebook for alternative usage 
and display on the Internet. 
5. You agree that you will not sell any data collected through, or derived from 
data collected through, Automated Data Collection. 
6. You agree that you will not transfer data collected through Automated Data 
Collection in aggregated or bulk form. 
7. You agree that you will destroy all data you have collected through 
Automated Data Collection upon Facebook's written request and that you will 
certify such destruction under penalty of perjury. 
8. You agree that Facebook may revoke any permission granted at anytime for 
any reason and you agree to immediately cease collection and use of data 
collected through Automated Data Collection on notice of such revocation. 
9. You agree to provide an accounting of all uses of data collected through 
Automated Data Collection within ten (10) days of your receipt of Facebook's 
request for such an accounting. 
10. You agree that you will not circumvent any measures implemented by 
Facebook to prevent violations of these terms. 
11. You agree that you will not violate the restrictions in any robot exclusion 
header. 
12. You agree that you will only use your own true IP address/useragent 
identity and will not mask your services under the IP address/useragent string 
of another service. 
13. You agree that you will not transfer any approved IP address or useragent 
to any party without Facebook's express written consent. 
14. You agree that any violation of these terms may result in your immediate 
ban from all Facebook websites, products and services. You acknowledge and 
agree that a breach or threatened breach of these terms would cause 
irreparable injury, that money damages would be an inadequate remedy, and 
that Facebook shall be entitled to temporary and permanent injunctive relief, 
without the posting of any bond or other security, to restrain you or anyone 
acting on your behalf, from such breach or threatened breach. Nothing herein 
shall be construed as preventing Facebook from pursuing any and all 
remedies available to it, including the recovery of money damages. 
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15. Nothing herein shall be construed to confer any grant to, or license of, any 
intellectual property rights, whether by estoppel, by implication, or otherwise. 
(https://www.facebook.com/apps/site_scraping_tos_terms.php) 
 
While it was determined that daily manual collection would be required for the 
project to move forward, due to the extreme nature of the material being researched 
there was concern that there was a possibility that much of the content included and 
stored as a part of this collection, by the letter of the law, might be or become in 
violation of the UK Data Protection Act and more seriously might be in violation of 
the 2000 and/or 2006 UK Terrorism Acts.  Even though the eventual target for 
collection was not a designated terrorist group, they were considered to be an 
extremist right wing group and therefore subject to being proscribed, and if they 
became violent then possibly deemed a terrorist group.  As such, efforts were 
immediately undertaken to secure a letter authorizing this research to avoid any issues 
with the Terrorism Acts, which was provided by the ACPO Counter Terrorism 
Internet Referral Unit (Appendix 3).  Further, to conform to the Data Protection Act it 
was necessary to incorporate into the research design, collection and storage protocols 
that would ensure compliance with the law and protect the identities of those 
individuals whose data would be collected as a part of this research.  This became 
even more important when it was determined that this collection would be 
accomplished utilizing passive covert observation on Facebook.   
The Myth of Online Anonymity 
The growth in the use of computer mediated communications (CMC) and 
particularly the use of social network sites like Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and 
others offers a new and unique opportunity for social scientists as well as other 
researchers to collect vast quantities of data with comparatively minimal cost.  When 
one considers that out of 2.4 billion internet users worldwide ( Internet World Stats, 
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2012) over one billion are members of Facebook (The Associated Press, 2013), it is 
not surprising that serious research is being done to understand the iterative effect 
these online social networks, and the groups operating within them, have on the 
individual user.  The quantity and potential quality, as well as the cost effectiveness of 
data that can be collected on individual users makes it very alluring to collect as much 
information as possible (Johns et al., 2004; Buchanan, 2004; Amichai-Hamburger, 
2005).  However, it should be recognized that users of these social network sites and 
other blogs and chat rooms are not truly anonymous.  Increasingly, the amount of 
profile information as well as the make-up of the individual’s social network makes it 
possible to identify even those who choose to operate using pseudonyms.  As an 
example, most categories of personal information contained within the typical 
Facebook profile (birth date, political and/or religious affiliations, sex, and sexual 
orientation) is deemed to be sensitive personal information under EU law (Edwards & 
Brown, 2009).  As users integrate the use of mobile phone devices into their social 
network experience, identification of individual users becomes even easier.   
Depending on the security settings one places on their own Facebook account it is 
possible for your personal information to be limited to just those individuals who are 
your ‘friends’ on Facebook, or everything you have listed under your profile, all your 
photos, as well as all your posts can be viewed by everyone who is on Facebook if 
your settings are not changed from the default setting of full access to all members, in 
order that you might limit access to this information.  It is important to note that 
contained within many individual profiles are name, marital status, family members 
names, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers.  This issue has become of great concern 
given the revelations of data mining by the UK government and other anti-terrorism 
efforts across Europe and the United States (Williams, 2012; Satter, 2012, The 
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Telegraph, 1 April 2012; BBC News, 1 April 2012; Casciani, 2009).  Further, profiles 
also contain the names of all friends, groups that the user likes or belongs to, political 
and religious affiliations if identified, as well as other personal information a user may 
have wished to present about themselves.  Therefore, given the amount of individual 
data that might be available, the need to protect the identities of the individual users, 
particularly given the controversial nature of the material being examined, was 
deemed vital. 
The challenge was to identify that information considered essential to the research 
project and how this essential data could be collected and stored in a manner insuring 
adherence to EU and UK law to protect the individuals who would become the 
subjects of the research.  More importantly, as research was being conducted on an 
extremist group, where informed consent was not practical and would most certainly 
be counterproductive, the need to protect the identity of the users becomes an 
important ethical issue, to meet with established academic standards, and address 
certain security risks for the researcher that could not be ignored and will be discussed 
herein (Johns et al., 2004; Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 2000).  The following represents 
some issues that were considered important to the project. 
Conducting Passive Covert Observation Online 
Given that research into online participation in social networks, particularly in 
extremist environments, is such a new undertaking, it is not surprising that there is 
sparse literature to provide guidance in this endeavor.  There is, of course, the 
significant issue that must be addressed when engaging in online research of this 
nature regarding whether to make ones presence known to the research subjects.  For 
the purpose of this research, the choice to perform covert research was carefully 
weighed and was addressed prominently in the application for UTREC approval. 
68 
The Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Society states: 
“There are serious ethical and legal issues in the use of covert research but 
the use of covert methods may be justified in certain circumstances.  For 
example, difficulties arise when research participants change their behavior 
because they know they are being studied.  Researchers may also face 
problems when access to spheres of social life is closed to social scientists by 
powerful or secretive interests (item 31).” 
The matter of informed consent was carefully considered and debated during the 
development of the research design.  The literature on Internet Research Ethics offers 
a diverse range of opinions on the matter.  Most authors adhere to the practice of 
informed consent in participant observation in online environments (Herrera, 1999; 
Thomas, 1996; Capurro & Pingel, 2002; Walther, 2002).  Others point out that 
identifying one’s self as a researcher and/or seeking informed consent can have 
negative consequences on the ability to acquire accurate data or may even get you 
kicked out of the group (Hudson & Bruckman, 2004).  Smith (2004) argues that when 
access to the online group in unrestricted (public) the need for informed consent is 
mitigated and in groups where the membership is in a constant state of flux, such 
consent is impractical (Smith, 2004, p. 223).  In one case where the researchers 
purpose was known to the group and informed consent was acquired to publish quotes 
from users, these methods seemed to have a significant impact on the subjects activity 
even leading to what the author describes as “the phenomenon of people who learned 
the nature of my research set about to deliberately manufacture quotable quotes, 
something that strengthened my conviction that non-disclosure of my research activity 
was both justified and necessary” (Reid, 1996, p. 173).    Lauder (2003) makes a 
strong point that “certain social groups, notably extremist political organizations and 
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new religious movements, require the use of covert methods—although only as a last 
resort” (Lauder, 2003, p. 188).  Given the nature of the medium, Facebook, and the 
potentially violent nature of the group to be examined, it was decided that informed 
consent was not practical for several reasons.   
First, the extreme nature of the group to be studied made it clear that informed 
consent would have a negative impact on the continued free flow of dialogue within 
the group, thereby negating the value of the research.  Hudson and Bruckman (2004) 
found that when attempting to acquire informed consent in online chat rooms by 
asking the participants to opt out of the study, they were expelled from the group, or 
otherwise what is known as sanctioned, 72% of the time.  When they chose a different 
approach and asked participants to “opt in” they were still sanctioned 62% of the 
time.  This led them to the conclusion that “individuals in online environments such 
as chat rooms generally do not approve of being studied without their consent”…and 
that “the vehement reaction to many in our study indicates they the object to being 
studied (Hudson & Bruckman, 2004, p. 135).”   
The ethical and legal implications of conducting covert research were taken very 
seriously and involved questioning the status of the participants as real people given 
the virtual nature of the communications; how one could/would be able to determine 
if the data collection contained communications from minors; could one actually gain 
informed consent in a dynamic and continually changing environment; and if we were 
able to obtain informed consent, would there then be a legal obligation to report any 
criminal activity or threats of impending criminal activity thus violating the 
confidentiality of the agreement.  After lengthy and careful deliberation it seemed 
obvious that making our research presence known would be counterproductive to the 
goals of the project and could not only place the participants at risk of arrest but also 
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potentially place this researcher at risk of reprisals by the subjects (Amichai-
Hamburger, 2005).   
Second, and related to the issue of risk, while the daily collection of information 
was considered to be conducting virtual field work, it was also viewed as conducting 
fieldwork in a dangerous environment.  Becoming known to the subjects within these 
virtual groups could have exposed this researcher to physical danger in the real world, 
particularly given that it was decided to conduct on-the-ground field investigation of 
EDL demonstrations in the UK to examine the real world phenomenon that was a 
result of the online activities being observed.  The literature on conducting research in 
dangerous places discusses the need to remain covert and the possibility of physical 
reprisals if the covert researcher is discovered (Lee-Treweek & Linkogle, 2000; 
Jipson & Litton 2000).  While the focus of this literature is related to doing covert 
participant observation in dangerous environments, the ability of online extremist 
groups to backtrack and identify those engaged in or monitoring the online activity of 
the group places any researcher in danger should they be identified and targeted by 
the group.  
Third, given the choice of conducting passive covert observation or passive 
participant observation, it was decided that there should be no interaction with the 
subjects within the virtual environment.  It must be understood, however, that even 
though the majority of this research took place in the virtual realm, there was always 
an understanding that the users within the environment were real people.  Reid (1996) 
provides an example of what can happen when she states, “I believe that to some 
extent I allowed my own sense of computer mediated detachment from the personal 
reality of the people behind the MUD characters and communities I was studying” 
(Reid, 1996, p. 174).  As such, the determination was made to conduct passive covert 
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observation.  In this virtual environment it was necessary to establish false identities 
that would allow access to the target group without making them aware of our intent 
or being placed at risk.  Further, the group would be passively monitored to ensure 
that there was no iterative effect on the dialogue.  Additionally, it was determined that 
engagement in the ongoing dialogue brought with it increased legal problems and by 
simply monitoring or lurking (Crystal, 2001) in this environment without participating 
it would be possible to collect the desired information without risk of violating the 
law beyond the collection of material which may be deemed in violation of the 
terrorism act.   
Finally, the nature and function of certain virtual environments made it possible to 
spend a very limited amount of time within that environment on a daily basis in order 
to collect the needed material.  In some environments it is possible, since there is no 
interaction with the subjects, to access and store 24-36 hours of activity while being in 
the group for only three to four hours per day.  This ability to open and copy archived 
material is very advantageous as it greatly reduces the online footprint of the covert 
identity and makes it possible to collect data without risk of being identified and then 
sanctioned (removed) as a lurker or troll (Amichai-Hamburger, 2005).  Once copied it 
was then possible to fully open the strings of comments to various posts in order to 
obtain the complete dialogue.  Extreme groups are constantly on the lookout for those 
they consider to be ‘unfriendlies’ or lurkers.  Examination of one extremist group’s 
website/blog (name withheld as group was proscribed by the Office of the Home 
Secretary), during the investigative part of  this research project, revealed that the 
designated security officer for the group was able to identify trolls/spies within the 
group and then went on to post the online identities and affiliations of over a dozen 
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individuals who were then sanctioned from the group (site and information withheld 
per 2006 UK Terrorism Act and the Data Protection Act).    
Ensuring Secure Collection 
One additional safeguard that was utilized to ensure the security of these research 
activities was the use of Tor while engaging in the daily collection process.  Tor is an 
online tool that is available as a free download that allows users to protect themselves 
from network surveillance and other threats to personal security when participating in 
online activities.   
“Tor protects you by bouncing your communications around a distributed 
network of relays run by volunteers all around the world; it prevents 
somebody watching your internet connection from learning what sites you 
visit, and it prevents the sites you visit from learning your physical 
location…..Tor was originally designed, implemented, and deployed as a 
third-generation onion routing project of the Naval Research Laboratory. It 
was originally developed with the U.S. Navy in mind, for the primary purpose 
of protecting government communications. Today, it is used every day for a 
wide variety of purposes by the military, journalists, law enforcement officers, 
activists, and many others.” (https://www.torproject.org/) 
Prior to engaging in collection activities it was necessary to engage Tor.  Once 
active it was then possible to access Facebook and the EDL page without concern of 
being backtracked by the group or others who may have been monitoring the group.  
This would include not only government entities but also Islamist groups and certain 
hacking groups who were interested in the identities of those participating in this 
environment.  During the collection process it became clear that members from 
Islamist groups had infiltrated the EDL page and were working to hack into personal 
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profiles of EDL members and post their “private” information including real names, 
addresses, and phone numbers for others to see.  Evidence of these activities will be 
presented and discussed in more detail in later chapters.  Therefore, the need for 
security precautions was justified. 
What can be collected–vs.-what should be collected: Data Protection  
The impact of this issue became clear when it was revealed that what could be 
collected greatly exceeded the needs of the project and the more important question to 
be asked was, more appropriately, what should be collected to achieve the research 
goals.  This is a very important consideration when collecting data in online social 
network environments.  Fortunately academic researchers are often required to submit 
research proposals to University Ethics Review Committees (UTREC) or an 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) that seek to ensure that subjects of the study are 
protected.  But does the fact that online users are not ‘identifiable’ because they are 
using a pseudonym reduce the need to protect the individual users?  It is clear that 
modern data mining applications allow for the collection of vast amounts of 
individual data, especially when privacy settings on social network sites do not 
restrict access to personal information.  Even when privacy settings are restrictive, 
some programmes are able to circumvent restrictive settings to access the personal 
data of the users.  Bots or web crawlers can be placed into an online environment and 
digitally mine for personal information that would normally be inaccessible to the 
casual user and provide a fuller perspective on the individual.  Fortunately, the UK 
Data Protection Act (DPA) provides guidance for the collection of what is considered 
‘sensitive personal data.’   
In this Act “sensitive personal data” means personal data consisting of 
information as to— 
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(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject,  
(b) his political opinions,  
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature,  
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the [1992 
c. 52.] Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992),  
(e) his physical or mental health or condition,  
(f) his sexual life,  
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or  
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been 
committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any 
court in such proceedings. (DPA, 1998, p. 6) 
Similar language is also found in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October, 1995, also known as the Data Protection Directive 
(DPD, 1995, p. 8). 
Therefore, in an environment where it is possible to collect such a vast amount of 
personal information, the researcher must determine for themselves what they can and 
should legitimately collect for their research purposes.  Clearly, it is possible to 
collect more than is needed for most studies and it was essential to be sensitive to the 
rights of those who became unknowing subjects of this research to ensure academic 
integrity and secure/protect the identities of the individual users. This was 
accomplished choosing to collect and segregate into variables only the information 
deemed essential to the research to ensure compliance with the law and ethical 
guidelines.  As such, no specific information on the individual users such as gender, 
location, race, etc., was collected or included in the dataset.     
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Protecting identities and information  
Central to this discussion is why this data is considered sensitive.  Both the DPA 
and the DPD are clear that ‘personal data’ is that which is “related to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (DPD, 1995, p. 8), “who can be identified from those data” 
(DPA, 1998, p. 5).  With the guidance of these provisions and the ethical 
considerations of identity protection due to the use of passive covert observation, it 
was determined that certain protocols would be implemented to provide the required 
protection while still allowing for the substantive collection of data within online 
social network environments.  These include:   
 Anonymizing user names during the data transformation process 
 Only utilizing data determined critical to the project  
 Segregating/sanitizing the data into the required variables for 
individual analysis thereby removing individual identifiers 
 Storing data in a way to avoid unintentional and potentially intentional 
access of the raw and sanitized data by unauthorized persons 
 Completing the University’s Data Protection briefing to reinforce the 
understanding of the responsibilities and limitations  
 Insuring destruction of the raw data and the secure long term storage of 
the sanitized data after the project has been completed. 
As research into online participation in extremist social network environments is 
not conducive to ‘informed consent’, it was determined that these and other protocols, 
to be discussed later, would be sufficient to protect the identities of users on these 
sites.  These protocols were included in the application for UTREC approval which 
was reviewed and found to be acceptable. 
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Ensuring the anonymity of the users was a key component of this research effort.  
In 2008, research into the Facebook accounts of an entire cohort of college students 
resulted in the publication of the dataset titled “Tastes, Ties, and Time (T3)” (Lewis et 
al., 2008).  While the researchers felt that “student privacy was assured by converting 
all names to numerical identifiers and promptly removing or encoding all other 
information that could be traced back to individual students (Lewis et al., 2008), 
information contained within the dataset related to the size of the student body and the 
available majors made identification of the institution relatively easy.  Within a few 
days of this revelation, the names of the research subjects were discovered (Zimmer, 
2010).  Following this discovery, the data set was taken down.  Importantly, this 
research had been reviewed by Harvard’s Committee on the Use of Human Subjects 
(Zimmer, 2010, p. 318). Following this incident the principal investigator of the T3 
Project responded by saying, “We’re sociologists, not technologists, so a lot of this is 
new to us” (Zimmer, 2010, p. 316).  Zimmer (2010) examines this failure and calls on 
academics to evaluate their own gaps in understanding the challenges of privacy and 
data anonymization, and should seek to develop interdisciplinary teams of 
collaborators to avoid the mistakes made in the T3 research data.  He goes on to 
suggest Institutional Review Boards should become better informed in this areas, and 
that methods courses, codes of best practices, and research protocols should be 
updated to consider the unique challenges of engaging in research on the Internet and 
in social media environments (Zimmer, 2010, p.323).   
Access to and storage of data 
When considering who should and would have access to the data, it was decided 
that access to the raw data would be limited to those individuals who were listed as 
participants in the research project.  Subsequently, any additional researchers who 
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might have a need to come into contact with the data, as additions to the research 
team, would receive a DPA briefing and acknowledge by signature their 
understanding of the law.  Following the publication of the Facebook restrictions 
access became limited to this researcher.    
Further, the data was stored in such a manner as to prevent unauthorized access 
and/theft.  This included the storage methods mentioned previously in addition to 
other precautions that may not be so obvious.  It is common for researchers to copy 
data onto disc or portable drives to facilitate working from home or when travelling.  
These practices significantly increase the risk that the data might be accessed by 
individuals who are not a part of the research team.  Possession of this material, away 
from the confines of the University places the data at a higher risk of being lost or 
stolen.  Beyond the dissemination of privileged personal information, which would be 
a violation of the DPA, this became an issue when investigating the use of a new 
analytic tool called Ayasdi Iris, which promised to provide “Interactive Analysis and 
Visualization for Complex Data (http://www.ayasdi.com/).  After some preliminary 
investigation of the program with another data set not related to this project, and a 
subsequent discussion with an engineering representative from Ayasdi, it was 
determined that the online use of the program involved placing the dataset within the 
Ayasdi Iris program server in order to perform the desired analysis.  Since this 
represented a transmission/transfer of data, and even though I was given many 
assurances by Ayasdi regarding the security of the data, I determined that this would 
most certainly have been a violation, and the use of this analytical tool was viewed as 
incompatible with the ethical and legal guidelines that had been set forth in the 
research design.   In the end, due to the restriction against the automated data 
collection that would have taken place in St. Andrews, and the resultant manual data 
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collection; the raw data is held by this researcher on a secure drive and will be 
destroyed on the completion of this thesis. 
While care was taken to protect the identities of the SNS users, one cannot ignore 
the capability of others to reverse engineer the segregation/sanitation algorithms to 
access user identity.  As such, there was much consideration of the real value vs. 
danger of retaining a copy of the anonymized raw data beyond the point of its 
usefulness to the segregation or sanitation process.  Additionally, care was needed in 
post analysis publications and presentations to avoid disseminating ‘sensitive personal 
data’ for the same reasons.  As such, no user strings/comments that may still be 
publically accessible were used.  There are, in addition to these ethical concerns, 
certain legal considerations that cannot be ignored. 
Given the legal and ethical concerns cited, the methodological aspects of this 
project are important toward establishing that it is possible to perform this type of 
investigative research and analysis, and provide substantive findings toward 
understanding the impact of computer mediated communication within online 
extremist environments. To accomplish this it was necessary to determine which 
group would be examined; how the raw collection data would be collected and stored; 
the methods that would be utilized to segregate the data into a format that would 
facilitate analysis; establish which variables would be most useful in understanding 
the phenomenon; and ensure the final disposition and destruction of the raw data.   
Collection Medium 
To ensure access to the information flow for the purposes of collecting as much 
traffic as possible it was decided to examine groups that were utilizing Facebook as a 
communication medium.  The rapid growth of Facebook in general and the increased 
presence of extremist groups, and their use of this outlet specifically, made Facebook 
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an opportune medium for investigation.  Monitoring Facebook traffic offered multiple 
advantages due to the format of the program.  The primary reason was that all posts 
were identified to a specific user.  Unlike some environments where there is a stream 
of comments that may or may not be identifiable to any one user, each post on 
Facebook is attributed to the user/author.   The posts and comments are well 
organized, dated and time stamped, and access to archived strings is possible due to 
the nature of the embedded coding found within the posts.  While many Facebook 
groups allow for a free flowing exchange of ideas and comments, in the case of the 
group which became the target of this collection, the group  administrators chose to 
control the dialogue on their page by only allowing ‘members’ to comment on 
material that the administrator(s) had posted to the page.  This was not the case in the 
early days of their Facebook presence, but after having been shut down by Facebook 
on two occasions for material that was deemed unsuitable
4
 (openly promoting racism 
or violence), the administrators chose to control the dialogue during the majority of 
the day and only allow open access for primary posting by users on an irregular 
schedule when they could monitor the posts and sanction anyone who might create 
problems for the group.  Since the settings on the page allowed for the monitoring of 
the ‘administrator only’ posts with comments, and since it was impossible to know 
when the administrators would open the page, it was decided to focus only on the 
administrator posts and comments for the collection.  Therefore, all the administrator 
(primary) posts were collected along with all the member comments to those posts 
which are characterized as secondary posts.  During the collection period the ability to 
monitor and collect information from the group page was uninterrupted, which was 
                                                 
4
 Noted during the observation phase. 
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advantageous given the fate of some of the other groups that had been considered as 
targets for collection. 
The Target Group 
The selection of the English Defence League as the target group was guided by 
several determining factors.  The first consideration was the need to have a group that 
would allow for a consistent and sufficient flow of traffic that would not be 
interrupted during the study period.  During the discussions with the Counter 
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, it became clear that part of their remit was to work 
actively to remove terrorist websites, blogs, and chat rooms from the internet.  As 
such, there was concern, not only about the legality of the information that might be 
collected and stored, but also about the viability of having a consistent flow of 
information to facilitate collection and analysis.  To investigate the viability of 
collecting from known extremist environments online, and to assess the utility of the 
collection method, there was a three month investigative period which began in 
August 2010, following receipt of the letter from the Counter Terrorism Internet 
Referral Unit (CTIRU) which provided protection for these activities.  During this 
three month period, two pro-jihadi groups and two far right groups were monitored 
and preliminary data was collected to determine the viability of these groups for the 
larger study.  At the end of the three month investigative period all but one group had 
ceased to have sufficient daily traffic and two had been taken over by spamming 
attacks that rendered them useless to the normal users, thereby forcing them to 
abandon the page.  These activities were recorded in a log book and the daily 
collection was stored on a dedicated hard drive that was kept by this researcher. 
Since the jihadi inspired groups have since been proscribed by the UK 
government, it is not possible to provide specific detail regarding the pages where 
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they were located without violating provisions of the UK Terrorism Act.  However, 
what can be discussed is the nature of the traffic and how the traffic was affected by 
the efforts of law enforcement and outsiders to shut them down.  The first pro-jihadi 
group, which was an iteration of the previously proscribed group, was itself banned 
by the UK government in January 2010.  Although this group maintained a Facebook 
page for a short time during the investigative phase, it soon suffered from continued 
interruptions of service and spam attacks.  As has been the practice with these groups, 
a new iteration, with the same cast of characters arose in late 2010.  While this new 
group, which was itself proscribed in 2012, had a very substantial webpage, they did 
not have a Facebook page.  However, there was a Facebook link/page that claimed 
alliance with the group.  The Muslim Defence League, which portrayed itself as being 
in service to the Muslim community to combat the influence of the far-right anti-
Muslim groups on Facebook, began to grow during the initial investigation period and 
offered promise for collection until they too became infiltrated by members of the 
opposition who then took over the page with anti-Muslim posts and spam attacks.  At 
this point it should be mentioned that spam attacks are automated postings of various 
content that occupies the page of the targeted group making it useless to the users.  
Typical spam includes thousands of worthless advertisements or pornography 
postings every day.  By the end of the investigation period, the traffic on this page 
was down to just one or two posts per day on an inconsistent basis. 
One of the far right groups, the Scottish Defence League (SDL), which was an 
offshoot of the larger English Defence League, provided consistent traffic in the early 
days of the investigative process discussed previously, but the number of members 
and the amount of daily traffic was deemed insufficient to meet the needs of the study.   
While the SDL was to be a separate organization from the English Defence League, it 
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seemed that there was a decision within the larger EDL to make these satellite 
organizations into divisions of the larger group.  The result was the bulk of the daily 
traffic took place on the main EDL page with only local issues being discussed on the 
division pages. 
The group that offered the most promise, which ultimately became the target 
group for collection and analysis, was the English Defence League.  With a growing 
membership over the summer and fall of 2010 and increasing daily activity, this group 
seemed to offer the best opportunity for collecting a sufficient amount of traffic to 
facilitate the collection and analysis of this computer mediated communication.  
Beginning 9 August 2010, the recorded number of users who had liked the EDL page 
was 16,685.  By 31 August 2010 the group had grown to 26,616 with daily traffic that 
indicated a growing enthusiasm for the EDL and the efforts of the group.  Following 
the publicity of EDL leaders traveling to visit New York City on the ninth anniversary 
of the 9-11 attacks, to protest the proposed building of a new mosque near the site of 
the World Trade Center attacks, the group gained momentum and by 20 September 
2010 had 29,350 ‘members’.  By 1 November 2010 the EDL likes/members 
numbered 40,372, with growing online activity and announcements of demonstrations 
and other key news for the membership.  The final entry for the ninety day period was 
on 8 November 2010 with the EDL having acquired 41,564 likes/members on their 
page.  Having made the decision to target the EDL page for collection, the 
determination of when to start the collection process was made when it was revealed 
that the EDL would be having a homecoming demonstration on 5 February 2011 as a 
show of their ability to mobilize their membership and garner media attention for their 
movement and their agenda.  An online check on 23 January 2011 revealed that the 
number of likes/members on the EDL Facebook page had increased drastically to 
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69,682 with the majority of the traffic on the page being focused toward the logistics 
of transportation to and from the demonstration to be held in Luton on 5 February 
2011.  Interestingly, there was considerable discussion focused on encouraging the 
members to be respectful of the police and other authorities, and to avoid any 
confrontations that might be portrayed negatively by the press since it was anticipated 
that this homecoming would garner world-wide media attention.   
Membership 
Unlike the restrictions placed on the flow of dialogue within the group, gaining 
access to the Facebook page of the English Defence League became easier over time.  
During the preliminary investigative phase of the project, it was necessary to request 
access to become a member of the EDL Facebook page.  This was accomplished by 
locating the page within the Facebook system by entering English Defence League in 
the Facebook search engine, and then requesting to ‘Join” the group.  Once the 
request to join was approved, notification was sent indicating this status and access to 
the traffic was possible.  At some point following the initial phase of investigation the 
EDL changed its access policy to one where “joining” the group, and gaining access 
to the traffic and being able to post to the page, only required that one “like” the EDL 
page.  Once this occurred, immediate access was available.  This new access policy 
was in place prior to the formal collection phase and continues to this day.  But does 
‘liking’ a group presuppose agreement with the group’s goals or narrative?  What 
does it really mean when one clicks ‘Like’ on a Facebook group? 
Liking-What does it mean?  
“Liking” a group or a specific page on Facebook is viewed differently depending 
on the context.  While some may view this as a simple expression of a passing 
agreement with an idea, others might view this act as a tacit acceptance of a page or 
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group and an active expression of an opinion or form of speech.  Tina McCorkindale 
(2011), who researches the use of social media as a public relations and marketing 
tool has an interesting perspective on the value of ‘likes’.  In her view ‘likes’ should 
not be considered to be a stand-alone measure of the strength of an individual’s tie to 
any specific social media page or group (McCorkindale, June 28, 2011).  She reports 
the following in her blog posting “Why the Number of Likes and Followers Don’t 
Matter” (McCorkindale, 2008): 
1. Liking something may not translate into anything of value such as 
behavior or attitude. 
2. Word of mouth has been shown to influence “liking” behavior. 
3. I may “like” you but I won’t want to hear from you. 
4. Few people visit their “liked” organization without an incentive. 
5. Followers are not listeners. 
If McCorkindale is correct in her view then users “liking” the EDL Facebook 
page, or any other extremist page or SNS should have no significance and be of no 
concern.  Morozov (2011) provides support for this position in his evaluation of social 
media participation in activism where users view “liking” as actual engagement in 
activism.  He goes on to state that “the supposed gains of digital activism are nothing 
but illusory: Whatever they save through their newly found ability to recruit new 
members, they lose in trying to make these new members act as a group—and, 
preferably, without giving in to social loafing” (Morozov, 2011, p. 194).  However, a 
recent court case in the United States expressed a differing opinion regarding the 
value of a “like” as a form of expression. 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, case number 12-
1671(2012), the court ruled that “Facebook provides a convenient and effective way 
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for millions of voters to express support for the candidates of their choice and become 
more personally involved in the political process as a result” (Appeal:12-1671, 2012, 
p. 12).  This case revolved around the dismissal by the sitting Sherriff of certain 
employees from the Hampton County Sherriff’s Department for having “liked” the 
Facebook page of his opponent during the latest election where he was able to retain 
his position.  After re-election he summarily dismissed those individuals who “liked” 
his opponent.  Such action then prompted the suit which is the focus of this case.  The 
court held that “liking” the page of the opposing candidate was a form of political 
expression, and was thereby protected under the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution (Appeal: 12-1671, 2012).  Interestingly within the amicus brief 
filed in this case by Facebook it states: 
“Liking a Facebook Page (or a non-Facebook website) is speech: it generates 
verbal statements and communicative imagery in the User’s Profile (or 
Timeline) Page – i.e., a statement that the user likes a particular Page, 
accompanied by the Page’s icon – as well as similar statements and imagery 
in the News Feed of the User’s Friends(p.9)….The use of social networking 
and other online communities to rally support for political candidates and 
causes is a contemporary example of quintessential political speech” (Appeal: 
12-1671, 2012, 12). 
What is important in this case is that for the EDL the number of likes was viewed 
and highly promoted as being the number of members they had within the group.  
During the collection period, the efforts to increase the number of likes/members was 
a primary focus of the EDL leadership and was mentioned often in the posts by the 
administrators and users to support the view that the popularity of the group was 
growing, that their anti-Muslim ideas were appealing to the mainstream, and that they 
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were becoming a force that the government could no longer ignore.  Central to this 
research is the relationship between the number of users/members who liked the EDL 
page and the actual participation of those users within this environment.   
Collection Period 
Determining the collection period was important for a number of reasons.  First, it 
was necessary to ensure that an uninterrupted daily collection period of at least thirty 
days could be accomplished.  The importance of a consistent flow of information was 
necessary to facilitate the multivariate analysis that was expected.  Large ‘holes’ in 
the collection may have missed important information or events that might prove 
valuable to the findings.  The viability of the continued activity of the group was 
another important consideration.  The EDL was experiencing substantial growth 
following the summer of 2010 and all indications were that the group would continue 
to grow, allowing for a growing traffic flow.  The growth of the group was monitored 
throughout the fall and winter of 2010 and a collection period was established based 
upon the growth of the group during the observation period and events that were to 
take place in early 2011 that seemed to offer the possibility of even more rapid growth 
and the opportunity to investigate the mobilizing effect of this online activity.  Having 
experienced significant growth over the last half of 2010, with membership rising 
from 16,685 in August 2010 to over 50,000 in December 2010, the EDL decided to 
have a demonstration in Luton England on February 5, 201,1using the slogan ‘Back to 
Where it All Began’ on their Facebook page,. This demonstration was to serve as a 
huge recruitment drive for new membership, create solidarity within the ranks of 
those who were already members, and to precipitate additional media attention to 
their cause.  The timing and purpose of this demonstration, which was attended by 
this researcher and discussed in the previous chapter, was pivotal in making the 
87 
decision to begin collection immediately prior to this event.  Therefore, data 
collection began on 1 February 2011.  Unfortunately, due to embedded viruses in the 
early posts, the data for the period from 1 February to 4 February was corrupted to the 
point of being irretrievable.  Following this revelation, updated virus protection was 
installed on the collection computer allowing for an uncorrupted collection set 
covering 5 February to 22 March 2011.   
The Collection of the Raw Data 
Facebook, during the collection period, offered a consistent platform that allowed 
for the uniform collection of traffic.  It has become a common practice of Facebook to 
periodically change the format that is used to ‘enhance the user experience’.  The end 
result for the researcher is that these changes make it difficult to have a consistent 
flow of information that can be broken down and coded.  This becomes even more 
problematic when computer programs are used to facilitate the automated coding of 
the collection.  Since the format remained the same during the collection process, this 
was not a problem, however, the collection of supplemental data later in the year 
revealed a significant change in format and the embedded coding of the data, making 
coding more difficult and necessitating a major revision to the parsing software. 
The method of data collection, given that the automated data collection methods 
previously described were deemed unfeasible, was to visit the EDL Facebook Page on 
a daily basis to collect the previous 24 hours of traffic.  Using a clean laptop that was 
Tor enabled, the daily collection was accomplished by logging on to EDL Facebook 
page, opening the day’s posts and then copying and pasting these posts into a word 
document which was then saved as a .doc file on the hard drive with the group name 
and date of collection (e.g. EDL 2-13).  Included in the collection were the primary 
posts of the administrator and the subsequent comments by various ‘members’ of the 
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EDL.  This collection process was used consistently throughout the entire collection 
period.  Following the end of the collection period all the daily files were placed into 
a single file folder marked EDL Data and then transferred onto a more powerful 
computer to facilitate opening all the comments to the administrator posts.  With this, 
it was possible to open all the comments in a string following a primary post and 
create a complete file containing all the traffic for that day. 
Security Protocols 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there were certain security concerns that had 
to be addressed to ensure the safety of the researcher and the safety of the data to 
guard against unintended or intentional access to the data by others.  One of the first 
things done to protect the research effort was the establishment of covert identities, as 
outlined in the UTREC proposal, which would be used to access Facebook for the 
purpose of collecting the daily traffic.  This involved acquiring an e-mail account on a 
legitimate e-mail service and then setting up a Facebook account for each of the 
identities.  There were four identities established, as originally set forth in the research 
design and the Ethics review, for the purpose of conducting the initial screening of 
groups to determine the target for the final collection.  This proved to be a prudent 
move as two of the four identities were compromised by hacking attempts following 
the initial investigative phase and had to be abandoned.  During the formal collection 
period only one Facebook user name was utilized and was sufficient for the purposes 
of this study.  This same username was also utilized during the collection of 
supplemental material later in the year without incident.  It should be noted that prior 
to initiating the investigative portion of the study in 2010, notification was sent to the 
CTIRU in the United Kingdom to inform them of these user names and e-mail 
addresses so resources would not be wasted if and/or when they were noticed within 
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the EDL logon and if concerns were raised.  Similarly, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security in the United States were 
notified, prior to the collection activities, to prevent alarm on their part as well since 
some of these activities would be taking place on my return to the United States.  All 
of these notification efforts were well received, but responses included an admonition 
against engaging in any activity that could be interpreted as illegal and included 
statements clarifying that I was not being provided any blanket immunity should my 
activities stray into the realm if illegality. 
The use of a clean laptop, during the collection process, was important as it 
provided the opportunity to collect data using a computer that had no identifying tags 
within its operating systems or other software.  Therefore, had there been any 
attempts to trace the collection activities by any of the potential target groups or 
others, the most that could be learned was the MAC address of the computer, that had 
no name(s) associated with it.  Such tracking and identification possibilities were 
further complicated by enabling TOR during the collection process to mask the 
collection location and then utilizing public Wi-Fi connections to prevent being 
tracked to a specific internet hub or wireless server that could be associated with this 
researcher.  The MAC or Media Access Control address is a specific identifier to each 
computer and can become the target of intrusion attacks for the purpose of collecting 
information on the user, stealing or compromising data, or perpetrating attacks against 
the targeted unit (Daintith & Wright, 2008). 
Following the successful transfer of the data to a portable hard drive, and 
confirmation that all the data was intact, the raw data was then deleted from the 
collection laptop, and that computer was subjected to multiple electronic wiping’s 
(erasures) to ensure that the data could not be accessed in the future on this devise.  
90 
While it is accepted that sophisticated forensic tools, like those used by federal law 
enforcement and the intelligence community, might provide access to fragmented 
portions of the data, and the only way to prevent such an event would be the total 
destruction of the devise, it was determined that the erasure efforts were sufficient to 
prevent inadvertent transmission of, or access to, sensitive raw data by unauthorized 
individuals which would have been a violation of the Data Protection Act.  
The Discovery of Embedded Coding 
Following the movement of the raw data onto the new computer, it was necessary 
to access each day’s traffic to then open all the comments, or secondary posts, which 
had been posted to the primary posts of the administrator.  When performing this 
activity, it was discovered that when opening the document and then clicking on the 
primary posting to open all the secondary posts, this action opened a new tab/window 
in which the EDL Facebook page appeared, and opened to that particular post.   This 
finding was significant in that it revealed there was embedded coding within the 
copied and pasted documents that were essentially hyperlinks to these posts and other 
content that existed within the EDL Facebook page.  Hyperlinks are URL’s to other 
information and are presented within a sting of code or text.  By ‘clicking’ on the 
hyperlink you are directed to a different web page via the new URL. 
Additionally, it was found, on reopening the saved posts, that the quantity of 
secondary posts that were available far exceeded what had initially been collected.  
Surprisingly, when opening the secondary posts that were associated with the primary 
posts, the comments that had been made subsequent to the date of collection were 
now included in the newly accessed comment string.  This was significant in that it 
increased the number of secondary posts/comments that were now available for 
analysis.   
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The embedded coding also revealed that each user name had its own numeric 
identifier within Facebook.  So, while the use of a pseudonym might offer some sense 
of online anonymity, that anonymity was a thin veil that could easily be pierced given 
the specific identifier contained within the Facebook coding that provided access to 
the user profile when accessing the hyperlinks found within the embedded code of the 
pages (to be discussed).  Again, given the amount of personal data that is available as 
a part of the typical Facebook profile, and the ability to track transmissions, the 
revelation of a specific identification number for each user further complicated 
matters when it came to protecting the identities of the online users, particularly given 
the amount of traffic that had been collected and the now increased amount of data 
that was available.  Moving toward the coding of the raw data, effective 
anonymization of the users became even more important. 
The Initial Variable Coding of the Raw Collection 
The compilation of the raw collection, which involved opening each post and its 
corresponding secondary posts, and then copying all this into another file took several 
weeks.  The results, however, were very satisfying as the amount of data that was 
collected far exceeded expectations and with all the posts and comments now in daily 
files it would be possible to begin coding.  However, before coding could commence 
it was necessary to determine the variables that would be used and whether the 
collection contained the information that was needed to perform the desired analysis. 
User 
The identification of the individual users was essential for several reasons.  First, 
it would facilitate the analysis of the total number of users that were posting to the 
EDL Facebook page during the collection period.  While there were an average of 
over 75,000 likes that were characterized by the EDL administrators and participants 
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as representing the membership of the EDL, what was unknown was how many 
users/members were actually taking the time to comment on the administrator posts to 
the EDL Facebook page.  As with Caren et al. (2011) in their examination of 
Stormfront user frequency, there are questions as to who is participating and at what 
level.  Issuing the user with an identification number provides the capability to 
understand just how many of the 75,000 ‘members’ are actually participating.  For 
example, a user analysis was accomplished using the duplication identification 
function within SPSS.  By selecting the user ID’s variable, the SPSS program 
identified duplicate cases and provided the number of actual users who participated in 
the online dialog.  A frequency analysis of the user id numbers then revealed the 
actual number of times each user posted during the collection period. These and other 
finding will be provided in detail in Chapter Six.   
Second, the user identification coupled with the date stamp allows for a frequency 
analysis of user activity during the collection period.  If one is to understand the 
impact of the online phenomenon, it only makes sense to examine not only who is 
participating but how often they participate.    By identifying the users by date of post 
provides the ability to conduct a frequency analysis of the active users.  
Understanding how often a user might comment in response to the administrator posts 
can give an indication of the user’s commitment to the group, even if it is only an 
online representation of that commitment.  Clearly someone who posted only once or 
twice within the collection period should not be viewed as a serious member while 
others who might post dozens if not hundreds of times should be viewed as having a 
strong association with the group if not the ideology of the group.   
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Date 
The identification of the date of the post is useful in assisting with frequency 
analysis and linking posts with what could be viewed as critical or important 
socio/political events.  Within the collection period there were several significant 
events that seemed to create a greater than normal amount of traffic.  These included 
the arrests of key EDL figures, confrontations with the pro-Islamist Muslims Against 
Crusades, EDL clashes with law enforcement, and notices of offenses by 
Muslims/immigrants that the EDL wanted to highlight to create fervor within the 
group.  A traffic analysis by date provides an understanding of the ebb and flow of the 
group’s online activities. 
 By tagging the secondary posts with the date for the primary posts it became 
possible to track the virility of any given post within the community. Understanding 
which primary posts receive the most secondary posts allows for the investigation of 
whether there is a specific type of content or topic that may solicit more responses 
than other topics.   
The Posts 
The primary and secondary posts were selected and included in their entirety to 
allow for multiple examinations.  First was the determination of the emphasis of the 
post.  Was it a pro-EDL post, an anti-Muslim post, anti-government, or other type of 
post.  Second, having the entire post made it possible to perform a key word/phrase 
analysis using NVivo software to determine the frequency of certain words and 
phrases that might indicate a certain acceptance of the extremist narrative of the EDL.  
It was then possible to determine if there were individual users within the group that 
tended to use these words and phrases more often than others. 
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The category coding of the primary posts was done manually after the post had 
been placed into SPSS.  Each post was opened and then coded according to the 
emphasis of the post.  This categorization allowed for the measurement of the EDL’s 
administrator emphasis in his messaging as well as being able to assess the impact on 
the membership as reflected in the number of comments per category of posts.  The 
primary posts were coded as follows: 
Pro-EDL.  Within this category included all generally pro-EDL posts by the 
administrator.  This included morning welcomes, evening salutations, and primary 
posts that were designed to speak to the ‘patriotism’ of the group and the membership.  
Many of these posts were for the purpose of reinforcing the identity of the group. 
EDL Demonstration/Mobilization.  This included all administrator posts that were 
placed on Facebook to promote upcoming demonstrations, mobilize the membership 
to attend those demonstrations, and even suggest various methods of transportation to 
facilitate getting to the demonstrations.  These primary posts became more prevalent 
as the dates of the demonstration became eminent and dropped off following the 
actual demonstration and were replaced by more propaganda posts. 
EDL Propaganda.  Primary posts that were for propaganda purposes only were 
placed within this category.  These include post demonstration assessments and links 
to stories or videos about the demonstrations.  It also included favorable articles or 
videos regarding EDL activities, efforts, or actions by local divisions. 
Anti-Muslim . Generally anti-Muslim posts were identified within the grouping.  
This would include issues of immigration, the building of New or larger mosques, the 
activities of MAC and their efforts to institute Sharia control zones and Islamic 
Emirates within the UK, and other generally anti-Muslim content. 
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Muslim Rape. Any primary posts that discussed or highlighted stories about the 
arrest of Muslims involved in rape were coded into this category including the high 
profile arrest of larger grooming and Muslim rape gangs.  A central theme in these 
posts is the victimization of non-Muslim women and children by Muslim men. 
Muslim Murder.  Administrator posts that discussed cases of murder by Muslims 
were coded into this category.  Again, as with Muslim Rape, the focus of these posts 
was the victimization of non-Muslims by Muslims (mostly men but not in all cases). 
Muslim Pedophilia.  Primary posts that were focused on incidents of pedophilia 
committed by Muslims were coded into this category. 
Anti-Government.  This category contains those posts that were considered to be 
anti-government in nature.  They ranged from feelings of persecution by government 
forces for their views to sentiments that the government was more in favor of 
protecting Muslim rights that protecting British values. 
Anti-EDL.  This category was created to record any anti-EDL posts.  There were, 
however, no primary posts that were anti-EDL in nature, however as will be discussed 
briefly there were a few anti-EDL URL links within a few secondary posts. 
Other/Unknown.  Any administrator posts that could not be placed in any of the 
previous categories was coded into other/unknown. 
Following the completion of this coding into a Primary Post Type (PPType) 
variable, another variable was created collapsing these categories into more 
generalized condensed categories and placed into the variable labeled 
CompressPPType. 
Pro-EDL (general), Demonstration/Mobilization, and EDL Propaganda were merged 
and coded as Pro-EDL. 
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Anti-Muslim, Muslim Rape, and Muslim Murder were merged and coded as Anti-
Muslim . 
Anti-Government, Anti-EDL, and Other/Unknown were merged and coded as Other. 
Likes 
Within Facebook groups, the users have the opportunity to not just comment on 
any given post but may also ‘Like’ a post, or ‘share’ a primary post by the 
administrator of the page.  The number of shares was relatively low and inconsistent 
and was therefore not noted, however, the number of likes often times far exceeded 
the number of comments and was therefore chosen as a variable to be examined.  
“Liking” a post is different from the Page or Group “Like” that was discussed earlier, 
which was viewed as being the vehicle for the user ‘joining’ the EDL Facebook 
group.  “Liking” a post allows the user to show their support for the item being posted 
without having to comment on the post, although as previously stated, the “like” itself 
can be viewed as a form of expression.  It was not possible, given the manual 
collection protocol, to determine who was “liking” these posts, but the recordation of 
the number of likes for the primary posts does provide an additional measure of 
popularity of or acceptance of a particular post. 
URL Links 
The inclusion of URL links within the administrator posts allows for the 
transmission of large quantities of information with little effort.  Many of the URL 
links are presented to either support the narrative of the EDL, highlight what are 
deemed to be government policies that are at odds with the goals of the EDL or in rare 
cases support their cause.  These links are also, and for the most part, used to expose 
behaviour by the Muslim minority that supports the position and  the EDL’s 
characterization of them as ‘the other’.  The URL links were further classified/coded 
97 
(manually), as were the posts mentioned earlier, as pro EDL, anti-Muslim/immigrant, 
anti-government, or other following their placement into SPSS.  The coding by 
category of the URL links was done in the same manner as were the primary posts.  
This designation coupled with the count on secondary posts and “likes” provides 
insight into which links were most effective in evincing a response from the group to 
which types of URL links.  As with the primary posts the URLType variable 
contained all the varied areas previously listed, and these too were collapsed into the 
more generalized categories previously noted as CompressURLType. 
YouTube Links 
YouTube links were found primarily within the primary posts and allow the 
members to have access to and comment on videos that are presented by way of the 
administrator post.  These links ranged from video links showing media interviews 
with EDL leaders or interviews with UK Islamist leaders to reinforce the negative 
image of what they deemed to be ‘the enemy’.  Additionally, music videos that had 
been produced as inspirational material for the EDL membership were provided as 
well as video showing footage of the EDL demonstrations.  These demonstration 
videos included the speeches by EDL leaders, images of the members marching to 
accentuate the size and power of the group, as well as video portraying the 
interactions of EDL members with local police to support the contention that the 
government was acting to suppress the EDL and what they deemed to be ‘patriotic’ 
acts.   
The use of YouTube by extremist and terrorist groups is a growing phenomenon 
and is seen as a very effective and cost efficient way to spread group ideology and 
propaganda (Weimann, 2006; Conway & McInerney, 2008).  In their analysis of 
Jihadi videos, Conway and McInerney (2008) examined the categories of jihadi 
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videos within their collection, the number of ratings these videos received by those 
who viewed them, the number of views, and the number of comments that were made 
on each video. Other data that was examined was the age of the users, the geographic 
location of the users, and the statements made by those who chose to comment on the 
videos (Conway & McInerney, 2008).  While they consider this work to be an 
“exploratory study to evaluate the feasibility of a larger scale project to explore the 
support base for political violence amongst the online audience jihadi-promoting 
video content on YouTube” (Conway & McInerney, 2008, p. 116), it provided the 
impetus to consider the way YouTube videos were used by the EDL.   The EDL made 
effective use of these videos in supporting the ideology of the group as well as 
developing the ‘us vs. them’ paradigm that is essential when seeking to characterize 
Muslims and immigrants as “the other”.  Analyzing the categories, the number of 
likes to a particular post that contained a YouTube video, as well as the number of 
posts/comments on that administrator post allows for an examination of the impact of 
the video on the group as well as understanding which videos elicited the strongest 
responses. 
Coding the Raw Data 
With the variables established, an Excel spreadsheet was developed to begin the 
process of coding out the captured posts.  Beginning with 5 February 2011, the 
documents were opened and the information that corresponded to each individual 
variable was cut and pasted into the appropriate cell on the Excel spreadsheet.  While 
the final analysis would be performed in SPSS, the use of Excel for the initial coding 
is more user friendly and exports easily into SPSS for more in depth analysis.  The 
early efforts at hand coding the data, which was initially estimated at several thousand 
posts, was laborious and slow.  Early coding sessions of eight to ten hours per day 
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resulted in the coding of approximately 200 lines of data per day (each line was a 
single post).  With the volume of data to be coded, and given the number of errors that 
seemed to be occurring in the later hours of the sessions, requiring a line by line 
recheck of the input, it was decided to limit the coding to 100-150 posts per day.  This 
went on for several weeks and after coding 2500 posts, with a minimum number of 
variables, it became obvious that the time required to code out the large number of 
posts was much greater than previously estimated. 
The Development and Implementation of Coding Software 
After discussing the coding issues with a seasoned computer scientist, and 
considering the presence of the embedded coding that was transferred over from 
Facebook to the word documents that made up the collection, it was determined that it 
would be possible to develop software that might automate the coding process.  
Following this initial discussion I provided a separate data set that contained the same 
embedded coding to determine if it might be feasible to develop such a program.  
Being informed that the documents provided sufficient coding to allow for the 
development of software that could facilitate automated coding of the collection; I 
commissioned the creation of this software as a tool to be used for the coding of the 
raw EDL Facebook data that was being held in my possession.  While the software 
designer prefers to remain unnamed due to the aggressive and litigious nature of 
Facebook, his efforts in the development of the specialized software that allowed for 
the automated coding of the posts not only made this project humanly possible but 
enhanced the capabilities of the analysis by ensuring the accuracy of the data coding 
and expanding the available variables beyond what was originally proposed when 
being manually encoded.  Working closely with this individual reinforced the point 
that was the early focus of this project; that being the need to develop interdisciplinary 
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approaches to solving research problems in the realm of cyber/internet research in 
social science. 
To illustrate the complexity of the work that was undertaken to segregate the 
desired information from the saved documents, the following is a sample of one post 
from my own personal Facebook feed that contains a single picture.  By accessing the 
source code for this post, which had one ‘like’ and nineteen comments, it was found 
to be 80 pages long.  The coding below represents only that portion of the source code 
pertaining to the original post, without the coding for the like or the comments: 
href="https://www.facebook.com/ted.reynolds.52?ref=tn_tnmn" title="Profile" 
accesskey="2"><img class="uiProfilePhoto headerTinymanPhoto uiProfilePhotoLarge img" 
src="https://fbcdn-profile-a.akamaihd.net/hprofile-ak-
snc4/273760_1073243381_651665586_q.jpg" alt="" id="profile_pic_header_1073243381" /><span 
class="headerTinymanName">Ted Reynolds</span></a></li><li class="navItem middleItem"><a 
href="https://www.facebook.com/find-friends/browser/?ref=tn">Find Friends</a></li><li 
class="navItem middleItem" id="navHome"><a href="https://www.facebook.com/?ref=tn_tnmn" 
accesskey="1">Home</a></li><li id="navAccount"><a id="navAccountLink" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/editaccount.php?ref=mb&amp;drop" rel="toggle" role="button" 
aria-haspopup="1" aria-controls="userNavigation" aria-labelledby="userNavigationLabel"><div 
class="menuPulldown" id="userNavigationLabel">Account Settings</div></a><ul 
class="navigation" id="userNavigation" role="navigation" aria-label="Account Menu"><li><a 
class="navSubmenu" 
href="/campaign/landing.php?placement=tad&amp;campaign_id=264263327005748&amp;extra_1=auto&a
mp;extra_2=AdvertisingMenu%3ACONTROL">Advertise</a></li><li><a class="navSubmenu" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/editaccount.php?ref=mb&amp;drop" accesskey="6">Account 
Settings</a></li><li><a class="navSubmenu" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy&amp;ref=mb" accesskey="7">Privacy 
Settings</a></li><li><form id="logout_form" method="post" action="/logout.php" 
onsubmit="return Event.__inlineSubmit(this,event)"><input type="hidden" name="fb_dtsg" 
value="AQASHv27" autocomplete="off" /><input type="hidden" autocomplete="off" name="ref" 
value="mb" /><input type="hidden" autocomplete="off" name="h" value="AfcdbHBuHbMfkppy" 
/><label class="uiLinkButton navSubmenu"><input type="submit" value="Log Out" 
/></label></form></li><li class="menuDivider"></li><li><a class="navSubmenu" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/help/?ref=drop" id="navHelpCenter" target="_blank" 
ajaxify="https://www.facebook.com/help/ajax/contextual/?page_type=365243976839773" 
rel="async"><div class="clearfix"><div class="lfloat">Help</div><img class="rfloat 
uiLoadingIndicatorAsync img" src="https://s-
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static.ak.facebook.com/rsrc.php/v2/yb/r/GsNJNwuI-UM.gif" alt="" width="16" height="11" 
/></div></a></li></ul></li></ul></div></div></div></div></div></div><div 
id="globalContainer" class="uiContextualLayerParent"><div id="content" class="fb_content 
clearfix"><div class="UIStandardFrame_Container clearfix"><div 
class="UIStandardFrame_Content"><div class="fbxPhoto" id="fbPhotoPageContainer"><div 
class="pvm" id="fbPhotoPageHeader"><div class="uiHeader pbs"><div class="clearfix 
uiHeaderTop"><div><h2 tabindex="0" class="uiHeaderTitle">Mobile 
Uploads</h2></div></div></div><div class="clearfix"><div class="lfloat fsm fwn fcg"><a 
href="https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.1622654720927.2087611.1073243381&amp;type=1"
>Back to Album</a> · <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ted.reynolds.52?sk=photos">My 
Photos</a></div><div class="rfloat fsm fwn fcg"><a class="photoPagePrevNav" 
onclick="PhotoPermalink.getInstance().pagerClick(&quot;prev&quot;);" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3700732311568&amp;set=a.1622654720927.2087611.
1073243381&amp;type=1&amp;permPage=1">Previous</a> · <a class="photoPageNextNav" 
onclick="PhotoPermalink.getInstance().pagerClick(&quot;next&quot;);" 
href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3607381497856&amp;set=a.1622654720927.2087611.
1073243381&amp;type=1&amp;permPage=1">Next</a></div></div></div><div 
id="fbxPhotoContentContainer"><table class="uiGrid fbPhotoImageStage" cellspacing="0" 
cellpadding="0"><tbody><tr><td class="vMid hCent stageContainer"><div id="photoborder" 
class="stageWrapper"><div id="imagestage" class="imageStage"><img class="fbPhotoImage img" 
id="fbPhotoImage" src="https://fbcdn-sphotos-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-
snc6/s720x720/282642_3699611323544_1225533872_n.jpg" alt="" /></div><div 
class="videoStage"></div><div class="photoError fbPhotoPageError" 
id="fbPhotoPageError"></div><div class="fbPhotosPhotoTagboxes minPhotoTagboxes 
minPhotoTagboxes" id="fbPhotoPageTagBoxes"><div class="tagsWrapper" style="width: 720px; 
height: 0;"><div class="fbPhotosPhotoTagboxBase faceBox" style="width: 44px;height: 
44px;left: 234px;top: 308px;" id="face:3699611523549"><div class="borderTagBox"><div 
class="innerTagBox"><div class="ieContentFix">    </div></div></div><div class="tag"><div 
class="tagPointer"><i class="tagArrow img sp_4i4ayo sx_57580d"></i><div 
class="tagName"></div></div></div></div></div></div><div class="stageActions" 
id="fbPhotoPageStageActions"><div class="fbPhotosPhotoTagboxBase newTagBox hidden_elem" 
style=""><div class="borderTagBox"><div class="innerTagBox"><div 
class="ieContentFix">    </div></div></div><div class="tag"><div class="tagPointer"><i 
class="tagArrow img sp_4i4ayo sx_57580d"></i><div 
class="tagName"></div></div></div></div><div class="fbPhotoTagger hidden_elem 
photoPermalinkTagger" id="un5mxy_2"><div class="faceBox"><div class="typeaheadWrapper"><div 
class="typeaheadContainer"><div class="arrow"><div class="nub"></div></div><div 
class="typeaheadBackdrop"><div class="mbs typeaheadLabel">Type any name to tag:</div><div 
class="clearfix uiTokenizer uiNormalTokenizer photoTagTokenizer" id="un5mxy_1"><div 
class="uiTypeahead photoTagTypeahead" id="un5mxy_3"><div class="wrap"><input type="hidden" 
autocomplete="off" class="hiddenInput" /><div class="innerWrap"><input type="text" 
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class="inputtext textInput DOMControl_placeholder" name="user_name" placeholder="Type any 
name" autocomplete="off" aria-autocomplete="list" aria-expanded="false" aria-invalid="false" 
aria-owns="typeahead_list_un5mxy_3" role="textbox" spellcheck="false" id="un5mxy_4" 
value="Type any name" aria-label="Type any name" 
/></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><div 
class="stageTagApproval"><div class="fbPhotoTagApproval" 
id="fbPhotoPageTagApproval"></div></div></td></tr><tr><td class="buttonsContainer"><div 
class="stageButtons"><div class="fbPhotosPhotoButtons" id="fbPhotoPageButtons"><div 
class="separatorBorder"></div><div class="likeCommentGroup fbPhotosPhotoLike lfloat"><span 
class="uiButtonGroup like uiButtonGroupOverlay" id="un5mxy_6"><span class="firstItem 
uiButtonGroupItem buttonItem"><a class="likeButton uiButton uiButtonOverlay" href="#" 
role="button"><span class="uiButtonText">Like</span></a></span><span class="lastItem 
uiButtonGroupItem buttonItem"><a class="commentButton uiButton uiButtonOverlay" href="#" 
role="button"><span class="uiButtonText">Comment</span></a></span></span><span 
class="uiButtonGroup unlike uiButtonGroupOverlay" id="un5mxy_7"><span class="firstItem 
uiButtonGroupItem buttonItem"><a class="likeButton uiButton uiButtonOverlay" href="#" 
role="button"><span class="uiButtonText">Unlike</span></a></span><span class="lastItem 
uiButtonGroupItem buttonItem"><a class="commentButton uiButton uiButtonOverlay" href="#" 
role="button"><span class="uiButtonText">Comment</span></a></span></span></div><a 
class="fbPhotosPhotoActionsTag tagButton rfloat uiButton uiButtonOverlay" href="#" 
role="button"><span class="uiButtonText">Tag Photo</span></a><div class="tagMessage">Click 
on the photo to start tagging. <a class="fbPhotosPhotoActionsTag doneTaggingLink" 
href="#">Done Tagging</a></div><div class="cropMessage">Drag the corners of the transparent 
box above to crop this photo into your profile picture. <a class="fbPhotosPhotoActionsTag 
doneCroppingLink" href="#">Done Cropping</a> | <a class="fbPhotosPhotoActionsTag 
cancelCroppingLink" href="#">Cancel</a></div></div></div></td></tr></tbody></table><table 
class="uiGrid fbPhotoPageInfo" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"><tbody><tr><td class="vTop 
fbPhotoUfiCol"><div class="photoUfiContainer"><div class="UIImageBlock clearfix 
fbPhotoContributor"><div class="UIImageBlock_Image UIImageBlock_SMALL_Image" 
id="fbPhotoPageAuthorPic" tabindex="-1" aria-hidden="true"><a 
href="https://www.facebook.com/ted.reynolds.52"><img class="uiProfilePhoto 
uiProfilePhotoMedium img" src="https://fbcdn-profile-a.akamaihd.net/hprofile-ak-
snc4/273760_1073243381_651665586_q.jpg" alt="" /></a></div><div class="UIImageBlock_Content 
UIImageBlock_SMALL_Content"><div class="fbPhotoContributorName" 
id="fbPhotoPageAuthorName"><a href="https://www.facebook.com/ted.reynolds.52" data-
hovercard="/ajax/hovercard/user.php?id=1073243381">Ted Reynolds</a></div><div 
class="fbPhotosPhotoCaption" tabindex="0" aria-live="polite" id="fbPhotoPageCaption"><span 
class="hasCaption"><br />Just four more hours and it&#039;s &#039;Chili 
Time&#039;.</span></div><div class="fbPhotoTagList hidden_elem" 
id="fbPhotoPageTagList"></div><div class="fbPhotoInlineEditor" 
id="fbPhotoPageInlineEditor"></div><div class="fbPhotosPhotoFeedback" 
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id="fbPhotoPageFeedback"><form rel="async" class="live_3699611323544_131325686911214 
commentable_item autoexpand_mode" method="post" action="/ajax/ufi/modify.php" data-
live="&#123;&quot;seq&quot;:2417705&#125;" onsubmit="return 
Event.__inlineSubmit(this,event)" id="un5mxy_20"><input type="hidden" name="charset_test" 
value="&euro;,&acute;,€,´,水,Д,Є" /><input type="hidden" name="fb_dtsg" value="AQASHv27" 
autocomplete="off" /><input type="hidden" autocomplete="off" name="feedback_params" 
value="&#123;&quot;actor&quot;:&quot;1073243381&quot;,&quot;target_fbid&quot;:&quot;36996113
23544&quot;,&quot;target_profile_id&quot;:&quot;1073243381&quot;,&quot;type_id&quot;:&quot;7
&quot;,&quot;assoc_obj_id&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;source_app_id&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;e
xtra_story_params&quot;:&#123;&quot;photo_viewer_version&quot;:&quot;0&quot;&#125;,&quot;con
tent_timestamp&quot;:&quot;1339952715&quot;,&quot;check_hash&quot;:&quot;AQCxFpJjMp3FhOTu&qu
ot;,&quot;source&quot;:&quot;2&quot;&#125;" /><span><span class="UIActionLinks 
UIActionLinks_bottom" data-
ft="&#123;&quot;tn&quot;:&quot;=&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:20&#125;"><button class="like_link 
stat_elem as_link" title="Like this item" type="submit" name="like" onclick="fc_click(this, 
false); return true;" data-
ft="&#123;&quot;tn&quot;:&quot;&gt;&quot;,&quot;type&quot;:22&#125;"><span 
class="default_message">Like</span><span class="saving_message">Unlike</span></button> 
&#183; <label class="uiLinkButton comment_link" title="Leave a comment"><input data-
ft="&#123;&quot;type&quot;:24,&quot;tn&quot;:&quot;S&quot;&#125;" type="button" 
value="Comment" onclick="return fc_click(this);" /></label> &#183; <button class="unsub_link 
stat_elem as_link" title="You are currently receiving notifications for this item because 
you commented on it." type="submit" name="unsubscribe"><span 
class="default_message">Unfollow Post</span><span class="saving_message">Follow 
Post</span></button> &#183; <a rel="dialog" 
href="/ajax/sharer/?s=2&amp;appid=2305272732&amp;p[]=1073243381&amp;p[]=33243028">Share</a> 
&#183; <span class="stat_elem"><a class="fbPhotosPhotoEdit" href="#" 
ajaxify="/ajax/photos/photo/edit/edit.php?fbid=3699611323544&amp;version=0&amp;mediaType=pho
to" rel="async">Edit</a><img class="mls uiLoadingIndicatorAsync img" src="https://s-
static.ak.facebook.com/rsrc.php/v2/yb/r/GsNJNwuI-UM.gif" alt="" width="16" height="11" 
/></span><span class="fbPhotosPhotoDisabledEdit">Edit</span> &#183; <span 
id="fbPhotoPageTimestamp"><abbr title="Sunday, June 17, 2012 at 1:05pm" data-
utime="1339952715" class="timestamp livetimestamp">21 hours ago</abbr> near <a 
class="fbPhotosImplicitLocLink" href="https://www.facebook.com/pages/Winter-Springs-
Florida/104114602958901">Winter Springs</a> </span></span></span><ul class="uiList uiUfi 
focus_target fbUfi fbUfiNoBorder fbPhotosPhotoUfi" data-
ft="&#123;&quot;type&quot;:30,&quot;tn&quot;:&quot;]&quot;&#125;"><li class="ufiNub 
uiListItem  uiListVerticalItemBorder"><i></i></li><li class="ufiItem uiUfiLike uiListItem  
uiListVerticalItemBorder" data-ft="&#123;&quot;type&quot;:31&#125;"><div class="UIImageBlock 
clearfix"><a class="UIImageBlock_Image UIImageBlock_ICON_Image" href="#" tabindex="-1" aria-
hidden="true"><label class="uiUfiLikeIcon" title="Like this item" 
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onclick="this.form.like.click();"></label></a><div class="UIImageBlock_Content 
UIImageBlock_ICON_Content"><a5 
 
As is evident, there are several ‘hyperlinks’, which appear underlined in blue, 
within the source code seen above.  These hyperlinks provide direct access to specific 
and specialized information contained within the post when clicked on.  For example, 
when one clicks on https://www.facebook.com/ted.reynolds.52?ref=tn_tnmn , a 
separate tab/window opens that contains 106 pages of code related to my own 
individual ID number.  Yet clicking on https://fbcdn-profile-a.akamaihd.net/hprofile-
ak-snc4/273760_1073243381_651665586_q.jpg  allows one to immediately view the 
profile picture which was in use at the time the post was made, with no attached code.  
The content/code relating to those who either liked or commented on this post was 
omitted for the simple reason that the coding for this information which was 
voluminous and space prohibitive, contained hyperlinks to their own profiles, 
individual ID numbers and profile pictures which, if presented, would have violated 
their privacy.    
The software that was developed to sift through this massive amount of coding, 
which came to be called ‘The Parser’, went through several iterations on its way to 
being able to sift through all the data, locate the pertinent information, and then 
segregate and format that information into a form that provided the desired variable 
data.  The first iteration proved capable of parsing one single post into the variant 
categories.  Once it was known that the program was able to parse out the desired 
information into a format that could be transferred into a spreadsheet, the software 
was modified to meet the demands of the project.  The software revision moved from 
                                                 
5
 Text specific to user profile has been redacted to prevent future hacking. 
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parsing one single post to an entire days capture, then parsing from a single file into a 
single text file to multiple files into multiple text files.  With every improvement the 
capabilities of the software made this researcher’s job less labor intensive with regard 
to coding of the raw data.  The final iteration for the parsing of the EDL collection, 
V6.0, was completed in November 2011, and allowed for the parsing of the entire 
collection.   
Interestingly, a technique similar to the one used during this project was recently 
used by Lewis, Zamith, and Hermida  (2013) and described in their paper titled, 
Content Analysis in an Era of Big Data: A Hybrid Approach to Computational and 
Manual Methods.  They point out that “while it is true that computational techniques 
can be applied to the sampling and coding problems facing content analysis in a sea of 
too much information, we argue that, in many cases, scholars may be better served 
with a hybrid approach-one that blends computational and manual methods 
throughout the content analysis process” (p. 39).  They created a Python  
based “parser” to identify key content within the 199 megabyte tab-delimited text 
file (various articles) that comprised the raw data they sought to analyze (p61).  The 
major difference between their efforts and those of this project is that the file they 
were parsing was already in a tab-delimited file that made the job much easier.  
Therefore, they were parsing an existing file to search for key words and phrases, 
which is similar to what was done herein using NVivo.  The parser developed as a 
part of this project took raw files and parsed the bulk collection into variables that 
were then placed into a tab-delimited file for import into Excel then into SPSS for 
analysis.  
106 
 The graphic user interface (GUI, pronounced- gooey), as seen in Image 1, and 
used in most computer applications, allows for a user-friendly experience for those 
not familiar with the intricacies of the computer coding required to perform the 
functions of the parser.  
Using the ‘search’ function in the graphic user interface, and locating the folder 
labeled EDL XML DATA (Image 2), which contained all the XML files for each day 
of collection, it was then necessary to ‘select all’ and then click ‘open’ to lace all the 
files into the parser.  
 
Image 2: Select all files to put into parser 
Image 1: Parser, Graphic User Interface 
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Image 3: All files in parser & hide poster names 
Prior to clicking the ‘parse’ button on the GUI, the ‘Hide Poster Name’ box was 
checked to hide the names of the author/user, which provided for the anonymization 
of all users that are included in the collection being parsed (Image 3).  
 
Image 4: Parsing complete, GUI view 
Once all the files were in place to be parsed and the tab was checked to hide the 
names, clicking on ‘Parse’ provided the view of the GUI seen in Image 4.  Clicking 
the parse button allowed the software to sift through the files, searching for the 
specified information that would be placed into the variable categories, while at the 
same time anonymizing the authors/users.    
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The process, or function, of parsing the data as seen above is explained in the 
following steps: 
Step 1:Data File 
The initial data files were captured from HTML pages on Facebook and copied 
into a Microsoft Word document. In order to separate the data so that it could be 
parsed, the data was saved to an XML file so that individual fields and attributes 
would become more tokenized and easily parsed. This was accomplished by opening 
the original file in the native Word format and saving it as an XML file.  An XML, or 
extensible markup language, file is used when wanting to structure, store, and 
transport data as opposed to the HTML format which is used to simply display data.    
Step 2: File Format 
In order to process the raw data files into a form that is suitable for import into a 
statistical analysis, a custom C++ application (a specific computer coding schema) 
was developed which processed one or more XML files and generated a Tab 
Delimited File.  Tab delimiting, which places the information into columns and rows, 
was chosen because it could be easily imported into Excel, and would allow most 
characters (including commas) to be left intact in the parsed data.  
To accomplish the parsing, the software opened the specified XML file and began 
searching for the occurrence of the start of a text string in the XML file. This was 
denoted by a “<w:t>” preceding the text. Once found, it would continue parsing the 
input file until it reached characters that represented the end of the text string in the 
XML file. This was denoted by a “</w:t>” following the last character of the text 
string.  
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Step 3: Identifying Various Components 
Once a text string was found, it was reviewed for context relative to the overall 
body. Since Facebook posts vary in structure and do not always contain the same 
fields, string values like “Top of Form” at the beginning of a string indicated the 
beginning of a post. Terms like “Like this.” and “people” at the end were used to 
denote the likely occurrence of number of likes and/or views. Dates and times were 
parsed using a custom date parser which interpreted the variable context Facebook 
posting date field to derive a more precise date/time. So, for example a date string of 
“April 12, 2011 at 2:02pm” would be converted to “4/12/2011 14:02”. In addition to 
parsing out items in context such as the poster name, actual post text, postdate and 
number of likes, the software would search for key words in the post such as 
“HTTP:”, “HTTPS:”,”YOUTUBE.”, “FACEBOOK.” as key contextual clues to look 
for a web hyperlink or a link to YouTube or Facebook. If a link was determined, it 
was placed in the output context. 
Step 4:Parsing Into Variables 
As the software parsed the file independent of the number of lines, length of post 
or size of the file, it would construct an output string that contained the core data 
needed to import into the statistical analysis program. The order of the output parsed 
data was:  
Pri – Whether this was a primary or secondary post.  Primary posts are coded as ‘P’ 
and secondary posts are denoted with ‘S’.  All secondary posts appear directly under 
the primary post to which they are associated. 
Author – Author of this post. While the parser is able to provide the actual 
author/user screen name, a special function was added, per the requirements of the 
research design, to provide for the anonymization of the users into a numeric value.  
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This value was not the actual text string of the author, but rather a cypher of the 
original text that was derived using an algorithmic function f(x) which contains 
exponential, multiplication and summation components using a prime number as a 
spreading method.  The actual formula for the cypher is withheld to prevent 
identification of the users.   
The purpose of this simple cypher was two-fold.  First, it would be highly unlikely 
that two non-identical strings would yield the same value.  Second, it imposes a 
reasonable level of difficulty such that it could not be easily reverse computed back to 
the subject string such as with a hash or simple substitution. The goal was to create a 
one-way cypher that neither inherently contained the number of characters nor the 
value of those characters.  According to Bruce Schneier (1996) in Applied 
Cryptography, a one-way cipher, also called a one-way function, is “relatively easy to 
compute, but significantly harder to reverse.  That is, given x it is easy to compute 
f(x), but given f(x) it is hard to compute x.  In this context, “hard” is defined as 
something like: It would take millions of years to compute x from f(x), even if all the 
computers in the world were assigned to the problem” (Schneier, 1996, p. 29).  More 
generally, the difficulty in reverse engineering f(x) is analogous to trying to 
unscramble eggs.  Before scrambling, the individual eggs are easily identifiable, but 
once scrambled it is impossible to separate the eggs back into their previous state.  
Even with the advances in computing power since this was written in 1996, the one-
way cipher offers a more than reasonable assurance that the user names cannot be 
easily reverse engineered from the anonymized value f(x) that is used in the data set.      
RefDateTime – The date/time of the primary post was parsed to identify the 
beginning of a string.  As all comments to a post are considered to be a part of the 
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string, this same date/time tag was placed as an identifier for the comments associated 
with the primary post.   
Post – The actual text of the primary and secondary posts was located and copied into 
the .txt format for placement into the Post cell.  It contains the entire post, as written 
by the author.   
DateTime – the date/time of the primary post is noted as is the date/time of the 
secondary post/comment.  This is different from the date/time of the primary post to 
which they are associated.  In some cases the secondary posts or comments occur 
several days following the initial primary posting by the administrator. 
Likes – contains the number of likes for the primary post.  While advanced automated 
data mining may have been able to provide the author of these likes, the manual 
collection only provided the ability to determine the number of likes per primary post 
which still offers an opportunity to determine the popularity or virility of an 
individual primary post. 
Link – Indicates whether a URL link exists as the focus of the primary post or within 
any secondary posts.  This was coded 0 for no and 1 for yes.   
YouTubeRef – Indicates whether the URL link contained within the post is a 
YouTube reference.  Again, the coding was 0 for no and 1 for yes. 
FacebookRef – Indicates whether the URL link contained within the post is a 
Facebook reference or link. 
WebLink – Contains the web link reference/address (URL) when possible.   In this 
one variable the parser was not able to provide 100% of the web links contained 
within or as a primary focus of the posts. 
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As stated previously the emphasis identification of the primary posts and the URL 
links were completed after the automated parsing process was completed into variable 
identified as, PPType, URLType, CompressPPType, and CompressURLType. 
Step 5: The TXT File 
A single Tab delimited string record per post was written to a file in a structured 
format that could be parsed by a database or statistical analysis software. This file was 
written as a .txt file so that Excel or other files would not assume a particular structure 
as with XML or Comma Separated Values (CSV) extensions.  CSV files allow for the 
individual pieces of text data to be inserted into individual cells.   American Standard 
Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) characters were used with as much of the 
original character spacing, context, capitalization, and flow as possible. 
Step 6: The Parsed Files  
The result, shown in the GUI below, is the parsing of the XML files (completed 
by the parser in approximately 30 seconds) and the creation of individual .txt files 
within the EDL XML DATA folder (seen in Image 5) corresponding to each days 
XML file as well as an EDL_AllData file containing a compilation of all the .txt data 
from each individual file in a single .txt file which can then be easily imported into an 
Excel spreadsheet. 
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Image 5: Parsed .txt files automatically placed in folder 
 
 
Image 6: EDL_Alldata file imported into Excel 
 
The Excel spreadsheet seen above in Image 6, containing all the information from 
the EDL_AllData file, required only one modification prior to importation into SPSS.  
Due to the formatting the parser used in providing the data/time information (all being 
in one cell in .txt format), it did not transfer into SPSS in a usable way, and required 
adjustment.  Therefore, it was necessary to modify the date/time cell within the Excel 
document into a simple month/day (mm/dd) format so it could be utilized in SPSS.  
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While the presentation of the times of the posts offered an additional measure for 
analysis, it was not significant to the overall project goals and was therefore deemed 
expendable for the purposes of this analysis.  It is important to note that the file 
containing the original date/time stamp as seen above was saved in the event it 
became necessary to work through this problem if it was deemed essential in the 
future.  Once the Month/Day issue was resolved, the Excel file was opened in SPSS 
for analysis.  It appears as seen below in Image 7: 
 
Image 7: EDL Excel spreadsheet imported into SPSS (the data set) 
The results from these efforts were nothing short of astounding.  As mentioned 
earlier, when all the EDL.XML files were placed in The Parser V.6.0, this final 
version was able to parse the entire forty five day collection into a single data file in 
less than forty seconds.  With the compilation of the daily data files into one singular 
data file it was then possible to import this into Excel which allowed for its easy 
importation into SPSS for analysis.  Realizing the many hundreds of human-hours this 
program had saved, it was determined that the software would be shared with anyone 
within the academic community who wished to perform similar research.  Following 
the completion of this thesis, a copy of the software will be provided on disc to the 
Department of International Relations as well as the Computer Science Department at 
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the University of St. Andrews.  Additionally, since it became necessary to modify the 
software to code the supplemental EDL collection from later in 2011 (V7.0), this 
program will also be included. 
Limitations 
As the focus of this research is on understanding the characteristics of the use of 
Facebook by the EDL, there are limitations that must be acknowledged.  First, while 
the collection of all EDL Facebook traffic during the collection period was possible, it 
was not possible to capture those posts that were either deleted by the individual user 
or by the administrator prior to collection.  There is evidence within the data to 
suggest that both of these occurred.  Second, it must be noted that the EDL Facebook 
traffic is only representative of those individuals who represent themselves as 
‘members’ of the EDL on Facebook.  There was no way, given the legal and practical 
constrains of the study to confirm whether the active ‘member’ on Facebook were 
engaged in real-world activism associated with the group.  Next, even if those 
engaged in the online dialogue are truly active members in the real world, the 
collection of Facebook traffic is only representative of those members who chose to 
engage in virtual activism and cannot speak to the actions of any members including 
those on Facebook.  The findings and analysis of the EDL Facebook traffic cannot be 
considered to provide broad findings pertaining to the overall membership of the 
EDL, but can only be seen as representing the activities and attitudes of those 
individuals who chose to/not to engage in this social media forum.  Finally, as this is a 
relatively new field of investigation, the tools that were available for the collection 
and analysis of this traffic were in some cases not available or incompatible with other 
programs to provide a more in-depth examination of the phenomenon.  The creation 
of the parser solved one problem, but it is hoped that as the field evolves, better tools 
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will be developed to facilitate greater understanding.  Even so, the efforts if this 
research did produce interesting and valuable findings. 
Preliminary Findings 
The initial findings were more than had been hoped for.  First, the initial transfer 
of the data into Excel revealed that there were 19,312 primary and secondary posts in 
the data set for the forty five day collection period.  All the posts had date/time stamps 
and included the posts as well as the number of likes and the indication of a URL link 
and the segregation of the Facebook and YouTube links.  Each primary post was 
designated with a P and the secondary posts, or comments, were given the designation 
of S.  Each secondary post/comment appeared directly under the primary post to 
which it was pertaining.  Further, the secondary posts were given two separate date 
stamps.  The first indicated the date it was posted, and the second indicates the date of 
the primary post it is attached to.   
The data collection included 19,312 posts which were comprised of 19,073 
secondary posts or comments made on 239 primary/administrator posts.  The number 
of comments per post ranged from a low of fourteen to a high of three hundred sixty-
one.  The number of likes on the primary posts ranged from six likes to nine hundred 
fifty-three likes on a single post.  Interestingly, there were two hundred eighty-eight 
posts, or only 1.5% of the entire set of posts/comments, that contained a uniform 
resource locator (URL) link, however, the overall percentage is misleading as fifty-
one URL links were found within the two hundred thirty-nine primary/administrator 
posts, which is a frequency of 21.3 percent, while the remaining two hundred thirty-
seven URL links were found within the member comments for a rate of 1.24 percent.   
It is important to note that these preliminary findings suggest that it is possible to 
quantify social media participation in a substantive way.  Previous literature on the 
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use of social media by activist or extremist groups (Jackson, 2011; Bartlett & Littler, 
2011; Diani, 2000; Harlow & Harp, 2012; Spier, 2011; Alterman, 2011; Margetts et 
al., 2013; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Wojcieszak, 2011; Ackland & O’Neil, 2011) 
have often focused on the characteristics of the individuals who participate, the 
drivers of that participation, or the links between various online fora.  Caren et al. 
(2012) was one of the few that was able to collect nearly all traffic (with the exception 
of those entries that had been deleted) where N approach ALL.  One of the more 
significant aspects of this research was the ability to code huge amounts of collection 
material in an automated fashion providing accuracy and anonymity.  The physical 
collection and subsequent automated parsing of that collection made it possible to 
delve below the surface of the data in a new way, and the resultant analytical findings 
surpassed this researcher’s expectations.  The quantitative analysis, coupled with the 
qualitative observations and analysis, provides a more holistic view of the EDL than 
might otherwise been possible had only one method been utilized. 
The collection and coding methods as presented allowed for the substantive 
quantitative analysis of the characteristics of online participation within the EDL 
Facebook group that is found in Chapter Six.  Included in this analysis is an 
examination of the traffic pattern found within the collection ; what type of primary 
posts garners the highest responses from the users; the use of URL’s within the 
primary and secondary posts as well as the impact of those URL’s on user 
participation; an analysis of the top key words/phrases used within the collection and 
a segregation of that information to determine the use of the words most used by the 
administrator and examining the use of these words by different groups of users; and 
finally, an examination of the member vs. user question with a frequency analysis that 
provides one of the most interesting finds of the study.   
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The qualitative aspects of this research, supporting the quantitative efforts, include 
the observations made while attending the two EDL demonstrations on 5 February 
and 3 September 2011 as discussed in the following chapter; the collection of the 
traditional print media stories printed on the EDL within the UK using LexisNexis, 
and a qualitative analysis of key words used within those articles, presented in 
Chapter Four, to examine the media’s characterization of the EDL; and an analysis in 
Chapter Five of the content of the actual posts contained within the original EDL 
dataset to determine whether the statements made by the users in this online social 
media platform reflect the lofty goals as presented in the EDL Mission Statement of if 
they were more in alignment with the characterizations presented by traditional 
media.   
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Chapter Three:  The Rise of the English Defence League  
and the Role of Social Media 
Since the summer of 2009, the English Defence League (EDL) has sought to 
influence the dialogue on immigration policy and multicultural issues in what they 
framed as a battle against the spread of radical Islam.  While the beginning of the 
movement was a manifestation of events that unfolded during that summer, the 
underlying angst among a segment of the population was already clearly building and 
only needed the spark that led to the creation of the EDL.  Since then, the EDL has 
sought to use new and traditional media in such a way as to promote their movement, 
garner broader support, and spread anti-Muslim and anti-immigration propaganda 
whenever possible in their campaign to return ‘Britishness to Britain’.  Of particular 
importance was the use of Facebook to promote the agenda of the EDL.  Bartlett & 
Littler (2011), in their examination of the EDL found that “the high percentage of 
online activism illustrates how important the internet is to the group’s identity” (p. 
18).  Utilizing the online social networking site Facebook, the EDL was able to 
eventually claim, in just over two years, a membership of nearly 100,000 ‘patriots’.  
This growth was viewed as both spectacular by EDL supporters and very troubling by 
law enforcement and politicians.  The primary concern by law enforcement was the 
potential for violence such a group represented throughout the country.  There was 
specific concern regarding the impact such an openly anti-Muslim group would have 
on the Muslim minority in the UK and whether the increasing rhetoric by the EDL 
would serve to radicalize a larger segment of the Muslim community toward violence 
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and terrorism.
6
  While the EDL promotes itself as a multi-ethnic group, the inclusion 
of minorities in the group is a later development in response to the charges of being 
Islamaphobic and racist.  The birth of the group tells the story of its dubious lineage 
and the true nature of the agenda of the English Defence League.   
Where and how did the EDL get its start?  While some might trace the birth of the 
EDL to the summer of 2009 in Luton England, such a narrative would be overly 
simplistic and ignore the socio-political conditions that would allow such a group to 
form and thrive in a democratic and open society such as the United Kingdom.  
Understanding the history, leadership, and organizational structure of the EDL is 
central to understanding their use of Facebook and other computer mediated 
communication, and the various characteristics of this participation that drive the 
group and its members. 
The National Front – BNP – EDL Nexus 
The post-War era roots of the far-right extremist movement in the UK can be 
traced back to the National Front (NF) which was formed in January 1967 (Ford, 
2010; Jackson 2011).  The NF was formed out of an ideological tradition of racial 
nationalism and is characterized as a racist and anti-Semitic movement (Ford, 2010; 
Solomos, 2013).  John Tyndall, who led the NF twice during the 1970’s, was 
committed to biological racism and promoting the idea of Jewish led conspiracies.  
This is evidenced in the following extract form the political journal Spearhead  where 
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 This sentiment was expressed openly in a “Countering Homegrown Terrorism Symposium” at 
the UK Defence Academy held in Oct 2011.  Since the symposium was held under strict Chatham 
House Rules, I cannot disclose the source of this assessment.  My invitation to participate in the 
symposium was as a result of having facilitated research analysis into the impact of the EDL and the 
group Muslims Against Crusades on at-risk populations in the UK. 
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he wrote, “If Britain were to become Jew-clean she would have no nigger 
neighborhoods to worry about… It is the Jews who are our misfortune: T-h-e J-e-w-s.  
Do you hear me? THE JEWS” (Ford, 2010, p. 172).  Tyndall would eventually go on 
to form the British National Party (BNP) in 1982 and remain in the leadership 
position of that party until being ousted by Nick Griffin in 1999.  The disintegration 
of the NF in the 1980’s allowed the BNP to become the prominent voice for and 
monopolize the political landscape of the extreme far-right movement in the UK 
(Ford, 2010; Solomos, 2013). 
The BNP, since its emergence on the political scene has experienced increased 
support in total votes and the average percentage of votes in every general election.  
With record voter performance in 2005, the BNP in Council votes in Barking and 
Dagenham received over 200,000 votes, winning twelve victories in council elections, 
making it the second largest party represented in these councils (Ford, 2010, p. 145).  
In 2009, the BNP continued its record of successes by acquiring nearly one million 
votes in the European Parliamentary Election “sending the first ever British extreme-
right representative to Strasbourg” (Ford, 2010, p. 145).  It is important to note that 
the resurgence of the far-right is not unique to the UK.  There has been a growing 
trend in support of far-right parties that is reflected in the political gains by the French 
National Front, the Australian Freedom Party, the Flemish Interest in Belgium, the 
Jobbik Party in Hungary, and the Golden Dawn in Greece (Ford, 2010).   
With the rise to BNP leadership by Nick Griffin in October 1999 there remained 
linkages to the NF.  Griffin, who was a former national director for the NF student 
division in 1978, member of the NF Directorate in 1980, and a NF parliamentary 
candidate in 1985 (Ford, 2010, p. 174; Solomos, 2013, p. 126), on his rise to power in 
the BNP sought to modernize the BNP by downplaying its ideological roots of racism 
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and anti-Semitism, in an attempt to improve the image of the movement.  These 
efforts have been difficult, yet following the attacks of 9-11, he launched the BNP’s 
“Campaign Against Islam” (Ford, 2010 p. 178).  Jackson (2011) points out that 
immediately following the 9-11 attacks, 32% of Britain’s deemed Islam to be a threat 
to Western Liberal Democracy, but by 2006 this had risen to 53% (Jackson, 2011, p. 
60-61).  The shift of the BNP away from racism and anti-Semitism, in favor of a 
platform that is anti-Islam/anti-Muslim marks a significant evolutionary shift in far-
right extremism in the UK and sets the stage for the rise of the EDL in 2009 (Jackson, 
2011; Solomos, 2013).   
EDL Leadership 
Before examining the growth characteristics of the EDL as a movement and how 
they utilized social media as a propaganda and mobilization platform, it is important 
to review some of the key leaders of the English Defence League. The development 
of the leadership of the EDL is a key part of the development of the online aspect of 
the group.  As the group gained in popularity, so did the leaders that rose to power.  
As such, the leader(s) had a significant ideological impact on the group and was a 
central aspect of the Facebook communications.     
Paul Ray 
Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun (2013) suggest that the “origins of the British 
counter-Jihadi movement came in the form of a blog called Lionheart run by a British 
National Party supporter named Paul Ray” (p. 9).  Like those who would come after 
him, Ray is a native to the town of Luton, which is seen as the birthplace of the EDL 
and the center of gravity for the tensions between the far-right and Muslim extremism.  
While a proclaimed supporter of the BNP, Ray denied any Nazi or racist views and 
expressed that he felt the BNP was changing direction under the new leadership of 
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Nick Griffin  (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013).  Within his blog, Ray set forth 
many of the themes that would become the mainstay of the EDL discourse, including 
the impending pan-Islamic war with the West; the growing concern over the growing 
Muslim demographic in the UK and the destructive nature of this growth; the 
complicity of the state run media in hiding what he saw as the degradation of the UK 
by “illegal immigrants and our Muslim neighbors under the banner of ‘multi-cultural’ 
society” (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013, p. 10); and the economic impact of 
Muslim immigrants and the burden they represent and the threat they pose to the UK 
(Kallis, 2013). 
While Ray’s online activities brought him some notoriety, his first engagement 
with an anti-Islam street protest movement, which included the future leader of the 
EDL Tommy Robinson, was the 13 April 2009 march by some 150 activists 
organized as the United Peoples of Luton (UPL) (Jackson, 2011, p. 15).  The UPL is 
described as an amalgamation of the football hooligan group United Casuals, and far-
right activists including members of the extreme right-wing  group Combat-18, led by 
Ray and Robinson (Jackson, 2011; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013).  This 
march, which was in response to the demonstration by a group of Islamist extremists 
in Luton on 10 March, was quickly shut down by the police due to lack of permission, 
but this action did not stop the movement.  Another march on 24 May 2009, under the 
slogan of “Ban the Terrorists”, sought to acknowledge that the terrorists represented 
but a small minority within the broader Muslim community but the day ended in 
“running street battles between protestors and police, as well as reports of racially 
aggravated assaults against South-Asians” (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013, p. 
12).   Following this, Ray and Robinson formed the EDL in June 2009 as a fusion of 
the UPL and the football hooligan firms it had been associated with (Richardson, 
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2013, p. 114;  Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun, 2013, p. 12).  By August 2009, Ray had 
begun to distance himself from the EDL due to the neo-Nazi symbolism that was 
exhibited during the 8 August 2009 demonstration in Birmingham, and the “infusion 
of more traditional far right themes, like references to Hitler” (Jackson, 2011, p. 15; ).  
The 8
th
 day of the 8
th
 month is important in Nazi symbolism. The number eight 
represents the eighth letter of the alphabet ‘H’, therefore the number 88 is symbolic 
for HH or Heil Hitler (Jackson, 2011, p. 15; Simi & Futrell, 2010, p. 22).  Following 
this, Ray removed himself from active participation in the group and it was at this 
point that Tommy Robinson emerged as the leader of the EDL (Jackson, 2011; 
Copsey, 2010). 
Tommy Robinson 
Stephen Yaxley-Lennon otherwise known as Tommy Robinson, following the exit 
of Ray, became the leader of the EDL and held that leadership role until October 
2013(Jackson, 2011; Saddique & Quinn, 2013).  While he began his involvement by 
hiding his face behind a mask and using the pseudonym Tommy Robinson in EDL 
videos (Jackson, 2011, p. 15; Copsey, 2010), once he began showing his face, his true 
identity was eventually revealed (Copsey, 2010).  Beyond any potential security 
concerns what did Yaxley-Lennon have to hide and why Tommy Robinson? 
Beginning with the later question, the name Tommy Robinson does indeed have 
significance.  ‘Tommy Robinson’, the pseudonym used by Yaxley-Lennon is itself a 
pseudonym that was used by a leader of “Luton’s notorious football firm Men-In-
Gear (MIG)” (Jackson, 2011, p. 18).  This firm was known to have been involved in 
anti-Muslim violence since the early 2000’s, and according to Jackson, Yaxley-
Lennon was convicted of “leading football fans in violence during an event in Luton 
in August 2010” (p. 18).  Jackson (2011) suggests that Robinsons association with the 
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football hooligan culture was prominent in the early days of the EDL and their 
presence has remained consistent.  So was the football association with the name 
‘Tommy Robinson’ the only reason Yaxley-Lennon took on this alias, or could there 
have been another reason? 
As to his motivation for using a false identity, it is possible he was hoping to 
avoid answering questions regarding his association and former membership in the 
BNP, as well as having previously served twelve months in prison for assaulting an 
off-duty police officer (Copsey, 2010; Hill, 2013). Interestingly, for someone who led 
what was deemed a humanitarian organization that sought to forward democratic 
ideals, Robinsons actions seem to belie these goals.  Although his true identity 
became known, including his previous criminal record, the media identified him as 
Tommy Robinson when reporting on EDL activities and even as his personal antics 
were reported, including future arrests, he continued to be identified as Tommy 
Robinson usually with a side note of his real name. As discussed previously, and will 
be discussed in future chapters, the arrests and prosecution of Tommy Robinson 
became something of a rallying point for the EDL.  Several prominent cases became 
issues that drove a considerable amount of activity both off and on-line.  Some of 
these arrests/events include the previously mentioned 2010 football brawl which he 
was convicted of in 2011, and given a twelve-month community rehabilitation order 
and banned from football for three years (BBC News, 25 July, 2011); an arrest in 
November 2010 and eventual conviction for an assault on a member of the group 
Muslims Against Crusades where Robinson’s assault was linked to poppy-burning by 
Islamist extremists on Armistice Day 2011(BBC News, 11 May, 2011).  As a result of 
this conviction Robinson was banned from attending EDL demonstrations; a 
conviction in September 2011 for assaulting another member of the EDL during a 
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rally in Blackburn in April 2011(BBC News, 29 September, 2011); and on 3 
September 2011, Robinson was arrested for violating bail conditions set forth during 
the poppy burning assault conviction.  Robinson was filmed by this researcher dressed 
in disguise during the 3 September 2011 demonstration in Whitechapel and when he 
took the stage he removed his hat and fake beard.  This prompted his arrest and while 
being held in jail Robinson initiated a hunger strike in protest for being held as a 
political prisoner.  More recently Robinson was arrested following his attempt to enter 
the United States using a friend’s passport in September 2012.  As a result he was 
convicted in January 2013 and jailed for 10 months (BBC News 7 January, 2013).  
His latest brush with the law came in January 2014 when he was convicted of two 
counts of mortgage fraud and sentenced to 18 months in jail (The Guardian, 23 
January 2014).   
Claiming that while in jail, and reflecting on his actions and those of the EDL, 
Tommy Robinson decided to leave the EDL and announced in October 2013 that he 
was joining the Quilliam Foundation seeking to counter Islamist ideology “not with 
violence but with better, democratic ideas” (Siddique & Quinn, 2013).  The Quilliam 
Foundation, a counter-extremism thinktank, claims to have been involved in the 
departure from the EDL of Robinson, as well as his cousin and EDL co-founder 
Kevin Carroll,  and will be helping them to understand Islam and provide help in 
lobbying institutions (Siddique& Quinn, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Kevin Carroll 
Another former BNP supporter, Kevin Carroll has been by Tommy Robinson’s 
side from the beginning of the EDL and has, when needed, stepped into the leadership 
role when Tommy was “unable” to participate in EDL activities.  Considered a “co-
leader”, Carroll has kept a much lower profile than Robinson and as such avoided 
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much of the controversy that surrounded his cousin.  Busher (2013)  indicates that 
Carroll was vocal in his characterization of the EDL as non-racist and non-violent and 
at one point, as reported by an EDL supporter responded to an attack on a Muslim 
man by yelling at the attackers, “You’re a disgrace!  You’re behaving like animals!” 
(Busher, 2013, p. 78).  Beyond acknowledging his position within the EDL and his 
BNP history, little else is written about Kevin Carroll and his background (Copsey, 
2010; Busher 2013; Alessio & Meredith 2014), although Jackson (2011) does remark 
that “Carroll is a little more circumspect than Yaxley-Lennon.  His speeches often 
cantain a clear distinction between Muslims and Islamists, and he is clearly aware of 
the need to distance the EDL from neo-Nazi groups that attach themselves to its 
events” (Jackson, 2011, p. 48).  
Alan Lake 
In contrast to Carroll, there has been considerable focus within the literature on an 
individual known as the EDL financier, Alan Lake.  Lake, a wealthy businessman 
who made his fortune in the IT industry, is thought to be a major financier of the EDL 
(Pitchford, 2011, p. 44)  There is no evidence of overt racism or anti-Semitism 
associated with Lake, and it is even suggested that his funding of the EDL was 
conditional on their distancing themselves from the BNP and that it is possible that he 
is more aligned with the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (Pitchford, 
2011) although UKIP would not ally itself with the EDL “or any other extremist 
group” (Copsey, 2010, p. 17).  Interestingly Alan Lake is evidently a pseudonym for 
Alan Ayling (Shifrin, 2012)and it is reported that he was potentially a mentor to 
Anders Beivik, who murdered 77 people in Norway and claimed to have had contacts 
within the EDL (Smith, 2011; Fouche, 2011).  Lake, who is a proponent of street 
politics also favors intimidation and violence as methods to achieved goals (Pitchford, 
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2011).  According to Copsey (2010), Lake advocated online efforts for 
recruitment/mobilization in support of this street action which he felt was necessary 
stating, “We have to put bodies on the street, writing letters to the Times does not do 
the work” (Copsey, 2010, p. 18).  Lake was also the person who suggested that 
counter-jihadi groups co-opt “floating groups; Sikhs, gays, women – all those groups 
that might feel threatened by Islam” (Copsey, 2010, p. 18).  This inclusive strategy 
was taken up by the EDL and can be seen in the various divisions that are a part of the 
organization (Copsey, 2010, Jackson, 2011).  Following the revealing of his true 
identity in 2012 and his association with the EDL, Alan Ayling (AKA-Alan Lake) 
was suspended from his job with the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Shifrin, 2012). 
The Beginning: The Luton Incident 
On 10 March 2009, the Royal Anglian Regiment marched through Luton in a 
homecoming parade after completing their 
latest deployment in Iraq (Collins, 2011; 
Garland & Treadwell, 2010)).  This parade was 
targeted by a pro-Islamist group, Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jamaah, where approximately 20 members 
of the group (Image 8 & 9) shouted accusations and held signs characterizing them as 
being the “Butchers of Basra” and calling for “Anglian Soldiers Go To Hell”  
(Jackson, 2011, p. 14; Collins, 2011, p. 5). 
Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah was an offshoot of 
al-Mahajiroun (Jackson, 2011, p. 14), which 
had been proscribed or banned by the UK 
Image 9: Protesters in Luton, 2009 
Image 8: Anti-war protesters in Luton, 
2009 
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government and was led by one of the key proponents for radical Islam in the UK, 
Andjem Choudary.    
This provided the impetus for a violent reaction by those who were looking for a 
reason to express their feelings toward the Muslim community.  The Muslim 
protesters were attacked by non-Muslim spectators, and even though the Islamist 
protest was condemned by the broader Muslim community this offered little comfort 
to those who had already been outraged by this anti-military protest that received 
national media attention.    Following this event, activists like Kevin Carroll, a former 
member of the BNP, who would become a key leader in the EDL, organized a protest 
march in Luton for 28 March where the United Peoples of Luton made its debut.  This 
group, which had links to more extreme far-right groups like Combat-18 and the 
BNP, organized a series of marches throughout the spring of 2009, often engaging in 
violence against counter protestors and vandalism of Muslim areas and businesses.  
With the rise of the anti-Muslim movement, the Islamist’s escalated their protests 
over the coming months, which fueled the animosity on both sides into what Paul 
Jackson (2011) describes as a, “process of tit-for-tat radicalization” where “one 
community develops a pugnacious stance, which inflames the other, leading to an 
increase in violence and disorder, in this case, in Luton in the spring of 2009” 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 15).  
By the summer of 2009, the English Defence League had officially formed into a 
group and was working through new and traditional media to build into a viable social 
movement.  By promoting itself on social media outlets like Facebook, and 
mobilizing its members via this outlet to engage in public demonstrations which were 
picked up by traditional media outlets, the EDL was able to engage in a cycle of 
online recruitment and mobilization that triggered significant mass media attention 
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that spread their anti-Muslim message to a wider audience (Jackson, 2011; Bartlett & 
Littler, 2011).  The attention given by mass media to the group’s use of Facebook 
only served to draw individuals who were interested into an environment where what 
could have been perceived as distasteful and/or bigoted attitudes were warmly 
received and encouraged.  The early Facebook page for the EDL required that users 
request admittance by sending a membership request.  This was later changed to a 
system where simply ‘liking’ the page gained the Facebook user access to all the 
content available on the EDL Facebook page, and all EDL posts were then sent to the 
users Facebook feed.  Interestingly, as the restrictions for membership were reduced, 
the “membership’ on the EDL page rose dramatically.   
The EDL Online 
While the collection and analysis efforts contained within this research were 
focused on the EDL Facebook account, which is acknowledged as their primary 
source of contact with their “membership” (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Copsey, 2013; 
Jackson 2011), the EDL did utilize other internet and communication technologies 
(ICT’s).  Primary among these ICT’s was the EDL website where information 
regarding demonstrations and other future events were placed on the site banner and 
through their own blog.  Through the EDL’s association with other organizations, 
other fora were used to promote the EDL and its events.  The Casuals United Blog, of 
the football ‘firm’ Casual United, put forth an ultra-patriotic, anti-Muslim message 
and used text as well as images to promote their anti-Muslim agenda (Jackson, 2011, 
O’Callahan, et al., 2014).  The blog site English Defence League Extra was an 
unofficial site run by a Birmingham supporter.  While the activity on this grassroots 
site was not as prolific as the Facebook page, with only 32 story postings in May 
2011, the discussions were more in-depth and covered issues “notably related to 
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foreign affairs, critiques of the state, activities of anti-EDL protestors and, of course, 
on-going EDL campaigns (Jackson, 2011, p. 37).  The site Infidels Online, also an 
unofficial site, was characterized by Jackson (2011) as containing a more violent 
version of the EDL narrative that openly promoted violence against Muslims.  
Postings on the Infidel site also mocked the more moderate stance of the EDL 
regarding its pro-Israeli stance and its positive position regarding the Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgendered (LGBT) community that had its own division within the 
EDL (Jackson 2011).  One of the more effective ICT’s used by the EDL was 
YouTube (Jackson, 2011; Copsey 2010).   
The use of mobile devices to “film” demonstrations and other EDL activities and 
subsequently posting them on YouTube “provided a ‘real time’ element” and helped 
to develop the online-offline connection with the membership that helped to create an 
overall sense of community with the disparate EDL community (Jackson, 2011, p.23).  
YouTube videos were also used effectively within the EDL Facebook page by the 
Administrator and the users.  As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, the 
Facebook collection that was analyzed as a part of this research contained links to103 
YouTube videos, with twenty-eight links posted by the administrator and seventy-five 
links posted by the users.  As discussed in the previous chapter, these YouTube videos 
were divided into groupings to measure the impact of the video as measured by the 
number of comments for each that was presented in the primary posts.  What was not 
measured was the number of YouTube videos that were posted by EDL members 
directly to YouTube during this period.  A YouTube search for ‘English Defence 
League’ conducted on 18 August 2014 showed that there were “about 68,000 results” 
for this search.  When the search parameter was changed to simply ‘EDL’ the results 
number grew to “about 181,000 results”.  A Google search of’ EDL YouTube’ 
133 
provided “about 2,940,000 results.”  It should be noted that these results also include 
videos that are anti-EDL.  As a comparison, a Google search for ‘David Cameron 
YouTube’ provided “about 45,600,000 results”, and a search for ‘Justin Bieber 
YouTube’ indicated “about 104,000,000 results”. 
Twitter is another social media platform that is used by members of the EDL.  
While the use of Twitter was not a part of this research, others have examined the use 
of Twitter by extreme right groups including the EDL (O’Callahan et al., 2013; 
O’Callahan et al., 2014).  In their examination of EDL Twitter activity, O’Callahan, 
Green, Conway, Carthy, and Cunningham (2013) found that “peaks in twitting 
activity by the community accounts may be associated with external events” and 
found that increases in traffic could be seen “around the times of street 
demonstrations” (p. 8).  Within their research, and as discussed herein, they found that 
“the online activity of extreme right groups has progressed from the use of dedicated 
websites to span multiple networks including popular social media platforms such as 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube” (O’Callahan, 2013, p. 9). 
EDL Organizational Structure 
One of the unique aspects of the EDL is the organizational structure they chose to 
use.  While EDL central set the overall agenda for the group, there were many 
divisions that engaged in local/regional recruiting and organizing (Copsey, 2010; 
Jackson. 2011).  These various divisions, giving the EDL an almost militaristic flavor, 
where established to provide local support and avenues of communication outside the 
larger construct of the main EDL website and Facebook page (Copsey, 2010; Jackson, 
2011)).  These included the regional divisions like the Northwest, East Midlands, East 
Anglia, Southwest, West London, and South East Central, just to name a few, with 
particularly strong divisions in West Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire, and London 
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(Copsey, 2010).  These regional divisions have their own regional organizers (RO’s) 
and were established in the summer of 2010 to create a cellular EDL that would have 
a tighter organizational structure.  The code of conduct that was established by EDL 
central was disseminated to and reposted by the divisions on their pages indicating 
that “all members must adhere to the correct chain of command” (Copsey, 2010, p. 
19; Jackson 2011).  It states “No member should supersede this chain of command 
without good reason i.e. their issue is with their division leader or RO it must be 
obeyed and respected at all time” (Copsey, 2010, p. 19).   
Other divisions exist that are considered ‘specialized divisions’.  They include the 
EDL Youth Division, the Jewish Division, the Disabled Division, the Women’s 
Division, the Soldier’s Division, and the LGBT Division (Copsey, 2010).  These 
specialized division were often highlighted to represent the open-minded nature of the 
EDL movement and combat the claims that the EDL was in fact a racist, far right 
movement.  The presence of a Sikh Division was used by the EDL to further 
demonstrate their diversity (Copsey, 2010).   
Outside the control of the EDL but certainly in alignment with narrative of the 
group are the various partner defence leagues that exist within and without the UK.  
The Welsh Defence League, Scottish Defence League, and the Ulster Defence League 
were all considered in alignment with the vision of the EDL.  It should be noted 
however, that in 2010 it was revealed that the Welsh Defence League had openly 
exhibited neo-Nazi sympathies and was subsequently shut down, only to reemerge as 
the Welsh Casuals (Jackson, 2011, p. 20).  These other Defence Leagues were much 
smaller in terms of membership and impact in their areas of operation.  Of note is the 
fact that as the EDL grew, other European countries began to take up the counter-
jihadi mantle and form their own defence leagues.  These countries included 
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Germany, France, Sweden, and Norway and there was even an Australian and an 
American Defence League (Copsey, 2010; Goodwin, 2013).  Notably, within the EDL 
Facebook traffic that was collected, particularly as demonstrations were approaching, 
the administrators of these various defence leagues would post to the EDL Facebook 
page offering support from afar.   
Within the EDL, one group that rose to become problematic was Infidels.  This 
splinter faction within the EDL, found the main narrative of the EDL to be too 
moderate and eventually came into conflict with the main group and separated 
themselves from the EDL (Jackson, 2011; Busher, 2013).  Within the following 
narrative of the   5 February, 2011 EDL demonstration, which was observed by this 
researcher, the Infidel Divisions from Bolton and East Anglia are shown to be in 
attendance and by the end of the day came into conflict with the larger EDL 
contingent (Busher, 2013). 
The Homecoming: Putting a Real World Face on a Virtual Phenomenon
7
 
Early page captures in the fall of 2010 showed membership had risen from the 
initial estimate of 500 members to over 30,000 in September 2010.  By January 2011 
the membership had risen to over nearly 60,000 users, and on the eve of the “Return 
to Where it all Began Demonstration” of 5 February 2011 the EDL page showed a 
membership of over 69,000 and was pushing to break 70,000 before or during the 
demonstration.  This event propelled membership to over 80,000 by April 2011 
(Allen, 2011).  This demonstration, which had been heralded for months on the EDL 
                                                 
7
 The narrative included herein is the result of on-the-ground fieldwork conducted on 5 February 
and 3 September 2011.  Academic citations included are in support of those phenomena that were 
personally experienced.  Online information is from observations of Facebook traffic prior to, during, 
and after the official collection period. 
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Facebook page and their website, received considerable media attention prior to the 
event and was covered by mass media outlets from within and without the United 
Kingdom. 
The decision to engage in on-the-ground fieldwork was precipitated by the need to 
understand the link between the real and virtual worlds of the EDL.  Having observed 
the EDL Facebook page for some months prior to the official collection period, the 
question that had gone unanswered was how much influence did the Facebook page 
have on the real world activism of the EDL; how many members would respond to 
the call for a major demonstration; and what would that participation look like from a 
street view perspective.  The observations made online offered only one side of the 
coin, and the experiences from the two on-site visits were integral to providing a more 
holistic view of the phenomenon, particularly as it relates to the online efforts of the 
EDL to put boots on the ground in the furtherance of their activist efforts.  Critically, 
the second observed demonstration provided the opportunity to see first-hand the 
impact of the attacks on the EDL, and the repercussions for world events that had 
placed the EDL under a cloud of suspicion. 
On February 5, 2011 the EDL returned to Luton, where it all started, as a 
demonstration of their ability to mobilize and show the people, the media, and the 
government, that they should be taken seriously.  The event was billed on Facebook 
as their homecoming, a return to “back where it all began” (Collins, 2011), and 
considerable effort was made on Facebook to mobilize the members, coordinate 
internal security, and arrange for transportation to maximize the EDL presence on this 
day.  Having followed the group for months online, it was decided that an ‘on the 
ground’ look at the EDL was needed to add a real world perspective to this research.  
As the group was poised to break the 70,000 member mark on Facebook, this 
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demonstration was viewed by the online membership as a truly national recruiting 
event, particularly given the media coverage that was expected and was indeed 
present. 
Arriving in Luton the day before the demonstration, what became immediately 
obvious was the tension and apprehension that gripped the area around the intended 
demonstration site by the St. Georges Mall and St. Georges Square.  Storefronts along 
the intended march route and around St. Georges Square were boarded up (Image 10) 
in anticipation of the vandalism that had been hyped in the newspapers and by those 
opposed to having the EDL in Luton.   
Appeals by the Luton council were made to the Home Secretary Theresa May to 
ban the EDL from marching 
and demonstrating in Luton, 
but she refused to issue such 
an edict.  Journalists in the 
hotel adjacent to St. Georges 
Square were arriving throughout the day 
and evening in anticipation of covering a rather significant event.  Photo journalists 
were prepared with helmets, and those news journalists who were filming were 
accompanied by hired security personnel.
8
  Just past midnight on the morning of 5 
February, the police had already begun mobilizing for the event.  CCTV trucks were 
brought into St. Georges Square to film the area as a way of providing comparison 
                                                 
8
 While taking video of the event I was stationed next to a videographer from the BBC whose 
security officer was a former Special Forces operator from the United States who encouraged me to 
stay close to them in case things got out of control. 
Image 10: Pre-demonstration Luton, 2011 
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photos to determine if any structures/devices had been brought into the site during the 
hours just prior to the demonstration.
9
  Truckloads of portable barricades were 
brought in and placed along the proposed march route and around the demonstration 
site.  As there was a planned counter demonstration by the United Against Fascism 
group, and there were concerns about attacks by local Muslim youths on the EDL, it 
was clear that access to the EDL static demonstration site would be limited and great 
care would be taken to ensure that the EDL and the UAF would remain separated. 
As the day dawned, the word had spread throughout the news media and online 
that the Prime Minister, David Cameron, had spoken the previous evening in 
Germany on the failure of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom and how it had 
allowed for the spread of radical Islamic extremism within the UK.  He went on to be 
quoted in The Guardian the next morning, “We have failed to provide a vision of 
society (to young Muslims) to which they feel they want to belong.  We have even 
tolerated segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values” 
(Wright, 2011).  This revelation, on the eve of the Luton march, was viewed by the 
EDL leadership and its members as a long awaited endorsement by the UK 
government of the agenda of the English Defence League and the legitimization of 
their claims regarding the growing influence of radical Islam in the UK.  The 
following post appeared on the EDL Facebook page in the early morning hours of 
February 5, 2011, prior to the demonstration:     
                                                 
9
 This was confirmed by one of the Police evidence gatherers just prior to the demonstration.  
Interestingly, teams of evidence gatherers were operating around the demonstration talking pictures and 
video of not only the participants but also the observers.  One particular team was none too pleased 
when they found this researcher filming them at their work. 
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English Defence League (EDL) At long last we are making people listen 
Muslims must embrace our British values, David Cameron says 
www.telegraph.co.uk 
British Muslims must subscribe to mainstream values of freedom and equality, 
David Cameron will say as he declares that the doctrine of multiculturalism 
has “failed” and will be abandoned.(EDL Facebook page/no longer available) 
Comments from the rank and file of the EDL on this matter included: 
“He’s just picking sides, just like everyone else in this country is doing. your 
either EDL, MDL or UAF. and cameron has realised that if he continues to 
side with UAF, he will lose alot of money due to our demos and that we will 
rise up and fuck him in the ass (not meant literally guys)” 
“Cameron says: 'Multiculturalism has failed and will be abandoned' (EDL 
Facebook Page/no longer available) 
Groups that fail to promote British values will no longer receive public money 
or be able to engage with the state. In the papers tomoro - WE'RE WINNING 
THE REAL BATTLE!  
Thanks EDL!” (EDL Facebook page/no longer available) 
“So they are all now agreeing with the EDL &BNP, good on you Cameron, its 
the best thing you have ever said. NS” (EDL Facebook Page/no longer 
available) 
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By early morning, the police presence in this area of Luton grew continually to an 
estimated 2000 law enforcement 
officers by the time of the 
demonstration (Taylor & Davis, 2011).  
Police vans, laden with law enforcement 
officers began lining the streets (Image 11), preparing to take as many demonstrators 
as necessary to jail if trouble broke out.   
At 10am, access to the Mall from St. Georges Square was closed off by police, as 
was the rail access to the mall entrance.  The route that the EDL would use to march 
from their rally point to St. Georges Square was now sealed and counter-protestors 
and agitators were prevented from 
accessing this area.  Evidence 
gatherers, as seen in Image 12, 
stationed on both sides of the street 
continued taking photos and video of 
the observers as they waited for the 
EDL marchers to approach the demonstration area.
10
 The estimated 2000 members of 
various law enforcement offices, from Luton and surrounding areas, many dressed in 
full riot gear, were taking this opportunity to discuss control strategies and establish 
choke points where the crowd would be herded to facilitate control and apprehension.  
A determination was made to reveal myself to those in command and determine the 
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 This group of evidence gatherers were not pleased that they were being videoed by me. 
Image 11: Luton 5 February 2011, Police 
preparing for the EDL demonstration 
Image 12: Evidence gatherers at the 2011 Luton 
Demonstration 
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closest exit window where I could escape danger and be recognized to avoid 
imprisonment in the event the 
demonstration became unruly.  
Mounted units, with horses 
outfitted in riot gear (Image 13), 
spent the morning patrolling the 
expected route to establish a security presence and ensure there were no breaches in 
the barricades as a helicopter continually circled overhead. Speaking to some of the 
officers on the ground at St. Georges Square, it was revealed that the goal (or more 
accurately hope) for the day was that the EDL would have their demonstration, and 
everyone could return home safely, without any violence.  While the police were 
certainly mentally prepared for any eventuality, and certainly dressed for such, it was 
obvious from discussions with different officers that they would be practicing 
reasonable restraint to avoid precipitating confrontation and violence. 
The police presence in Luton was a major source of aggravation to not just the 
EDL but also to the citizens of Luton.  While the EDL questioned the need for such a 
presence given what they characterized as the ‘peaceful’ nature of their previous 
demonstrations, Luton’s town leaders bemoaned the estimated 2.5 million Pounds that 
would be expended to provide law enforcement and security for this one day event.  
Interestingly, following the EDL’s realization that the individual communities would 
have to bear such expenses, the message that local governments must bend to the will 
of the EDL or the group would march on their town became a coercive tactic of the 
EDL (Jackson, 2011, 24).   
As the EDL moved from their rally point at pubs in Luton to the demonstration 
site at St. Georges Square, they were enveloped by riot police on foot and on 
Image 13: Roving mounted police in riot gear 
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horseback.  Being positioned just short of St. Georges Square along the demonstration 
route provided a good vantage point from which to view the march and then move 
easily into the static demonstration area to observe the speeches and the crowd.  Even 
before the EDL turned onto the street and began approaching the square, the chants of 
the demonstrators echoed up and down the otherwise abandoned windswept city 
center.  Slogans specific to the group narrative on Facebook came to life; “E-E-EDL”; 
“Never Surrender” and “No Surrender”; and rounds of a song to St. George rang out 
as the group moved closer to the square.   
 
Image 14: The police lead the way in Luton and push back against the forward progress of the EDL 
The forward progress of the marchers seemed slow until it was realized there was 
a cordon of riot police, arms linked, controlling their forward progress to prevent 
them overrunning the police line (Image 14).  Police in full riot gear acted as a speed 
governor, walking backwards and pushing against the forward momentum of the 
group.  At the same time, other police in riot gear lined both sides of the street, as 
seen in Image 15, to constrain the group to the 
roadway itself and keep the pavement clear 
for law enforcement and media.   
As the estimated 3,000 demonstrators 
(Jackson 2011; Taylor & Davis, 2011) 
marched up the street toward the square, they carried flags, banners, and signs that 
Image 15: Police in riot gear line the streets in 
Luton 
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reflected many of the sentiments that had been observed in the virtual community.  
Key among these is the groups association with the flag of St. George and many of 
the divisions used this flag to identify themselves.  At the same time, some of these 
flags (Image 16) were used to segregate their group from what they viewed as an 
overly moderate EDL community by identifying themselves as “Infidels” (Jackson, 
2011, p.29). 
 
Image 16: The EDL Division flags fly in Luton 
These Infidel Divisions were begun out of frustration with the larger EDL group 
narrative.  Led by John Shaw (AKA Snowy), the infidel movement was viewed as a 
more extreme element within the EDL that often criticized the actions of the larger 
group and following this demonstration actually engaged in inter-EDL violence when 
they cornered Robinson and Carroll indicating that they were “dealt with” (Jackson, 
2011, p.30).  These Infidel divisions have now emerged as their own factions, 
separate from the leadership of the EDL with their own communication network and 
structure (Jackson, 2011, Busher, 2013). 
Signs, dispersed throughout the march, also reflected the EDL’s anti-Mosque 
agenda.  Some called for the ending of mosque construction while others called for 
requiring local popular votes prior to construction.  This is an issue that appears 
regularly in the virtual realm as posts address what the EDL perceives as an 
aggressive agenda by Muslim leaders to build new or expand existing mosques in 
their communities (Jackson, 2011, p. 24).  Several EDL events have been centered on 
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protesting what they perceive as the 
aggressive spread of Islam through the 
construction of new mosques (Images 17 & 
18) and promote the groups attendance at 
council meetings where these issues will 
be discussed and ‘outing’ council members 
who support these construction projects 
‘against the wishes of the larger 
population.’  The following photos are a sampling of those signs: 
This is the narrative used by the EDL to foment anger regarding the construction 
of new mosques and further the development of the ‘us vs. them’ dynamic.  The EDL 
places itself as the voice of the people in what they see as the ongoing struggle against 
the spread of the Islamic influence in Britain.  
Other hot button issues that the EDL uses to further its aggressive anti-Muslim 
agenda are those issues they perceive as being associated with Sharia Law (Jackson, 
2011, p. 12).  These would include the 
lack of women’s rights and the practice of 
honour killing within Muslim families.  
Both issues, in addition to other criminal 
activity which the EDL portrays as being 
endemic to the Muslim community get considerable attention within the online 
community and this was also reflected in some of the signs as seen in Images 19 and 
20.   Issues that get special attention by EDL administrators online are arrests of 
Muslim men for pedophilia, Muslim on non-Muslim rape, the specific targeting of 
Image 17: Protest against the mosque 
Image 18: Protest against mosque construction 
Image 19: Against Sharia Law 
145 
non-Muslim girls for sexual grooming and prostitution, and trials involving the 
murder of non-Muslims by Muslim men.  Another issue that received special attention 
as representing the infiltration of Muslim culture throughout Britain is the 
proliferation of halal foods in traditionally non-Muslim venues and in the schools 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 24). 
Throughout the march the chants of E-E-EEDL continued as did their slogan of 
Never Surrender.  One young man (Image 21), not pleased with being videoed, 
decided to express himself in a more vehiment way by approaching the camera and 
shouting aggressively “NEVER SURRENDER ….NEVER FUCKING 
SURRENDER!”   He was moved 
along by the police officer who 
was stationed on the streetside to 
ensure there was not an 
escalation of this confrontation.   
On a lighter note, one 
marcher doning a New York Yankees ball cap (Image 22) was rather pleased at the 
prospect of being on video and approached the camera with a jovial “heyyy,” which 
brought a smile to the officers face marching alongside.     
Image 20: EDL member unhappy with being filmed 
 
Image 21: Signs against poppy burning, honour killings, Sharia Law, ect.... 
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One thing that was noticed as being 
consistent with previous demonstrations, 
and a matter of public and law enforcement 
concern, was the practice by many EDL 
members of hiding their faces.  In much of the 
early online EDL propoganda, members wore ski masks or balaklava’s to hide/protect 
their identities.  Youtube video of recorded statements and previous demonstrations 
showed members covering their faces in multiple ways.  As the demonstrators 
marched by and into St. Georges Square, this practice was also observed as seen 
below. 
 
 
Image 23: The demonstrators hide their faces to avoid the CCTV. 
  With the prevalence of CCTV in the UK and particularly given the additional 
‘evidence gathering’ in Luton on this day, those individuals with previous issues with 
law enforcement, or not desiring to be associated as being as part of the EDL, chose to 
hide their identities (Image 23).  It is well known that the police will take pictures of 
known demonstrators arriving at the train stations, detain them as they disembark at 
Image 22: A jovial demonstrator 
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their destination, and strongly suggest they return home without attending the 
demonstration. 
While it took approximately fifteen minutes for the entire group to proceed into 
St. Georges Square for the static demonstration, the group was relatively well behaved 
and there was no trouble with the police during this part of the day.  As it became 
clear that violence was less likely, the word was passed down the line to change from 
riot helmets to ball caps in an effort to de-escalate tensions and minimize the 
expectation of violence.  The officer shown below (left) is relaying this message to 
those officers manning the side of the street and shortly thereafter, all the officers had 
made the change.  The comments of the officer were captured on video/audio 
instructing the officers on the street to “change helmets to ball caps, pass the word 
down the line (Image 24).”   
 
Image 24: Switch to ball caps, pass it down 
     Not until the group reached St. Georges Square did the police line open up, 
allowing the marchers to enter the square where a stage and sound equipment had 
been set up for the static demonstration.  At 
this point, the whole of the police presence 
enveloped the static site (Image 25).  While 
they allowed the EDL to move about the 
square while the music and speeches went on, 
those wishing to leave the area were discouraged from doing so.  It was observed that 
Image 25: Closing ranks at static demonstration 
site 
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about half way through the static demonstration a group of younger members decided 
to leave and were heard to complain that the event was boring and they should go 
look for some action.   
Along with a lineup of speeches by various EDL members including Tommy 
Robinson and Kevin Carroll, members from other Defence Leagues from around 
Europe and even the United States were brought up on stage to deliver their own 
orations in support of the mission of the EDL and in opposition to what they 
perceived as the unabated spread of radical Islam in the United Kingdom, Western 
Europe, and the United States.  During the speech by Tommy Robinson, he told those 
in attendance that they were part of a “tidal wave of patriotism” spreading throughout 
the UK (Taylor & Davis, 2011).  It was noted as the group marched into the square, 
many of the more seasoned members wore yellow vests, identifying themselves as 
“STEWARDS” as seen in Image 26.    
 
Image 26: EDL Stewards 
These individuals, who were viewed as senior EDL members from each division, 
were acting as a buffer between the other EDL members and the police.  Their job, 
according to one of the senior stewards, was to keep the younger members from doing 
anything that would cause trouble with the police, presenting a negative image for the 
EDL (Busher, 2013, p. 77).    When questioned, this same individual revealed that 
much of the mobilization effort for this day’s event had taken place on Facebook.  He 
confirmed that while Facebook is the primary vehicle for reaching the masses and 
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recruiting new members, the really important communications were not done on 
Facebook as they were confident their page was being monitored by law enforcement.   
This is reflected in a post on the EDL Facebook page the evening prior to the 
demonstration: 
“This is a start people , not enough at the moment,but that will come .We are 
being listened to, so what we do tomorrow will have a huge bearing on this, 
Tommy and the rest of the leadership are putting their lives on the line,So all 
they as...k is that we keep it peaceful.Lets show the world that we arte not the 
thugs we have been branded as. 
ANYONE WHO KICKS OFF WILL BE EJECTED FROM THE MARCH ..BY 
EDL STEWARDS - CANT HAVE THE EDL NAME RUINED ON A DAY 
WHEN EVERY PRESS ORGANISATION IS WATCHING”(EDL Facebook, 5 
Feb.2011, no longer available) 
Interestingly, due to the windy weather, the poor quality of the sound system, and the 
noise from the still hovering police helicopter, the energy of the group of 
approximately 3000 demonstrators waned quickly.  Those who were not standing by 
the stage had difficulty hearing what was said and chants rose up from the outer edges 
of the mass, often times while someone was speaking on stage.  Some of the older 
members on the periphery took time to talk to the police in what seemed to be an 
effort to assuage the concerns regarding violence and engage in public relations. 
At the conclusion of the event, the crowd disbursed to their coaches and the rail 
station, the police demobilized, and the mall reopened.  By evening, the barricades 
had been removed and traffic in the city center had resumed.  Journalists, 
understanding the implication of the day’s events, and on the heels of the comments 
by the Prime Minister, frantically packed their gear and made plans to travel to 
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London to gauge the political response to the day and determine whether the PM’s 
comments represented a shift in the government’s position regarding the EDL, since 
previously Cameron had characterized the EDL and its members as disgusting. 
Beginning the morning of 6 February, the impact of the EDL demonstration in 
Luton was well known.  The news of the demonstration had been on the television the 
night before, and was on the cover of most papers this morning.  Even before the 
demonstration was over, video of the demonstration and speeches appeared on 
YouTube and continued to proliferate throughout the 6
th
.  Comments on the EDL 
page reflected their positive view of the previous day’s events. 
“English Defence League (EDL)   46 coaches 9 minibuses and thousands on 
the trains and cars at least 6,000 in attendance in Luton today well done to all 
attendance we will never surrender we will only grow”11 
“No trouble and a good thing too. Our numbers will go up after today, NFSE” 
“the bbc r full of it the square outside the shopping centre was packed about 
5ooo strong and well done 2 all the edl well behaved good speach by tommy 
and full praise to the police thay never hasseled us once as tommy said no 
surender edl edl”  
“I was there and there was definitely 4000+ marching that day.A great day 
can't wait for the next one!”  
“The good thing about all this is the EDL are being moved into a spotlight 
position in the media. Yesterdays excellent behaviour at the Luton demo will 
start to show people that we are not thugs or racists, and that we are genuine 
                                                 
11
 Estimates of EDL attendance at the demonstration ranged from 1500 in the UK media to 3-4000 
by other media sources.  The police, when contacted, indicated it is their policy to NOT provide crowd 
numbers.  It is well accepted that 6,000 is an exaggeration. 
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people wit...h a genuine agenda who are taking a stand against a real threat 
to our society.  This can only be a good thing for us, and will help our 
numbers swell as the public realise what we believe in, and what our true 
cause is.”(EDL Facebook page, 6 Feb. 2011, no longer available) 
 
Most notably, the membership numbers on the EDL Facebook page began to 
skyrocket.  By 7 February, just two days after the demonstration, membership on the 
EDL Facebook page had already reached 74,618 users.  By the end of the online 
collection period on 22 March 2011, membership on the Facebook page of the 
English Defence League had risen from 69,000 to over 82,000, reaching 85,000 by 
the beginning of April (Allen, 2011, p. 286), sometimes by thousands per day in the 
weeks following the demonstration.  This rise in membership continued unabated, to 
reach nearly 100,000 users, until July 22, 2011, when the EDL would be impacted by 
two events that nearly spelled the end of the EDL as a viable movement. 
Conclusion 
On the surface, the birth and growth of the English Defence League seems to have 
been fueled by anti-Muslim sentiment that is rooted in the newer messaging of the 
BNP, propagated by the early leaders who either had ties to the BNP or held strong 
anti-Muslim views.  The shaping of the group as being an anti-Muslim extremist 
organization engaging in street politics and online activism is often at odds with the 
messaging presented in the demonstrations.  Further the growth of the Facebook page 
and the number of members that are presented by the leadership as active fully 
engaged participants is not supported by their ability to put boots on the ground 
during demonstrations.  Was the public messaging effective at influencing the media’s 
perception of the EDL? Does the dialog of the Facebook participants reflect the anti0-
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extremist agenda as presented by the leadership?  And, how do the claims by the 
leadership of having a vast online army compare with the reality of the user 
participation?  These and other questions will b examined in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Four: The Impact of Offline and Online Events  
On the English Defence League 
Introduction 
While Facebook may have been a valuable tool for propaganda and mobilization 
for the English Defence League it would be a mistake to think that by simply 
controlling this social media platform the EDL could control their destiny.  There 
have been, over the years, several externalities that have had a significant impact on 
the group as well as its social media platform.  From the beginning, the EDL has 
faced strong opposition from traditional media regarding its agenda and the 
“peaceful” nature of their actions.  News articles in various papers consistently 
provided negative characterizations of the EDL, its leadership, and membership.   
These stories were often featured in EDL posts to demonstrate the contentious 
position being taken by the media, often driving a dialog of victimization at the hands 
of the media.  In additional to the media’s assault on the EDL, there were critical 
events like the attacks committed by Anders Breivik in Norway that brought increased 
criticism of the EDL in the media as well as prompting security concerns within the 
UK as to the potential violent nature of the movement.  The online response to this 
event by the EDL was disrupted when their Facebook page was hacked and the online 
membership became concerned about the security of medium and the increased 
security concerns of the government regarding the actions of the group.  This chapter 
will examine these phenomena and how they impacted the English Defence League, 
its membership, and their use of Facebook. 
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Traditional Media Characterization of the EDL 
One of the interesting aspects of this research was observing the impact of various 
offline activities and how traditional print media coverage as well as certain events 
impacted the EDL activity on the ground and the effect they had on the dialog within 
their Facebook page.  There were several events that had considerable influence on 
the EDL as a group and in one case on their Facebook page which will be discussed 
herein.  This discussion will be supplemented by observations from on-the-ground 
field work, online observations, and from a collection of traditional print news stories 
within UK papers related to the English Defence League.  While the EDL primarily 
used Facebook to communicate with its members, the broader population was 
exposed to the EDL through its street demonstrations but mainly vis-à-vis traditional 
‘mass media’.  To consider the impact of the traditional media coverage on the EDL 
and its social media campaign, a LexisNexis search was done to obtain all of the news 
articles written about the English Defence League from 1 August 2009 through 1 
August 2014.  The results of this search provided 5,885 articles and using the 
download function within LexisNexis were placed into two formats.  First, the 
metadata were exported into Excel files that could then be imported into SPSS for 
analysis.  This allowed for a frequency analysis of the publishers of the articles and 
the graphing of the volume of articles over time to consider the relationship between 
the volume of articles and EDL activity.  Second, the articles in their entirety were 
downloaded into Word Documents to search for key words and phrases to examine 
how traditional media portrayed the EDL, and how often they mentioned their use of 
Facebook and other social media within the articles.  These two collections were then 
separated into four separate time periods to coincide with important events to allow 
for a more granular inspection of the data.  These four time periods are as follows: 
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1 August 2009 through 4 February 2011 - The 4 February date is the eve of the 
large Luton Demonstration. 
5 February 2011 through 22 July 2011 - 22 July is the day before the double blow 
to the EDL of the Anders Breivik attack and the hack to the EDL Facebook page, 
which will be discussed in detail following. 
23 July 2011 through 22 May 2013 – The 22nd of May is the day before the 
murder of Lee Rigby by Islamists in Woolwich. 
23 May 2013 through 1 August 2014 – This segment includes the news from the 
Woolwich murder discussed herein and extends through the announcement of the 
separation of Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll from the EDL discussed in the 
previous chapter.   
Traditional Media as a Promotional Tool 
As discussed in chapter one, there is considerable debate regarding the power of 
social media to drive movements (Morozov, 2011; Budish, 2013).  One of the 
interesting questions, particularly following the Arab Spring was the role of 
traditional media in spreading the news of events to the masses which then draws 
people to the social media aspect of the movement (Lim, 2012; Alterman, 2011; 
Comunello & Anzera, 2012).  To consider this question the LexisNexis metadata was 
graphed to provide the frequency of articles and then look to see how this frequency 
coincides with the schedule of demonstrations held by the EDL.  Did the articles 
preceded the demonstration, which could serve to promote the event, or was the rise 
in frequency found to follow these demonstrations?  The graph of the entire search 
period, seen in Figure 1, shows that there were certainly periods of high frequency, 
with the volume of articles reaching a crescendo in May/June of 2013.  To get a more 
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precise picture various time periods that are marked by significant events will be 
examined.  
Figure 1: Frequency of Articles on the English Defence League 
 
To examine the traffic related to the early demonstrations that predate the 
collection period of this research, the list of EDL demonstrations compiled by Copsey 
(2010) was used (p. 27-29).  While Copsey (2010) lists all marches including those of 
EDL affiliates like the Welsh and Scottish Defence Leagues, he lists the first EDL 
march as occurring on 8 August 2009 and his list extends through 9 October 2010 
(Table 1).  Additional demonstration dates were taken from articles.  
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Date Location Attendance 
8-Aug-09 Birmingham Unknown 
5-Sep-09 Birmingham 100 
13-Sep-09 Harrow/London unknown 
10-Oct-09 Manchester 1500 
31-Oct-09 Leeds 900 
5-Dec-09 Nottingham 500 
10-Jan-10 Wooten Bassett 200 
23-Jan-10 Stoke-on-Trent 2000 
5-Mar-10 London 200 
20-Mar-10 Bolton 2000 
3-Apr-10 Dudley 2000 
27-Apr-10 Blackburn ** 27 
1-May-10 Aylesbury 800 
3-May-10 Dudley ** 40 
29-May-10 Newcastle 800 
5-Jun-10 Cardiff 200 
17-Jul-10 Dudley 500 
28-Aug-10 Bradford 1000 
11-Sep-10 Oldham ** 120 
12-Sep-10 Nuneaton ** unknown 
9-Oct-10 Leicester 1000 
25-Oct-10 London Unknown 
30-Oct-10 Amsterdam, Netherlands 60 
21-Nov-10 Wolverhampton 100 
27-Nov-10 Preston & Nuneaton 1000+/500 
11-Dec-10 Peterborough 500 
5 Feb 10 Luton 3000 
  ** Flash demonstrations   
Table 1: List of Demonstrations 
The graph for the period that includes these demonstration dates (Figure 2) shows 
that in nearly all cases the increase in the number of articles per day occurs after the 
date of the demonstration.  The flash demonstrations indicated with blue lines on the 
graph seem to have had little impact on the article frequency.   
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Figure 2: Articles 1 Aug. 09 - 4 Feb. 11 
 
This perspective is supported by the frequency analysis of the number of 
published articles per day in ascending order of date (the full chart appears in 
Appendix 4). With a few exceptions during this period, the number of articles 
following the demonstration exceeded the volume preceding it.  Table 2 below shows 
the demonstration dates emboldened within the annotated list of dates contained in 
Appendix 4.  The preceding four days and the four days following the demonstration 
are also provided to examine the volume of traditional media traffic pertaining to the 
EDL in relation to the demonstration dates.  As can be seen in most cases, in keeping 
with the graph above most cases indicate that the volume of news articles either 
follows after the demonstration or on the day of the demonstration.  For example, in 
the four days prior to the demonstration held on 5 September 2009, there were only 
seven articles published pertaining to the EDL including two on the day of the 
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demonstration, but a total of sixty-five articles appeared in the four days following the 
demonstration.  The next demonstration on 13 September shows there were twenty-
five articles prior to the demonstration, thirteen on the day of, and thirty-one articles 
in the four day after the demonstration.  One important note is there were eleven 
articles published on the day before the demo, the most articles published on the day 
before any demonstration within the Copsey (2010) grouping.  For many of the dates 
for the rest of 2009 and into 2010, the media attention following the demonstration 
was unremarkable, with only a few articles appearing per day.  However, the 5 March 
2010 demonstration saw a significant increase with six articles preceding, nine on the 
day, and twenty-two following the day of the demonstration.  Similarly the 28 August 
2010 demo had only five articles leading up to the date, but had eleven articles on the 
day of the demonstration and thirty articles in the four days following the 
demonstration in Bradford.  Interestingly, the day preceding the 21 November 2010 
demo had fifteen articles, with only five on the day of and thirteen in the four days 
following.  The demonstration on 27 November and 11 December both experienced a 
huge increase in traffic but with a slight delay.  The 27 November demo had eleven 
articles on the day of the demo, four on the day following, but thirty-six on the second 
day.  Likewise, the 11 December event had two articles on the day, four on the day 
after, but thirty four on the second day after and twenty five on the third.  This can 
possibly be explained by the fact that the demonstrations were held on Saturday and 
the news was held until Monday.  It should also be noted that on both these dates 
there were clashes with counterdemonstrators and during the 11 December demo, 
there was a significant police presence of over 1000 officers to keep the EDL and the 
counterdemonstrators away from each other (BBC News, 11 December 2011).   
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Date Number 
28-Aug-09 2 
30-Aug-09 2 
3-Sep-09 3 
4-Sep-09 4 
5-Sep-09 2 
6-Sep-09 22 
7-Sep-09 27 
8-Sep-09 12 
9-Sep-09 4 
10-Sep-09 2 
11-Sep-09 8 
12-Sep-09 11 
13-Sep-09 13 
14-Sep-09 18 
15-Sep-09 3 
16-Sep-09 4 
17-Sep-09 6 
    
5-Oct-09 3 
7-Oct-09 4 
8-Oct-09 3 
9-Oct-09 1 
10-Oct-09 5 
11-Oct-09 14 
12-Oct-09 6 
13-Oct-09 3 
    
14-Oct-09 1 
25-Oct-09 8 
26-Oct-09 2 
27-Oct-09 3 
29-Oct-09 2 
30-Oct-09 1 
31-Oct-09 3 
1-Nov-09 3 
2-Nov-09 5 
3-Nov-09 1 
    
6-Jan-10 2 
7-Jan-10 1 
8-Jan-10 1 
9-Jan-10 1 
10-Jan-10 1 
11-Jan-10 7 
13-Jan-10 1 
14-Jan-10 3 
    
18-Jan-10 1 
21-Jan-10 3 
22-Jan-10 2 
23-Jan-10 3 
24-Jan-10 2 
25-Jan-10 6 
26-Jan-10 5 
27-Jan-10 3 
    
1-Mar-10 3 
3-Mar-10 1 
4-Mar-10 2 
5-Mar-10 9 
6-Mar-10 19 
7-Mar-10 2 
9-Mar-10 1 
    
16-Mar-10 1 
17-Mar-10 3 
19-Mar-10 2 
20-Mar-10 4 
21-Mar-10 11 
22-Mar-10 7 
23-Mar-10 4 
    
30-Mar-10 5 
31-Mar-10 1 
1-Apr-10 3 
2-Apr-10 2 
3-Apr-10 4 
4-Apr-10 9 
5-Apr-10 4 
6-Apr-10 1 
8-Apr-10 1 
23-Apr-10 7 
24-Apr-10 3 
26-Apr-10 2 
27-Apr-10 1 
29-Apr-10 2 
30-Apr-10 1 
1-May-10 1 
2-May-10 2 
3-May-10 1 
4-May-10 4 
5-May-10 1 
6-May-10 3 
9-May-10 1 
    
25-May-10 4 
26-May-10 1 
27-May-10 3 
28-May-10 1 
29-May-10 7 
30-May-10 3 
31-May-10 7 
1-Jun-10 4 
2-Jun-10 3 
3-Jun-10 5 
4-Jun-10 3 
5-Jun-10 3 
6-Jun-10 2 
7-Jun-10 5 
8-Jun-10 4 
11-Jun-10 1 
    
13-Jul-10 2 
14-Jul-10 2 
16-Jul-10 2 
17-Jul-10 1 
18-Jul-10 6 
19-Jul-10 5 
20-Jul-10 1 
21-Jul-10 4 
    
 
 
 
 
162 
24-Aug-10 1 
25-Aug-10 2 
26-Aug-10 2 
28-Aug-10 11 
29-Aug-10 11 
30-Aug-10 14 
31-Aug-10 4 
1-Sep-10 1 
    
8-Sep-10 2 
12-Sep-10 5 
13-Sep-10 5 
14-Sep-10 2 
15-Sep-10 3 
    
5-Oct-10 8 
6-Oct-10 3 
7-Oct-10 6 
8-Oct-10 5 
9-Oct-10 7 
10-Oct-10 9 
11-Oct-10 6 
12-Oct-10 5 
13-Oct-10 1 
    
21-Oct-10 1 
22-Oct-10 2 
23-Oct-10 2 
25-Oct-10 12 
26-Oct-10 4 
27-Oct-10 2 
28-Oct-10 2 
29-Oct-10 2 
30-Oct-10 1 
31-Oct-10 2 
1-Nov-10 6 
2-Nov-10 2 
3-Nov-10 2 
20-Nov-10 15 
17-Nov-10 1 
19-Nov-10 5 
21-Nov-10 5 
22-Nov-10 4 
23-Nov-10 6 
24-Nov-10 1 
25-Nov-10 2 
26-Nov-10 2 
27-Nov-10 11 
28-Nov-10 4 
29-Nov-10 36 
30-Nov-10 6 
1-Dec-10 2 
    
7-Dec-10 3 
8-Dec-10 3 
9-Dec-10 1 
11-Dec-10 2 
12-Dec-10 4 
13-Dec-10 34 
14-Dec-10 25 
15-Dec-10 9 
  
  
  
  
Table 2: Number of articles 
per day 
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The traffic graph for the period beginning with the day of the 5 February 
Demonstration and ending the day before the Breivik attack (Figure 3) shows a 
significant and sustained increase in traffic following the Luton demonstration with 
sixteen articles on the day of the demonstration and one hundred-two articles in the 
four days following the demonstration that as discussed previously, was attended by 
approximately 2500-3000 EDL members which essentially shut down the area around 
St. Georges Square in Luton and attracted over 2500 police officers.  In the ten days 
following the demo there were 186 articles published about the English Defence 
League. 
Figure 3: Article frequency 5 Feb. 11-22 July 11 
 
 
 
The spike in traffic seen on 21 April-29 April is related to the Royal Wedding of 
Prince William and Kate Middleton where the Islamist group Muslims Against 
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Crusades (MAC) was vowing to disrupt the wedding with protests and the EDL was 
seeking to mount counter-protests on the day of the wedding.  The slight increase on 
7-8 May is related to the EDL counterdemonstration where they clashed with MAC 
members honoring Osama bin Laden with a “funeral service” (The Mirror, 7 May, 
2011).   
The following graph (Figure 4) depicts the frequency of print news articles for the 
period following the Anders Breivik attack in Norway which also coincided with the 
hacking of the EDL Facebook page.  Both events are discussed in detail herein, but it 
is interesting to note the increased frequency of articles following these two event, 
although this increase was very likely driven by the Breivik attack and his supposed 
connection to the EDL, but also of note is the number of demonstrations by the EDL 
during this period and impact they had on the traditional news volume associated with 
the EDL. 
Figure 4: Article frequency 23 July 11- 21 May 13 
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Anders Beivik, the Oslo Attacks, and the Connections to the EDL 
On 22 July 2011 Anders Breivik, a self-proclaimed crusader against the spread of 
Islamic influence in Norway, murdered 76 people in Oslo in what he proclaimed in 
his manifesto as “a Pre-emptive war to rid Europe of Marxists, Muslims, and 
multiculturalists—even if it took to 2083 (Syson, 2011).”  His two prong attack 
included detonating fertilizer bombs in the government area of Oslo, killing eight and 
wounding thirty, and then traveling to a Labour Party youth camp on Utoya Island, 
dressed as a police officer, where he systematically murdered 68 people and wounded 
another 67 with multiple firearms.
12
  Most concerning to British authorities were his 
claims of having been involved with the English Defence League.  Breivik claimed to 
be Facebook friends with more than 600 EDL members, had attended at least one 
demonstration where Geert Wilders had spoken, and had met privately with members 
of the EDL leadership while he was in the UK (Jackson, 2011, p. 47; 4News, 2011).  
Further, Breivik claimed to have supplied the EDL with anti-Muslim ideological 
material.  His purported ties to the EDL were covered within the reportage by 
traditional media and is reflected in the number of articles that were published 
following the event.  During the first few days following the attack there were only a 
few articles that mentioned the EDL (eight in all), but by 25 July that number had 
risen to sixty following the revelation that there may be EDL ties to Breivik.  Between 
                                                 
12
 This attack was discussed among some senior law enforcement attending the Countering Home 
Grown Terrorism symposium in October 2011, and how Breivik’s wearing of a police uniform 
facilitated his ability to kill and wound so many people.  In a situation where shots are being fired, an 
individual in a police uniform would represent safety and people naturally ran toward the person that 
would become their executioner.   
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25 July and 31 July there were a total of two hundred fifty-five articles published 
pertaining to the EDL in which Anders Beivik was named 1,976 times.   
Following this horrendous attack, the EDL leadership rushed to distance itself 
from Breivik and his attacks by denying any direct involvement with him and 
condemning his attacks.   
The EDL Facebook page issued a statement regarding Breivik: 
‘We can categorically state that there has never been any official contact 
between him and the EDL, our Facebook page had 100,000 supporters and 
receives tens of thousands of comments each day. And there is no evidence 
that Breivik was ever one of those 100,000 supporters. 
Even so, anyone who expresses any extremist beliefs of any kind, be it white 
supremacist, Christian fundamentalist or Islamic extremists, they all get 
banned from the site.”(Dolan, 2011) 
While this was the official statement, when interviewed, Tommy Robinson (Stephen 
Yaxley-Lennon) expressed concern about how others could be inspired by these 
actions to commit similar atrocities “within five years” if they felt their concerns were 
not being legitimately addressed (Dolan, 2011).  Given the level of concern regarding 
the loss of life in Norway and the potential for violence as a result of these attacks, 
could such a comment be viewed as a veiled threat?   
 The investigation into the claims by Breivik that he was friends with dozens if 
not hundreds of EDL members seems to have had some legitimacy.  Some members, 
who were interviewed by the media, acknowledged that they had been friended by 
Breivik and saw his content on the EDL Facebook page.  Following the attacks some 
even praised his actions: 
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“One said: ‘This man is no terrorist, he is a soldier in the war against Islam. 
God bless him.’” In this same article the financier for the EDL, Alan Lake,  
was quoted as saying, “As far as I’m concerned I’d be happy to execute 
people who try to spread Sharia Law.” (Dolan, 2011, p. ) 
Whatever the extent of Breivik’s contacts with the English Defence League; his 
actions on that day had a significant impact on the EDL and its Facebook participants 
(Jackson, 2011, 63).  Additionally, the British government was forced to re-assess 
their perception of the far right as a threat and begin to consider how their actions 
could actually increase the possibility of additional Islamic radicalization.  As it 
turned out, the Breivik attack and other events of the day had a very chilling effect on 
the general membership of the EDL which seems to have caused the group to 
diminish significantly. 
The Loss of Trust and the Fracturing of the EDL 
On the day of the Oslo attacks, the Facebook page of the English Defence League 
suffered a fatal hack that resulted in the groups’ page being taken down, and for the 
first time since they opened their page, the EDL were unable to recover their 
Facebook page.  Interestingly, while the Breivik attack and his alleged links to the 
EDL were reported with great zeal, the hacking of the EDL Facebook page received 
absolutely no media attention during the days and weeks that followed the hack.  The 
result of the hack was that the nearly 100,000 users who had ‘liked’ or joined the page 
were left with nowhere to go on Facebook to learn what was going on regarding EDL 
activities.  As accusations of complicity with Breivik and how he had been inspired to 
commit his acts of terror by engaging in dialogue with the EDL on their FB page were 
proliferating in the media, the EDL Facebook users had to rely on the official EDL 
website for information regarding the Facebook hack and the status of their primary 
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mode of communication. By the next day the EDL had opened another page on 
Facebook, but there were many unanswered questions about how such an attack could 
happen, had the names of the users been compromised, and whether the government 
was involved in the shutdown of their page.  Within a few days it was made clear to 
the members that the old page was “lost forever” and they would have to rebuild their 
membership numbers.  However, following the heinous attacks in Norway, and the 
perception of Breivik’s association with the EDL, the group struggled to recover its 
prior prominence on Facebook (Jackson, 2011).  Were the concerns about the security 
of the site legitimate?  Was the UK government monitoring the EDL Facebook page 
and gathering intelligence on the users?  To consider these questions, it is necessary to 
understand who hacked the FB page of the EDL, and then examine the impact these 
events had on the group. 
The Z Company Hacking Crew 
Within hours of the Oslo attacks, a group known as Z Company Hacking Crew 
(ZHC) hacked and took control of the Facebook page of the English Defence League 
(Bosserman, 2011).  This was not the first time the page had been hacked by ZHC, 
but it proved to be a fatal hack that could not be resolved by Facebook 
Administrators.  ZHC, which is a pro-Islamist hacking group based in Pakistan has 
been responsible for hacking the Facebook pages and websites of hundreds of groups 
who have a pro-western/anti-Islamist agenda.  As mentioned, this hack received no 
media attention and searches for ZHC, the Z Company Hacking Crew, or even the 
word hack produced no results from within the traditional media articles during this 
period.  On the day they took over the Facebook page of the EDL they boasted by 
placing posts on the page and antagonizing those members who chose to engage the 
“new administrators” about their actions. 
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Examples include: 
 English Defence League (EDL)  Hack dedicated to our 
beloved Andy Cox 
-ZHC 
-Barmy Army 
-TeaMp0isoN 
-St trinians 
 English Defence League (EDL)  Edl founder pricey is a peado....Steven 
Lennon we know wos in your computer u dirty little animal! How fucking 
dare u talk about some man many centuries ago being a peado wen you 
fucking sell your kids naked pics u lowlife scum! No wonder you attract 
people like pricey! 
Following these and other taunts, ZHC began posting the screen names as well as real 
names of EDL members, their addresses and phone numbers.
13
  Posts by other 
outsiders on the day of the hack included: 
-haha edl cant even defend there own facebook page 
-What idiot of the EDL admin let these Anti-English Multi culti left wing 
pricks take over this page lol 
- these american bastards really do piss me off, they call us Muslim brothers 
and sisters terrorists but dont realise what they do. Thank you hacking bro for 
showing me the stuff about aafia...its made me feel the need of killing these 
mofos as thats what they try getting out of us, i hope america simply sinks with 
all the bastards in their including some of these dumb british people :) 
                                                 
13
 To comply with the UK Data Protection Act, these posts cannot be presented. 
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- LOL bare pussyhole edl scum licking ass so they so they don't get rushed by 
there fellow skin heads.. All ya lots can do is act bad on facebook u don't get 
out ya yards ur too busy cleaning the dishes ir drinkin piss down the pub and 
ur acting thugish on a facebook group! 14 
As a result of this cyber-attack, the English Defence League was forced to 
upgrade its internet security and open a new page on Facebook.  However, following 
the attacks and the revelation that the EDL page had been so badly compromised, and 
the comments by the UK government that they were concerned about the actions of 
the EDL and their links to Breivik, the membership numbers on the new Facebook 
page were a fraction of what they had been and these members were concerned about 
the security of their information and identities.  A sampling of the posts following the 
establishment of the new page provide a glimpse of this trepidation: 
o Make Sure You Guys Changed Your Passwords And Stuff Like That, 
Change It Like Every 2 Weeks So You'll Be Safer, So You Wont Be Hacked 
Like The Original EDL Page. 
o (Name withheld) I think the problem with the ease of hacking lies with 
facebook. Facebook is easily hacked. All we can do yo help is make sure 
email addy on fb profiles is not linked to your fb or anything else, and set 
long passwords of mixed characters. Change all passwords regularly too 
and dont have duplicate passwords. 
o just been banned from main page trying to redirect people, they are 
banning members by the second 
o The banter page has been mass reported couple weeks ago but its still 
running with ZHC profile. I know it was mass reported because I was one 
the people they outed on the wall, all of us outed reported it. I am starting 
to think ZHC have some kind of link with Facebook because they are 
getting away with too much and its taking so long to get them shut down. 
o Go onto the page 'ZHC NEWS'.  It is them that hacked the other page.  
Lets mass report their pages, but DO NOT enter into an argument with 
them and DO NOT post anything on any of their groups, they will get your 
I.P address if you do..... you can work out the rest. 
                                                 
14
 These comments were captured while the EDL FB page was under the control of the pro-
Islamist ZCompany Hacking Crew.  Apologies for the language but it provides the flavor that is 
integral to understanding the ongoing dialogue between the opposing groups.   
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o Facebook security is quite lax, it also doesn't help when one of the hackers 
is a data analyst for Facebook  
o How do we know if we get hacked again.. and personal details spreaded 
over mdl's wall 
o Can we have an explanation of how you were hacked, maybe to protect 
our own facebook sites? 
o if people leave there numbers and adresses then its themselves to blame 
for not having proper security and they have closed the page down now it 
will be a good thing whats the point of having 100k members and 2000 go 
demos 
o It can't be a good think if they are putting up peoples names addresses and 
phone numbers. (Excerpts from posts collected 22-23 July 2011 on post-
hack EDL page/no longer available) 
While some of those who ‘rejoined’ chided those who stayed away as “armchair 
activists” and “keyboard soldiers”, one of the questions that will be examined in this 
research is to what degree was the nearly 100,000 member number accurate?  Does 
liking a Facebook page really make you a full member and an adherent to the 
ideology or narrative of the group?  And finally, could such an event and the loss of 
so many ‘members’ on the primary source of propaganda and recruitment actually 
cause the group to lose momentum and begin to falter? 
Following this series of events, the EDL Facebook page has been shut down 
numerous times by Facebook administrators for inflammatory speech.  Having 
initially recovered around 20,000 members following the Breivik attacks and the ZHC 
hack, the latest iteration of the EDL homepage on Facebook, as of May 2013 has 
roughly 21,000 members.  This inability to communicate effectively and consistently 
was also demonstrated in its ability to mobilize its members to demonstrate with a 
significant show of force. 
The Shadow of the EDL, September 2011 
On September 3, 2011, the EDL marched into Tower Hamlets in East London in 
what had been billed as their most provocative event to date.  Since July 2011, 
Tommy Robinson had been banned from participating in EDL demonstrations as a 
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bail condition for charges stemming from a physical altercation with Muslim 
protestors who had been burning poppies during a Remembrance Day event (Jackson, 
2011).  The concern from within the predominately Muslim East London community 
was that there would be civil unrest and that such an event would precipitate a violent 
confrontation between the EDL and the radical Islamist group Muslims Against 
Crusades (MAC) who would eventually be proscribed by the Home Secretary Theresa 
May in November 2011 for glorifying terrorism (Casciani, 2011).  The Tower 
Hamlets Council appealed to Theresa May to ban the EDL from marching saying that 
“something must be done to prevent this demonstration” (Dominiczak, 2011)  While  
May, would not ban the EDL from having a static demonstration, an order was issued 
banning all marches in Tower Hamlets (BBC, 26 August 2011).  It is important to 
note that this demonstration took place just following the August 2011 riots that 
occurred in and around London.  After observing online the difficulties the EDL was 
having with the dissemination of its message and its significant loss of membership, it 
was decided that another trip to the UK for further fieldwork was needed to observe 
the real world impact of the virtual neutering of the EDL.  As it turned out, this day 
provided the opportunity to observe not just the EDL demonstration but also the MAC 
counterdemonstration that had been scheduled for earlier on 3 September off 
Whitechapel in front of the East London Mosque.   
Arriving in Tower Hamlets the morning of 3 September 2011, it was clear by the 
growing police presence throughout the morning that there was significant concern 
about clashes between these two groups.  Tube stations in the area had been shut 
down and there was a cordon of police encircling this area of Tower Hamlets.  Later it 
was learned that a second cordon was established around the area where the EDL 
were expected to arrive and demonstrate.  The counterdemonstration in Whitechapel 
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was actually somewhat festive, with music and food and was attended by an estimated 
1,500 people (Jackson, 2011, p. 73).   
While the streets were lined with signs protesting the EDL and their movement, 
the only ‘march’ in Tower Hamlets was about two dozen men who were walking with 
the Mayor of Tower Hamlets up and down the street, a few of them carried signs  
(Image 27) comparing the EDL to the BNP, and one (Image 28) comparing Tommy 
Robinson to Anders Breivik, stating “Different Faces Same Hatred….Racist EDL Not 
Welcome Here.”  As the morning went on, the police sealed off the Whitechapel area 
of Tower Hamlets to prevent anyone leaving and engaging with the EDL who were 
about to arrive a few blocks away.  While leaving this area and getting to the rally 
point for the EDL demonstration proved difficult, it was not impossible.  After 
zigzagging several blocks away from Whitechapel, where the police presence was 
minimized, I was able to talk my way past a few junior officers to get to the area 
where the EDL were expected to arrive and demonstrate. 
The EDL arrived in hired coaches and although marches had been banned by the 
Home Secretary (BBC, 26 August 2011) they were made to walk from the busses to 
their pre-designated static demonstration site.  Stationed along this path, it was 
possible to observe this entrance which was, to say the least, much less intimidating 
than what was experienced in February.  Where the march in Luton in February 2011 
had involved 3-4,000 members, it was obvious the EDL had only managed to muster 
an estimated 1,000 members for this trip (Jackson, 2011, p. 73).  As they marched in, 
Image 27: EDL and the BNP Image 28: Equating Tommy Robinson to 
Anders Breivik 
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it was a much more subdued group 
walking along in groups of four to ten 
with big gaps in between (Image 29).   
This rather casual procession went on for 
about ten-fifteen minutes until all had 
reached the static demonstration site. 
 
Image 30: Banners on a day when signs were banned 
While there were proscriptions against marching with signs for this day, some of the 
EDL members carried homemade collapsible signs to express their views (Image 30). 
Even though Tommy Robinson (Lennon) has been banned from participating in 
any overt EDL activity, he was captured covertly 
entering the demonstration site dressed in disguise 
(Image 31).  Following the demonstration, a 
YouTube video showed Robinson climbing on 
stage in costume and then revealing himself to the 
EDL crowd to a huge roar and applause.   
 
Image 29: Tower Hamlets Demonstration 
September 2011 
Image 31: Tommy Robinson in disguise 
(black coat and hat with phony beard) 
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It was also learned that he was arrested following his speech for violation of his bail 
conditions and was to be held in jail pending trial.
15
  
The demonstration was conducted without large scale violence, and although there 
were 60 arrests associated with this static demonstration (Jackson, 2011, p. 73), 
eventually the EDL members were escorted by law enforcement away from Tower 
Hamlets and to their waiting coaches. 
 
Image 32: The police escort from the demonstration site to the carriages 
As the police covered the removal of the EDL on foot and horseback (Image 32), 
what was noticeably missing was the riot gear that was prevalent in Luton.  Most of 
the officers wore their regular hats and walked at a leisurely pace alongside the 
demonstrators (Image 32).  As they walked through the streets, observers were heard 
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 Having arrived the day before the demonstration, I had been contacted by the CTIRU and was 
asked to meet with a research group who was working on an analysis of potential radicalization within 
at-risk communities.  While the major concern was Islamist radicalization I was asked about my work 
on the EDL and how they operated, and pointed out that UK law enforcement had, in the eyes of the 
EDL membership, made Tommy Robinson (Lennon) a ‘Robin Hood’ type figure and my suggestion 
was to minimize the stature of the EDL leader and treat him as you would any other criminal.  
Following his arrest on 3 September, Lennon went on a hunger strike and a petition was made to 
Amnesty International to intercede on his behalf claiming he was being held as a political prisoner.  
Learning of this I reminded my UK colleagues of our discussion and how keeping him in jail was a 
tactical mistake.  While I doubt my input had any influence, Mr. Lennon was released a few days later 
with orders to report to court at a later date. 
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to shout both for and against the EDL and their movement.  Many shouted approval to 
the police for getting the EDL members out of their area. 
Surprisingly, one action by the 
police that seemed a major mistake 
was having parked the EDL busses 
on the other side of the river, which 
required the EDL to march across 
Tower Bridge (Image 33).  This 
was viewed by the EDL as a major coup and was used in EDL online propaganda for 
days afterward.  It was clear, however, that the EDL had been severely diminished by 
the events of the summer and even with the march across a national monument, they 
were unable to regain any traction online or in future demonstrations.  While the EDL 
continued in its efforts to regain momentum, concerns by the UK government of an 
Oslo type attack in the UK, and the public’s concern of being targeted for 
investigation if they associated themselves with the EDL have had the effect of 
rendering the movement to a shadow of its former self.  The diminished status of the 
EDL was also reflected in the media coverage of the event.  For all of the fervor over 
going into Tower Hamlets, the media response leading up to the demonstration, with 
twenty-five articles in the two days before the demo, was short lived with only five 
articles on the day of, thirty-three articles in the two days after, then eight in the next 
two days.  Following this series of events, the coverage of the EDL was limited to 
post demonstration articles that became fewer over time.  There were within the 
collection two spikes that are anomalies due to the repeated posting of single articles 
on 1 and 8 August 2012.    At the time it was felt that the marginalization of the EDL 
Image 33: The EDL march across Tower Bridge 
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would continue barring any significant events or additional Islamist attacks in the UK 
or Europe that would serve to foment greater anti-Muslim sentiment. 
The Death of Lee Rigby and the Re-Birth of the EDL 
Following the death of Lee Rigby, and the publication on YouTube of the video 
taken of one of the murderers proclaiming this act in the name of Allah, the outcry by 
the British people and particularly by the EDL was immediate and loud.  As 
recounted earlier, at the time of this murder, the EDL had roughly 21,600 members on 
their Facebook page.  This greatly diminished membership was due to blowback from 
the Anders Breivik attack, the ZHC hack in 2011, and continued efforts by UK law 
enforcement to marginalize the EDL and highlight the criminal activities of its 
members and leadership.  Yet, these efforts were no match for the emotional response 
to the murder of Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013. 
As a result of this gruesome murder, and the subsequent news coverage of the 
event, membership in the English Defence League’s Facebook page skyrocketed.  
While the EDL began 22 May 2013 with just over 21,600 likes, by the end of the day, 
with many posts pertaining to the murder, the EDL had over 60,000 likes on their 
page.  At one point during the evening they added over 10,000 likes in two hours.  By 
noon the next day, 23 May, the ‘likes’ hit over 81,000 and by the end of the day were 
at 91,000.  This increase in membership continued unabated and by 1840GMT on 24 
May the EDL had over 111,000 likes/members on their Facebook page.  When one 
considers that this was just 48 hours after the event, the increase of over 89,000 likes 
represents a growth rate at that time of over 1,800 members per hour, 30 members per 
minute, an astounding one new “like” every two seconds.  This increase in likes 
would continue and on 25 May the group exceeded 122,000 members, increasing their 
membership by over 100,000 new members in just over three days.  However, this 
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rate of increase proved unsustainable and within a week had begun to wane 
dramatically to just a few thousand new members per week.  A new feature on 
Facebook supplies a graph of group participation over a specific time period and 
accessing this on 17 July 2013 provided the following information, as seen in Table 3, 
regarding the increased number of likes. 
From To Number of new ‘likes’ 
10 June 2013 16 June 2013 4,888 
17 June 2013 23 June 2013 3,141 
24 June 2013 30 June 2013 2,284 
1 July 2013 7 July 2013 1,341 
8 July 2013 14 July 2013 1,923 
 
Total new members 
in five weeks 
 
13,577 
Table 3: Increase in EDL likes leading up to 17 July 2013 
And on 17 July 2013 the total number of likes on the EDL Facebook page was 
151,310.   
While the increase in membership is significant, what is not known is whether the 
same participation rates and user rates are reflected in this new phase of the EDL’s 
social media drive.  What is known is that as a result of this event, and the 
subsequently increased interest in the EDL, they were able to mobilize what they 
estimated as 7,000 demonstrators to march in Newcastle on 25 May 2013.  
Interestingly, news reports of the march estimated the EDL participation at several 
hundred to no more than 1,500.  After viewing YouTube videos of this demonstration 
it is clear that the media and law enforcement underestimated the size of the crowd 
while the EDL certainly exaggerating the impact they had on that day.  What was 
demonstrably different about this demonstration versus the Luton demonstration in 
February 2011 was that the police were not initially geared up in anticipation of 
violence.  While the mounted police and their horses (4-5) were wearing riot gear, 
those officers walking along with the demonstrators were not.  Given that the 
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demonstration was in response to the attack on a member of the UK military and in 
his honour, did the police feel there was no need for such attire? This is unknown.  
Currently, the EDL (17 July 2013) is planning another large demonstration in 
Birmingham for 20 July and as can be seen on the banner in Image 34, which appears 
at the top of the EDL Facebook page, the mobilization efforts are in full swing. 
 
Image 34: EDL Banner for Birmingham Demonstration 20 July 2013 
 
The increase in news articles pertaining to the EDL following this event was the most 
significant increase seen during the entire period observed.  Figure 5 below, shows 
that following the murder of Lee Rigby there was a large and extensive increase in the 
volume of news articles affiliated with the EDL.  In the days following this event 
there were fifty-eight articles on 23 May, seventy-five articles on 24 May, thirty three 
articles on 25 May (when there was an EDL demonstration in Newcastle-upon-Tyne), 
and seventy-two articles on the day following the demonstration.  In the twenty days 
that followed this murder, there were nine hundred seven articles related to the EDL 
and its activities published in the UK in which Lee Rigby was mentioned 1,158 times.  
The English Defence League was referenced 1,078 times in articles that covered the 
angry response of the EDL members to this murder, the rallies they held, and the 
growth of their Facebook membership.  Within these few days there were 108 
references to the EDL Facebook page.  It is significant to note that with 5,885 articles 
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in the 1,827 days within the search period, these 907 articles represent 15% of the 
overall volume of news article associated with the EDL in a time period of just twenty 
days or just .01% of the overall time.  While it is impossible to establish at this time 
any correlation between the increase in news articles with the increase in membership 
to the EDL, it does point to the possibility that traditional media exposure could have 
an impact on, or be a driver for, social media participation by the broader audience.  It 
certainly provides exposure to a large cohort than what might otherwise be possible 
via word-of-mouth.    
Figure 5: Article frequency 22 May 13- 1 Aug. 14 
 
After the Rigby murder, the remaining EDL activity garnered only tepid media 
attention.  As can be seen above, the 20 July demonstration created a minimal spike in 
traffic.  The arrest of Tommy Robinson on 8 September created a small spike for a 
few days, and Tommy’s announcement on 8 October that he was leaving the EDL to 
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join the Quilliam Group generated just seventeen articles on 9 October, twelve on the 
10
th
, ten on the 11
th
 and it dropped off sharply after this.   With the exit of Robinson 
and Carroll from the EDL, there again comes the question of the long-term viability 
of the EDL as a movement and whether future events might precipitate a resurgence 
of the group.   
Key Words and Phrases in Traditional Media 
As discussed briefly in the previous section, the use of certain key words or 
phrases by traditional media provides some understanding as to how they perceive 
and/or characterize the EDL.  The discussion in the literature review focused mainly 
on the academic perspective and characterization of the EDL, but it would be a 
mistake to not consider the role of traditional media in this area as well.  This practice 
is supported in communications literature as it relates to the characterization of certain 
groups within traditional media.  Schemer (2012) suggests that media characterization 
can influence stereotypical attitudes.  Alimi (2007), considered the positive aspects of 
media coverage and offers that “When media coverage goes as far as to adopt the 
particular frame a social movement is attempting to promote, the sense of opportunity 
may possibly be amplified” (p. 74).  However, Dines (2013) determined that during 
the Italian refuse crisis in 2008, the British Press (specifically the Guardian and the 
Independent), “persistently and incorrectly singled out the Camorra as a principal 
culprit for the breakdown of the household waste disposal system” (p. 409).  He 
contends that these news outlets ignored the Italian governments’ findings that the 
problem was due to “corporate malpractice and institutional complicity” and instead 
sought to place the blame squarely on organized crime and specifically Camorra 
(Dines, 2013, p. 409).   
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With a collection of the 5,885 news articles mentioned previously, it is possible to 
examine how the EDL is presented within the mass media articles.  This analysis was 
performed by compiling all of the articles within one document then using the ‘find’ 
function to provide a count of each word or phrase contained within the entire set of 
articles/stories.  While the original intent was to examine how often these articles 
referred to Facebook or social media, it was decided to expand this to include a list of 
words that could provide insight into how the EDL was portrayed to the people of the 
UK through traditional print media articles.  The list found in Table 4 examines first 
the use of words or phrases that are associated with various social media fora.  Within 
the articles, the mention of social media or social networking was eclipsed by  
Word/Phrase Count 
EDL 14,663 
Facebook 980 
social networking 114 
social media 317 
Twitter 540 
YouTube 251 
    
Table 4: Word search for mentions of EDL and social media 
references to Twitter and Facebook.  The Twitter references were sometimes 
pertaining to individuals associated with the EDL who had posted offensive messages 
on Twitter (Evening Gazette, 5 July 2014; Daily Star Sunday, 20 April 2014), or 
contact information for the author of the article.   
The YouTube references varied greatly with over seventy articles discussing the 
YouTube video of the murder of Lee Rigby; discussions of YouTube videos 
explaining why people convert to Islam or videos sympathetic to the jihad; pointing 
out that there are YouTube videos promoting the EDL, their demonstrations, and their 
narrative; and in the overall context of the use of various social media by various 
‘extremists’ groups.   
183 
 
The much larger use of Facebook includes many discussion of the EDL’s use of 
Facebook as their main communication forum where they announce demonstrations, 
facilitate discussions, and make major announcements impacting the group or its 
leadership.  While the analytical tool being used did not allow for the measurement of 
the context in which each of these words was used, visual observation of the matches 
did confirm a subset within each grouping that was not directly linked to the EDL, 
although the references did occur within an article related to the EDL.  Future efforts 
might make it possible to examine these articles in more detail as a separate project.  
The main point to be taken away from these observations is that traditional media did 
highlight the EDL’s use of social media, and mentioned Facebook more times than 
Twitter and YouTube combined.  Additional research could include a survey of EDL 
participants to determine how they learned of the EDL and whether their engagement 
with the EDL Facebook page was facilitated by its mention in traditional media.  It is 
interesting to consider how the characterization of the EDL by traditional media might 
have driven those who identified with this characterization to the group. 
The Print Media’s Portrayal of the EDL 
In an effort to follow up on the discussion within the literature review pertaining 
to the characterization of the EDL as being far-right, racist, or neo-Nazi, a separate 
word/phrase search was conducted to examine how traditional media sought to 
portray the EDL by either directly referencing or inferring by association that they 
were other than the ‘humanitarian’ organization the EDL claimed to be.  Table 5 
provides the results of the various searches that were done on the 5,885 articles 
related to the English Defence League.  As can be seen the use of non-favorable 
words or phrases far outnumbers the use of humanitarian.  More interesting is the fact 
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that the eleven uses of humanitarian were in no way associated with the EDL, but 
used to describe humanitarian efforts in Gaza three times, Islamic law/values four 
times, and one time each pertaining to the meaning behind the wearing of the poppy, 
the NATO intervention in Libya, Tony Blair’s intervention in Kosovo and Sierra 
Leone, and humanitarian efforts following the flood in Pakistan.  None of the matches 
for ‘humanitarian’ were associated with the EDL or its claim of being a humanitarian 
organization as put forth in their mission statement.   
While the traditional media chose to ignore the humanitarian claims of the EDL, 
they did not seem to restrain themselves in their characterization of the EDL as being 
a far-right, right-wing, racist, extremist organization, just to name a few of the words 
and phrases that were found within the news stories.  As can be seen below, the use of 
what can be considered negative characterizations words and phrases outnumbers 
even the mention of the EDL within the articles.  As seen in Table 5, the EDL was 
mentioned 14,663 times, yet the various characterizations of the group occurred 
16,150 times.  Interestingly, some of these words/phrases were found in conjunction 
with each other to add impact (e.g. far-right extremist group, right-wing hate group, 
etc.).  In addition, there were many instances where the EDL was linked to other 
groups that are known to be far-right extremist like the BNP (1,708 references), the 
National Front (321 references), and Combat 18 (63 references).  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the EDL association with various ‘football firms’ can be seen in the 
characterization of them as thugs and hooligans.   
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Descriptive/Associative 
references   
humanitarian 11 
far-right 3,318 
right-wing 1,394 
neo-Nazi 297 
extreme 918 
extremist 3,584 
racist 2,442 
anti-Muslim 1,084 
anti-Islamist 114 
counter jihadi 12 
anti-immigrant 87 
thugs 483 
hooligans 284 
hate group 41 
BNP 1,708 
National Front 321 
Combat 18 63 
Total  16,161 
  Table 5: Word search for descriptive/associative references 
From this list of words and phrases it is clear that the print media was not an 
objective bystander in its reporting on the EDL.  While it is not the intent of this 
analysis to suggest that the EDL is what they claim to be, it seems clear that while 
traditional media provided the EDL with a considerable amount of exposure through 
their reporting, the characterization of the group throughout the period observed was 
certainly less than favorable.  This realization again forces the question of whether 
this characterization played any part in the type of people that might subsequently 
have been drawn to the EDL.  Further, might these articles have served as a sort of 
outreach to those individuals who embraced some of the characteristics the media put 
upon the EDL and through them discovered kindred spirits for their far-right/right-
wing/anti-Muslim sentiments?  As mentioned previously, a survey of EDL members 
might help to understand this phenomenon more fully.   
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Following this examination of the traditional media reporting on the EDL it is 
clear that as the group grew in size, the number of articles per incident increased.  
Further, it is also evident that print media had no affinity for the EDL and this is 
reflected in their characterization of the EDL and their efforts to associate the EDL 
with known far-right groups.  How much impact this had on the public has yet to be 
measured.  However, by examining the posts of the EDL administrator and the 
comments by the users, it is possible to examine whether these characterizations are 
reflected in the online dialog of the EDL members, which might provide supporting 
evidence for the claims of traditional media.  
Conclusion 
As mentioned in the introduction, it would be a mistake to only consider the 
EDL‘s Facebook activity and not consider the impact of other online as well as offline 
phenomenon that impacted the groups use of Facebook and the group as a whole.  The 
empirical material presented herein suggests that the majority of the media coverage 
of the EDL was in response to EDL action and other events related to the EDL like 
the Breivik attack.  It is notable that the spikes in the number of news articles occur, 
for the most part, immediately following demonstrations.  Following the large 
demonstration in Luton, and the spike in the number of articles published following 
the demo, it appears that the print media became less interested in the group until the 
Breivik attack when the number of articles per day spiked to its highest point to day 
and leading up to the Royal Wedding where the EDL and MAC were potentially set 
to clash.   
The impact of the offline events is also significant in that they not only impacted 
the EDL’s recruitment efforts, but that two separate events had such opposite impact.  
The Breivik attack in Norway brought increased scrutiny by the UK security services 
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as well as the press, which had a deleterious effect on their membership.  Coupled 
with the online hack of the EDL Facebook page by the Z Company Hacking Crew 
and the personal security concerns that arose within the membership as a result of this 
event, it seemed the EDL might have been finished as a movement.  However, the 
death of Lee Rigby created a flood of new members to the EDL at a rate that had not 
been seen in the history of the group.  The rebirth of the EDL following this horrific 
event and the growth in membership on their Facebook page, as well as the other 
events presented,  speaks to the role external events can have on a movement.   
The role of traditional print media in framing the publics’ perception of the EDL 
and reporting their use of Facebook as their preferred method of communication is 
difficult to measure without more specific survey data.  However, it was possible to 
show that the UK print media did highlight the use of Facebook by the EDL by 
mentioning it 980 times within the set of articles.  Further, the word search conducted 
on the articles found that print media favored a negative characterization of the EDL 
as being far-right (3,318 times), right-wing (1,394 times), extremist (3,584 times), and 
racist (2,442 time).  While these news articles offered no empirical support for these 
characterizations, the following chapter will examine the words used by the members 
of the EDL contained in the Facebook posts found in the original collection, to 
determine whether the media’s portrayal of the group is a mischaracterization of if the 
terms used to describe the group are well earned.   
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Chapter Five: The EDL Rhetoric vs. Reality 
It is clear that the English Defence League has a vested interest in seeking to 
counter the message put forth by traditional media and its other detractors regarding 
the motivations of the EDL and the attitudes of its members.  As seen in the previous 
chapter, traditional print media has, whether wittingly or not, characterized the EDL 
as a far-right, neo-Nazi, extremist, thuggish bunch of hooligans (Taylor, 2010).  
However, this is in direct conflict with the mission statement put forth by the EDL on 
their Facebook Page, their own website, and by the leadership of the EDL when 
interviewed by the media (Jackson, 2011; Alessio & Meredith, 2014, Richards, 2013).  
This chapter will consider some of the broad ideas put forth in the EDL’s mission 
statement and compare them to the ideas espoused by the administrator and members 
within the Facebook collection that was acquired as a part of this research.  While the 
EDL sought to position  itself, through its mission statement, as an inclusive human 
rights group wishing to promote democracy and the rule of law, respecting traditions 
and being open to embracing the best of what other cultures have to offer, wishing to 
have an open debate about Islam and its impact on society; an examination of key 
aspects of the dialog within the Facebook communications provides an opportunity to 
determine whether these postings are in alignment with the lofty rhetoric put forth by 
the EDL leadership. 
To accomplish this analysis, the Excel spreadsheet with the Facebook collection 
from 5 February 2011-28 March 2011 was modified to contain only the row reference 
number, the primary or secondary post designation, the discrete user number assigned 
by the parsing software anonymizing function, the date of the post, and the 
post/comment in its entirety.  This Excel file was then imported into NVivo where 
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text searches were performed for certain key words and phrases that were significant 
to understanding how/whether the administrator and member posts reflected the 
public narrative put forth by the EDL membership.  While it is recognized that a 
comprehensive discourse analysis could, in itself, become a full research project, it is 
hoped that this initial qualitative effort might provide some illumination. 
It should be noted at this time that while the previous discussion of the data 
protection act would suggest that providing full comments or string of comments 
could be a problem, given the fact that these Facebook posts were lost and 
irretrievable as a result of the Z Company Hacking Crews attack on the EDL 
Facebook page and are only available due to the collection efforts as a part of this 
study, it is practically impossible for anyone to be identified as a result of the 
inclusion of these comments/posts.  This user identification is made even less 
probable due to the anonymization efforts provided by the one-way cypher when 
parsing the data.  As a final security measure, any user names that might occur within 
the posts/comments will be redacted and posting dates will not be included.  The 
posts/comments that follow within this chapter are presented without any correction 
or editing other than previously listed.  Therefore all errors in punctuation, spelling, 
and diction appear as they were in their original form, as do the expletives contained 
within the comments.  It should be noted that the most offensive comments were not 
included. 
A Review of the Mission Statement 
There are several concepts within the EDL’s mission statement that will be 
examined as a part of this analysis.  The EDL’s claim of inclusiveness, the desire to 
promote human rights, democratic values, the rule of law, and respecting tradition 
seem quite benign.  However, on examination of those statements there is within them 
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an inherent anti-Muslim tint that is critical of Islamic law, traditions, and what they 
see as the growing influence or the “Islamisation of our country because that presents 
itself as an undemocratic alternative to our cherished way of life” (EDL mission 
statement, EDL Facebook page, accessed 31 January 2011, see Appendix 5)).  Within 
the EDL Facebook collection there were only twelve references to the mission 
statement, all provided within secondary posts, which means they were not issued by 
the Facebook page administrator.  Most of the comments simply implored the users 
within the current stream to read the mission statement.  A few went further. 
User 63378 - sling your hook Josef Globelstein,your a troll with a made up name 
coming on here trying to stir up trouble,we don't want your leftie,anti everything 
except common sense,holier than thou type on here,read the mission statement to 
find out what theEDL represents and then click on unlike on the way out please 
User 63378- you need to get out more mate,my girlfriend is of Indian descent and 
a lot of my friends are in mixed black and white marriages,my mom and dad are 
from Dublin but i am a proud Englishman and happily get along with EVERYONE 
i have no problem... with the ethnicity of anybody,i'm as proud of Ian 
Wright,Nasser Hussain,Kevin Pieterson,Daley Thompson,Kelly Holmes as i am of 
any other proud Englishmen,i love the Gurkhas they are a credit to the British 
army,in Birmingham where i live the main pubs and clubs are mixed with 
white,black,hindu,sikhs.chinese etc etc and more the fun for it,i along with 
EVERYBODY that has read and supported the EDL mission statement am against 
political Islam and the non compatibility it has with western FREE 
democrasy,now go and have a wash you anti globalist UAF troll 
User 47096 - EDL... I dont see how the above fits in with the EDL mission 
statement. Youre not going anywhere with material like this. Let's have some 
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serious debating and counter argument. This is embarrassing. Lets get out of the 
playground and into the real world before we gain the impotent and objectionable 
reputation that the BNP carries around its neck like a noose 
As for the EDL being a human rights organization, an NVivo text search for human 
rights revealed there were 65 references to human rights within the collection.  On 
closer examination most had nothing to do with the human rights agenda as stated in 
the EDL mission statement. 
User 63497 -  they talk about their human rights being affected by the march . 
what happened to the rights of our troops that marched through our town on there 
home coming ?. and as for the UAF, when has it been wrong to love the country 
you was born and breed in ?. 
User 135464 - Rob apparently there was some people there but was nowt to do 
with radical muslims, just sounds like human rights campaigning do-gooders from 
amnesty international showing support for the Egyptian protestors. 
User 99442 - the freedom and human rights must dominate this world not the ugly 
islam and muslims the criminals. what are england waiting for ? all the world will 
suffer of islamic religion, finish them or kick them out, they are minority but like 
the concer illeness they will be the majority, beleive me they will be majority, 
where is the england government ????? 
User 66038 - that scum should be strung up fuck there human rights 
This is a sample of the comments pertaining to human rights that had no association 
with human rights and the EDL mission statement.  There were, however, two 
comments within the 65 references to human rights that did mention the human rights 
agenda of the EDL. 
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User 87528 - EDL-Marching forth for equality, human rights and to protect 
young girls from vile, selfish dirty nonces! United we stand in the face of a 
common and dangerous enemy! NO SURRENDER!!! 
User 208096 - Because we are a peaceful protest human rights group. If civil war 
happens, it would be down to muslim radicals trying to wipe us out 
Another area that was examined was the democratic ideal espoused within the 
EDL mission statement.  A search for the term ‘democratic’ provided twenty-six 
references that ranged from the desire to protect the democratic way of life in the 
UK to comments where the user is pointing out the desire of Muslims to destroy 
democracy. 
User 45871 - could'nt agree more ian !!! we will never surrender our 
democratic life too ANYONE bring it on !!!!!!!! 
User 24129 - Geoff MoverleyWe're not "extreme right wing". The EDL and 
Islam is nothing to do with left/right wing democratic politics, other than one 
wants to uphold democracy, and the other wants to replace it. 
User 38115 - soooooo..... they admit they will never fully integrate? wtf!!??!! 
how did we let 2.3mil muslims onto this tiny island in the first place..... Did 
noone check up on their cultural beliefs and assess their communities 
suitability to live in... a western democratic and free society?Thanks liberal 
hippy ideology from the 60's - you might have fun then but you've left your 
descendants with one hell of a mess to clean up. 
User 60928 - why should any muslim complain? sharia is anti democratic and 
America is a democracy therefore sharia has no place in america. america is 
christian and they observe a single tier system founded on christian values and 
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freedom of will and expression so the guy was right what does sharia have to 
do with oklahoma? or America? simple question which answers its self NS 
User 44387 - Islam isn't a religion it is an insidious barbaric idea to destroy 
western democratic ideals & subjugate the masses to a climate of constant 
fear in the name of a murdering molester called allah, make women third class 
citizens and put the globe back to the dark ages...in short if these islamic 
maniacs got their way It'll make Pol Pot look like mother Teresa. 
While in public statements the EDL leadership argued they were not anti-Muslim 
but were against radical Islam, the dialog from within the Facebook posts suggests 
there is a strong anti-Muslim sentiment running through the group that is not in 
alignment with the more moderate public statements of the leadership.   
Attitudes toward Muslims and Islam 
Within the EDL Facebook collection there were 1065 references to Muslims and 
915 references to Islam.  While there were some comments that were neutral in nature 
there was a significant sample that did not reflect the inclusive aspiration of the EDL 
mission statements nor did they distinguish between the Islamic extremists, which 
they view as the threat, from the larger body of Muslims in the UK.  Below is a 
sampling of these posts taken from within the Facebook collection. 
Muslims 
Within the NVivo search for the term ‘Muslims’ there were some comments that 
were not inflammatory.  For example user 101304, engaged in a discussion of 
whether Muslims are compelled to follow British law states: 
Steph, i do follow British Law. Islam instructs ALL muslims they MUST follow the 
law of the land wherever they live. 
This user goes on to state within the same string: 
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Gaz i am Muslim/English/British, all are as equal and important to me. I 
cannot have one without the other. My faith defines me as a person, my nation 
is what has made me who i am (environment). There certainly i no conflict for 
me as a bri...tish asian muslim, and i can safely say 99.9% of the muslims i 
know feel the same. Those who say there is a conflict are people who put 
words onto our mouths, so called "analysts/thinkers" etc. 
 
Users 101304’s comments are not well received.  This unwillingness to engage in a 
useful dialog is seen in the very next comment. 
User 294484- I dont even want to read any more of his comments, another 
muslim going to the blocked list. goodbye Nazire 
But even when threated with being blocked User 101304 is not dissuaded and, after 
several disparaging remarks by other users, continues to make the point regarding the 
obligation of Muslims to follow the law. 
User 101304 - Steph Shariah Law is Koranic law/regulations etc. One of those 
that the EDL need to take note is the major one which states muslims MUST 
follow the laws of the land whereever they live, even if its not a Muslim state. 
A true muslim in the UK will follow UK law as this is what Islam instructs 
The response to this users comment is typical within the collection.  When a user 
seeks to have a reasoned discussion, or is making their comments are not in alignment 
with the group narrative, they are vilified and other users call for their removal.  
Fortunately, this string was captured before user 101304 was removed and these posts 
were lost.   
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To provide a glimpse into the attitudes toward Muslims contained within the EDL 
posts, the following comments were chosen from the 1065 referenced obtained as a 
part of the NVivo search. 
User 90755 - fuck the muslims edl our streets  
User 46053- this country is gonna look pretty empty when we throw all the 
muslims out  
User 23534 - Well they've not lost as much credibility as the Muslims ever had to 
start with, bunch of misogynistic fascists and all who support em  
User 46515 - Its all muslims and islam thats invading and taking over mother 
England not to mention unlimited immigrants from the poxy Eu ! 48% of British 
would vote for a far right party if image was right says alot the rest will awake 
and we will have civil war !  
User 24465 - muslims should live in muslim countries ans christians in christian 
countries 
User 56112 - Muslims are low life's and should be treated as such 
User 88739 - How am I Racist lol I only hate Muslims x 
As can be seen in the previous comments, there is among the members little 
distinction between moderate and extremist Muslims.  Of more concern are comments 
that go beyond simply expressing anti-Muslim sentiment to suggesting more 
aggressive action like deportation of all Muslims.  Following is a sample of some of 
those comments: 
User 46053 - am i the only one thats getting sick and tired of these people? deport 
them, they dont want to live in peace like the jews buddist hindus ect.. they want to 
take over the uk! 
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User 75089 - Close em down and deport the lot this is our land love it or leave 
it!!!!! Bollocks to the flip flop mob 
User 65814 - now fucking deport em.. 
User 54796 - Life is cheap for them sorts who just board planes and set 
themselves off like giant fireworks... Deport the lot of them and let them blow each 
other up in their own country. The trouble with britain is, it has got alot to say 
about what happens everywhere else in the world but can't open it's mouth when 
anything kicks off here!! 
User 65093 - Why do we have to put up with scrounging , charity case immigrants 
who only want to blow us all up? DEPORT! 
And at times there are those who suggest even more aggressive and even violent 
action be taken. 
User 45738- If you have twelve muslims standing up to their necks in concrete, 
what do you have?Not enough fucking concrete! 
User 39130 - We need to start building camps for these muslims 
User 55027 - for media: say it as muslim not asian! go EDL, kick all muslims out 
of the country! 
User 80388 - Waste them 
User 67739 - Kill all muslims in uk 
pregnant,children,grandads,nans,mothers,fathers etc just. Fuck them off 
User 67830 - I say "Kill Them All, Let God Sort Them Out!" and I dont mean 
Allah... 
User 104020 - please some1 kill this fucker. js shoot the cunt when he arrives . fuk 
sharia law. NFSE 
User 24465 - wipe these fuckers off the face of the earth!!!!! 
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Further demonstrating the anti-Muslim sentiment of some of the EDL members was 
their use of the disparaging term ‘muzzies’.  While this reference was only found 19 
times within the collection, it further demonstrates that racism does exist within the 
EDL membership.   
User 37534 - tom webb your on the wrong page you need mdl { muzzies don't 
listen } leave our great land 
User 46718 - Think im going to commit a crime here in aus so i can get shipped to 
England and come fuck some muzzies up 
User 45703 - do any muzzies know the word......respect... 
User 64974 - I'm watching, the fucking dirty muzzies 
User 54712 - The muzzies have forgotten one major thing...we have not only a 
highly trained,organized military, but also ordinary citizenry is also veteran 
soldiers...all of us! We also have atomic weapons and will not hesitate to use them 
if need be. 
User 54369 - we would smash the muzzies in a war but mass imigration has 
allowed the enemy behind our lines not saying all of them are bad to be pc but a 
good few and thats the worry.leftist ideolgy has created us a nasty rat problem we 
need to cure in our own garden 
User 80969 - Time for us all to stand together and get it done......armed with as 
much pig grease as we can find..it can be put in all sorts of everyday 
products......you could saturate England with the stuff....the muzzies would leave 
or be dammed. 
The last comment by user 80969 containing a reference to ‘pig grease’ is another 
disparaging narrative found throughout the collection and will be discussed further 
within this chapter. 
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Islam 
References specifically to Islam within the collection were also found to be in 
high frequency.  The NVivo search for ‘Islam” provided 915 references.  The sample 
provided below once again suggests there is little distinction between radical and 
moderate Islam in the eyes of these EDL Facebook users. 
 
User 47782 - The Islam issue has to be looked at like a mountain of termites 
destroying Britain an the world. These fanatics will fight and die to destroy you an 
your country. They must be met head on.....an deported. Neville Chamberlain is 
best known f...or his appeasement philosophy on foreign policy. It appears the 
ghost of Chamberlain is guiding domestic policy along with this outrageous 
immigration policy in Britain & America. Is there no National Security issue with 
so many potential terrorist living in our countries? Britain & America should 
admit our immigration policy is flawed an began mass deportation.Send them 
back HOME• to practice their religion an third world life style. An never try to 
rescue another Muslim Country from the Grips of Islam.• This middle eastern 
filth must be washed from the streets of Britain..the sooner the better No 
Surrender.good going EDL. 
User 44506 - islam is NOT a religion, it's the political system dedicated to re-
establishing the Islamic Empire. The clearly stated goal of Islam is to overthrow, 
undermine, or alter all existing non-Muslim governments and to replace them with 
Islamic g...overnment (Caliphate) under an Islamic leader (Caliph) .Teaching 
Islam is the same as advocating overthrow of the UK government. Islam is not a 
religion it is a political movement dedicated to restoring the form of government 
that Mohammed established before he was assassinated by a fed-up wife and 
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before the Ottoman Turk Empire collapsed. As such, all mosques should be closed 
immediately permanently banned from existence and operation, recognizing that 
mosques are no more places of worship than were Ottoman Turk military 
garrisons. 
User 56112 - Islam is the devil's greatest accomplishment 
User 25564 - Islam has no respect just hatred toward everyone other than what 
they want. Islam means to submit, well I ay gonna submit, they can try but the 
only response from me will be NS NFSE! 
User 53648 - Islam is a much bigger threat to europe that hitler ever was. 
User 46760 - It seems people are waking up, becoming aware of the threat islam 
poses to us all, well done the EDL for raising the awareness..I've noticed in 
Tommy's recent speeches the confidence he's gained..he's far more eloquent, 
informed..keep it up boys..this is our country, always will be.. 
User 54621 - Proud to british fuck islam god save the queen 
User 54250 - He ain't dangerous to me...i am a freedom loving Englishman..Islam 
has no place in Europe..my ancestoral bloodline built the heritage,culture and 
language of my great and beloved England..twas not the efforts of Muslims..i shall 
die by the sword before i surrender..god bless mother England. 
User 56112 - Islam is a cancer,WW3 is the answer. 
User 55349 - Islam is a CULT NO BETTER WORD FOR IT. Allah is Satan and 
Muslims are his slaves 
User 45332 - Islam is a poison, a cult of hatred and lies, our politicians need to 
learn the truth and do the right thing, and that is to repatriate every last moslem! 
User 55027 - we have knew muslims won't be patriotic, THEY NEVeR be 
patriotic, because they serve on one nation, named islam. KICK them all OUT! 
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User 137312 - I hope everyone had a good day and got home safely, well done 
kuffars, Death to Islam! NFSE! 
User 38374 - No more islam in my country 
These comments show that there is no distinction among these members between 
the minority of extremist Muslims and all other Muslims.  The lack of basic 
understanding of the religion is demonstrated in the broad call for the extermination 
of all Muslims.  Further, there is no recognition of those Muslims who have integrated 
into British society and consider themselves to be just as British as anyone else.  
These generalizations feed into the development of the ‘evil other’ as a part of the us-
vs-them narrative that runs throughout the EDL Facebook page and is demonstrated 
by these comments.  
Religious Practices 
One of the religious practices mentioned in the EDL mission statement is the halal 
tradition within Islam.  The EDL considers the push by the Muslim minority to have 
halal food served in schools and available in markets and prepared food stores to be 
an invasion of Islamic tradition into British society (EDL mission statement, EDL 
Facebook page, accessed 31 January 2011).  Halal, in this context, refers to meat 
which is considered religiously acceptable for consumption and has been prepared 
(butchered) in keeping with religious tradition.  For example pork is not considered 
halal and is therefore not consumed by Muslims.  Within the Facebook collection 
there are 116 references to ‘halal’.  These comments presented are a sampling of the 
attitudes reflected within this search. 
User 25802 - Sainsburys asda tesco ect ect all sell halal meat also KFC. this is 
barbaric and there Is no place in England for this . These poor animals are in 
pain this needs to be banned sick bastards 
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User 55055 - rob our livestock is stunned before being dispatched,also the 
animals are very aware of their surroundings and are extremly stressed before 
slaughter.most halal slaughter houses are not exactly concerned in the welfare of 
the animal prior t...o slaughter to say the least.dont get me wrong im sure cruelty 
happens over here in some of ours,but i would say that the vast majority are 
strenously regulated.people dont realise that HALAL is just an anagram for 
ALLAH,so its allah meat,allah food.we as christians are not allowed to eat 
religeously slaughtered meat of any description,but yet our govt is allowing it to 
be force fed to us and our children.the two biggest weapons in their arsenal are '' 
HALAL FOOD'' and the ''CRY OF PERSECUTION'' IN ISLAMIFYING OUR 
NATION.NFSE 
User 67739 - Halal meat is sick they will all grow up to b the same with these 
sharia courts fuck them all off I just give a fuck about this country get rid of em all 
b4 its too late 
User 67347 - BAN THAT FILTHY HALAL MEAT NOW. SICK CRUEL 
BASTARDS. 
As discussed in the literature review, the topic of halal foods is one of the hot-
button issues used by the EDL and other anti-Muslim groups to create antipathy 
toward the Muslim minority.  Interestingly, while there are distinctions between halal 
and kosher foods, the slaughtering process, which seems to be the focus of the 
animous about halal food within these posts, is the same.  However, the EDL wraps 
the issue of halal food into the broader concept of what they see is the growing 
influence of Muslim tradition into British society. 
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Perceptions of Mosques 
Another of the topic central to the EDL movement is the role of the mosques in 
the radical Islamist movement.  Again, while the rhetoric is focused on combating 
Muslim extremists and their influence within the mosques, the open dialog on 
Facebook is very different.  Within the EDL collection the predominant theme is one 
where the mosque is seen as a threat that is often times facilitated by the government.  
This section will examine a selection of the 232 references located in the search for 
‘mosque’.  These comments pertain to mosque construction and expansion, the 
government’s support of the mosque, the perception of activities that take place 
within the mosque, and comments that relate to the users desire to desecrate mosques 
or potential mosque sites.  
Mosque Construction 
Another of the reoccurring themes of the EDL is the threat posed by the growing 
number of mosques in the UK.  This is reflected in the signs carried at 
demonstrations, as seen in the photos of the Luton demonstration presented earlier, 
and within the posts on the Facebook page.  The EDL has even gone so far as to stage 
demonstrations to oppose future mosque construction and expansion and the 
comments below are a sample of this dialog. 
User 86541 – Its ok for them to build mosques here but you just try and build a 
church in there country they would kill you 
User 39116 – for Jack Walker. I have worked and paid taxes all my life and am 
fucked off at the fact it goes to building mosques and paying for jobless unwashed 
UAF scum and giving hand outs for people that hate this country. 
User 64806 – In Luton a building which was used for TA training was to be sold 
by the council and turned into affordable housing for Lutonians. Instead the 
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council sold it to the Muslims to be converted to a mosque, for Â£1m cheaper than 
it was if sold for affordable housing. 
User 23618 – makes me sick man,i have only liked edl today,i am with it all the 
way,i got stabbed by pakis in 203nglish203am town centre a few years ago,i have 
tried to see the good in these people but there is none,my 203nglish203 fought for 
the freedom in this… country!where is the freedom in smallheath 203nglish203am 
where there are ‘no white’ zones!they are taught hatred towards the west at every 
chance,but they dont mind taking our benifits and building mosques here!ive had 
enough of it! 
User 57386 – Ban all Mosque’s in the uk. They close down are youth and sports 
clubs etc so kids have to hang round on streets. Yet they build Mosques with tax 
payers money 
User 37534 – zeehan nothing wrong with most muslims you just need to live by 
our laws no burkas no peados no more mosques 
User 46508 – Everyone who can get to Green Lane, Dagenham next Saturday 12th 
feb should if you oppose the building of a mosque & sharia law centre by proven 
extremists!Some involved in the poppy burning in London on the 11
th
 Nov 
shouting abuse & spitting at our homecoming soldiers in Barking! NEVER 
SURRENDER 
User 45689 – Just to let you know the Preston demo was a success, the Mega 
Mosque that was to be built has been rejected…way hey ;) NS 
User 45934 - @adrian there’s a static demo about a mosque being built 
User 30842 – People in my town of 203nglish203 are outraged of plans to build 
this mosque,it must not happen !!!!!!! 
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User 42805 – protest against the new mosque, meet in eva hart, then onto green 
lane about now, stay safe everyone there  
Government Support of Mosques 
Hot button issues for the EDL also include the government support that is given to 
assist with mosque construction.  Whether it be preferential treatment in the 
purchasing of government buildings or the governments funding of new mosques, the 
EDL members of Facebook have strong opinions. 
User 77784 – 1400 MOSQUES in Britain, and 100s of ISLAMIC schools? ALL 
paid for by YOU the British taxpayer! We literally funding the enemy within. 
WAKE UP PEOPLE! 
User 57386 – Ban all Mosque’s in the uk. They close down are youth and sports 
clubs etc so kids have to hang round on streets. Yet they build Mosques with tax 
payers money 
User 55958 – Northampton! Its off the M1! A very large town in the uk, bigger 
than some cities! As the npton div and snipers will tell you that the council are 
giving millions to mosque projects when making record cuts! Not to mention the 
mosque’s are not wanted by anyone, they have delibertly chosen problem and 
sensitive areas for these monsterous things! (run down high crime areas and old 
people areas) 
User 37765 – Im from Scotland and way i c it is if they do that and dont want 
2integrate with us then why the hell r they staying n this country. Go bk 2their 
own country and live happy. I hated that programme. Why is it they get 2build 
mosque’s n our c…ountry. We would’nt get 2 build a church in any country they 
come from. The goverment’s not going 2do anything as usual. We need to stand 
up for our country and whatever it is we believe in. Its not right 
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User 46774 – how come that local councils and governments are willing to pay 
for /and towards a mosque being built but won’t pay towards the upkeep of our 
churches 
Activities within Mosques 
During the collection period there was a series of posts pertaining to the abuse of 
children within the mosques and religious schools affiliated with the mosques.  This 
news was met with strong condemnation by EDL members on Facebook and 
precipitates many comments. 
User 208096 – Peace,love and tolerance currently being beaten into children at a 
mosque near you. 
The above post is interesting as it was provided by the administrator as a primary 
post. 
User 93849 – English law should apply in the Mosque. When can child abuse 
be tolerated, never, the mosques need supervised at least to prevent this 
User 54677 – Channel 4 s dispatches Monday at 8, extremist teachers 
exposed, secret filming reveals pupils as young as 6 being beaten and taught 
extremist islam, religion of peace my arse, ns 
User 31493 – what got me was they have there own law in the mosque well 
hang on there in bloody 205nglish we have laws that state you cannot harm a 
child its called child 205ngli they should be locked up not covered up FACT ! 
User 46592 – Those kids r being fucking brainwashed. They looked like a load 
of monkeys sat around in a circle hitting one another. British law doesn’t even 
cover the mosque, there legaly allowed to hit as long as they don’t leave a 
mark. Wtf. If I was one of those kids that bearded prick wud be sparcos. 
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User 65506 – Al-taqiyya and dissimulation are words used for a practice of 
Muslims blatantly lying to non-Muslims. The officials of this mosque blatantly 
lied to the schools inspectorate about child abuse (physical and mental) until 
they were exposed by this documentary. They’ll probably blame America, 
Britain and Israel lol! 
User 24934 – i think the whole point is , these children are being brought up 
and taught by people with extreme views , beaten and brainwashed , these 
very children are going to be adults soon and its terrifying that they are being 
taught to hate non-mu…slims , that any non-muslim is the enemy , its a 
problem that goes a lot deeper than a few kids getting a smack in a mosque 
…......... its the hatred and segregration thats instilled within these places 
User 37569 - @clinton,i’m from s-on-t & the scumbag your talking about was 
a iman & was sentenced a few wks back for rape and sexual assults on young 
boys at his mosque but is back in the papers now because he is up on charges 
for sexual 206nglish206am on female prison staff. Should just string him up 
instead of wasting tax payers money keeping him in jail!!! 
 
User 208096 (the administrator with another primary post) – Islamic HATE 
conference happening this Sat in Birmingham (public building) & then this 
Sunday in the East London Mosque. Some hate preachers who would be 
banned from the UK are being beamed in on live TV. For London; contact 
http://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/ to complain. These preachers in most cases 
are known to us as extreamists who speak about dominating the uk & calling 
for muslims to rise up against non-believersTAYYIBUN ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 2011 – REVIVING THE KNOWLEDGE www.tayyibun.com 
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â€Ž”Indeed Allah does not snatch away knowledge from the servants but he 
takes away knowledge by taking away the scholars – until when there is no 
scholar remaining the people take Ignorant ones as heads, so they are asked 
and give verdict 
Desecration of Sites and People 
One of the more distasteful narratives found within the EDL Facebook collection 
deals with the desire to desecrate religious sites and people with pigs blood or some 
other pork product.  This is directly related to one of the tenets of Islam where the 
consumption of pork is prohibited.  There were, within the collection, 163 references 
found to the search for pig, pork, or bacon.  Below is a small sampling of these 
comments. 
User 45787 – LISTEN TO THIS !! Ive just read that the people of a town in spain 
found a way to stop the planned 207nglish207am207n of a mosque in their area 
by burying a pig on the proposed site then making sure the media knew about it. 
Islamic rules forbid mosques being built on” Pig soiled ground “ and so the 
project was cancelled !! Sounds like a plan.. 
User 74025 – bury a dead pig – or 10 – at the construction site 
User 64176 – yeah chris howard, we should start burying pigs on future mosque 
land 
User 56378 – i think we should all send some food to the 207nglish207am mosque 
so the can have a sandwich on us polite understand stiff upperlip 207nglish A 
GREAT BIG VAN FULL OF FUCKING BACON 
User 80969 – Time for us all to stand together and get it done…...armed with as 
much pig grease as we can find..it can be put in all sorts of everyday 
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products…...you could saturate England with the stuff….the muzzies would leave 
or be dammed 
User 24976 – Ed Choudoury. Rot in hell smothered in bacon and glisten in pork 
fat 
User 81725 – HOW WOULD THEY FEEL IF WE CAUGHT THEM AND LET 
PIGS BLOOD INTO DRIP INTO THEIR WOUNDS ? COME ON GUYS ALL WE 
HAVE TO DO IS WAIT HE WILL SHOW HIS UGLY FACE AGAIN 
SOMEWHERE THEM CAN THE PEOPLE WHO WANT TO HELP THEM WHO 
LIVE IN DAGENHAM NOT DIG A GRAVE AND SLAUGHTER A PIG IN IT AT 
NIGHT AND LEAVE IT TILL ALL THE MUSLIMS SEE IT THEY WONT BUILD 
A MOSQUE THERE THEN 
As stated previously, these comments show the propensity among the EDL 
members on Facebook to lash out at all Muslims.  These comments not only show an 
overall disdain for the Muslim faith, they also demonstrate the willingness to engage 
in what could be seen as hate crimes in their efforts to prevent the building of a 
mosque or to desecrate a site or person.  How different is this from painting a 
swastika on the side of a synagogue?   
EDL Response to Media Characterization 
In the previous chapter there was an examination of the characterization of the 
EDL by traditional media.  As seen, there is considerable evidence to support the idea 
that traditional media did seek to frame the EDL as a far-right, , neo-Nazi group.  
Within the Facebook collection there were 127 references matching the search for 
Nazi, far-right, and neo-Nazi.  Within these comments are protestations that the EDL 
is not a far-right or Nazi group but are instead freedom fighters as well as those who 
embrace the far-right nationalist moniker.   
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User 62930 - facist,nazi who?i was in Luton today,i did not see one bit of trouble 
from any member of the EDL.we had apeacefull demo,we are not racist one bit.i 
loved too see our black brothers,sisters in luton today.AND DONT FORGET 
THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR OUR FREEDOM NOW IN AFGAN,GOD BLESS 
THEM,AND WE WILL NEVER SURRENDER 
User 65660 - fukin callin us nazis Scott? my grandad went to war against them 
sick bstards .....your just a yellow bellied poofta that probably wears mummys 
dresses whilst daddy/uncle joe gives you your pocket money for being a good little 
girl ... every saturday .Thats if you have a dad u THICK BASTARD dnt you dare 
call me nazi cos i would chuck you in gas chamber given a chance ...;-) 
User 160797 - I am sick of having labels, racist, far-right, now I am a retard cos I 
am an atheist. Anymore labels people want to chuck @ me. Only when people 
can't win an argument do the labels get thrown @ ya, be a sport, when u are 
losing or have lost an argument stop the labels. I aint racist, I aint a nazi, I aint 
right- winged n I certainly aint a retard. 
User 44198 - I personally do not care how this government or the previous labels 
me. I know what I am, a very proud and patriotic Englishman/Briton who is 
bloody proud of his heritage and nation and wants to fight for its ways and beliefs. 
If they want ...to label me as a racist/Nazi for believing this, then I say, yes I am. 
They will not change my love for this land by name calling and branding me. 
Bring it on you marxists, PC, Eurosnivelling,Islam appeasing cowards your 
downfall is upon the horizon, the Lion is hungry again. 
User 115164 - Fellow Crusaders - Please remember we are not an anti Muslim 
Group, we are against the islamification of our great country and the sharia law 
that extremists want to see rooted in England. Let us serve EDL with honour, 
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integrity and above all without racism. That way EDL will gain power and 
strength and not get seen as just some other far right hatred group. Remember the 
worlds media are focused on EDL. 
User 208096 (administrator in a secondary post)- New EDL News Item Press 
Release: The EDL Is A Human Rights OrganisationPress Release: The EDL Is A 
Human Rights Organisation Press Release - For Immediate Distribution EDL 
Leadership 21st March 2011 Attachment 300 Please note: the English Defence 
League (EDL) is not now, nor has it ever been a "Far Right" organisation. The 
EDL welcomes all colours, creeds, religions, sexualities... and anyone who 
believes in the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. In 
the past many media outlets have dubbed the EDL "Far Right" without providing 
any significantSee MoreSource: EDL NewsMarch 21 at 3:57pm 
User 30450 - Nice one, when we get the media to drop the 'racist, far right and 
hooligan' descriptions of the EDL and realise we are just standing up for this 
country, our support will grow more and more into the main stream.... When 
people realise it is not racist to love your country and want to protect our way of 
life, they will support us in their thousands EDL NSE. 
One user actually posted the contents of a letter in that was in response to statements 
made by a local councilor following a demonstration in Reading. 
User 133448 - Hello, Could you enlighten me on the comments you representative 
made after the EDL protest in your town on the 19 March. He called the EDL 
racist, Does he actually know what a racist is. How can a group that has many 
different races as me...mbers be racist. They have Muslims, Jews, Indians, 
Africans and many other races. They are opposed to extreme actions by any other 
race against the democracy of the United Kingdom. Also they are against radical 
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Islam starting to dominate this country. Do you and your colleges really want 
Sharia Law is so you would soon be out of a job. ItÂ´s people like your 
representative that is allowing this to fester. Please tell me how you have come to 
the decision that the EDL are racist. Or is it that to attempt to cry down the 
strength that this group are achieving. I would like an answer but I doubt that you 
will. 
Dear Mr MooreThank you for your enquiry.I have passed your e-mail on to The 
Corporate Projects Manager.I have asked them to respond to you directly. Please 
be advised that the department will endeavour to respond to your query within 5 
working daysYour original correspondence is quoted below. Please note that to 
protect your personal details they have been removed from the quoted text. 
Regards Customer Service Advisor (10073)Call CentreReading Borough Council 
This effort was supported by another member in the next comment: 
User 54775 - I am so happy this has finally been settled in a such a manner. I 
have always argued that how can a non-political group, whose membership spans 
the political spectrum be described as far right. 
EDL Deals with Trolls 
Within the EDL Facebook Collection, as with many controversial online social 
networks, there are those who participate as antagonists.  These individuals, known as 
trolls, are often a source of frustration for the members and can serve to disrupt the 
narrative that the administrator is trying to set forth.  As such, there are often calls by 
the users to remove or block these users from the EDL Facebook page.  Once 
blocked/removed, the content from the troll is no longer available.  While some 
members question the ‘democratic’ nature of blocking these participants, there are 
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those who find them amusing and mock their efforts.  There were 51 references to 
trolls in the EDL Facebook collection. 
User 160797 - Trolls out in force again today I see, yawn yawn yawn, its gettin 
rather tedious don't u think? 
User 158662 - reported roy and other clowns trolls nfse 
User 145096 - lets just ignore roy people, lets not show face to trolls on this post . 
its not right. let the admins deal with em 
User 96803 - Don't dignify the trolls comments with a response...If they can't 
show humanity when a young life is lost (regardless of their difference in views) 
then it says more about them than it does the EDL...We're better than that, rise 
above their... hate fuelled, taunts and callousness. it just shows they don't belong 
in a civilized society.R.I.P To the young lad who so tragically lost his life today. 
I'm sure he's gone to a better place. God give his family strength and comfort at 
this terrible time...AMEN! 
User 38542 - The trolls must work for the bbc. Dirty hairy little posh pricks 
User 160797 - Do trolls really believe we have the slightest interest in what 
they've got to say? Do they not know their comments are not wanted on this page. 
Doh. 
User 53564 - Now lets stop biting with the trolls and get ready to be taken serious. 
EDL not far right but human right. By the grace of god. NS 
Conclusion 
While in public the EDL professes to be a group that promotes human rights, 
democracy, and inclusion, it seems clear from the examples provided herein that the 
comments made by the membership on Facebook, which is in no way a private venue, 
does not reflect the benevolent rhetoric of the leadership.  Quite the opposite, the 
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comments seen previously show that racism and strong anti-Muslim sentiment do 
exist within the Facebook membership of the English Defence League.  A review of 
the comments included in this chapter shows that there were few user duplications 
within the examples, suggesting this broadly anti-Muslim  and what some might call 
racist sentiment is not centralized with only a few users but is more distributed within 
the Facebook collection than the EDL leadership might like to be known.   
The comments of the Facebook members show that, for the most part, they make 
no distinction between the Muslim minority in the UK and the extremist Muslims to 
whom they claim to be opposed.  The blatantly anti-Muslim comments and the 
characterization of Islam as a religion of the devil and of hate seek to perpetuate the 
idea that all Muslims are the enemy and are clearly not in keeping with the ideas set 
forth in the EDL mission statement.  The number of malevolent comments was not 
only illuminating but also quite disturbing when one considers that they were made by 
so many different members. 
Future hopes are that with more advanced tools to perform sentiment analysis on 
the strings contained within this collection, it will be possible to provide a more 
granular picture of the narratives contained within this collection and/or future 
collections.  The insight provided vis-a-vis the brief discourse analysis within the last 
two chapters has helped to see how the EDL is publically portrayed by the 
government and the media, how the EDL seeks to portray itself, and how the 
statements of the members who participate in the Facebook group are/are not a 
reflection of these various characterizations.  This material is further reinforced by the 
findings of the primary focus of this research which was the collection and analysis of 
the Facebook traffic to understand the patterns of traffic, the influence of certain 
topics on user traffic, and the understanding of user frequency within the collection.  
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Chapter Six:  Findings and Analysis 
As the English Defence League grew out of its humble yet violent beginnings in 
Luton the summer of 2009, the decision to ‘go public’ on Facebook was instrumental 
to the growth of the group.  This venue served multiple purposes as it was at the same 
time a communications vehicle, a propaganda machine, recruitment and a 
mobilization tool.  As their presence on Facebook grew, so did the size of their 
demonstrations and the amount of traditional media coverage given to the group and 
its leaders.  By the time this research collection began in February 2011, the group 
boasted nearly 60,000 members on Facebook and Tommy Robinson was being 
interviewed regularly on radio and television and quoted within print media.  The 
demonstration held in Luton on February 5, 2011 was arguably the largest showing by 
the EDL to date with an estimated three thousand participants, and as it turned out, the 
largest they were able to mobilize in the coming years.  This seems counterintuitive 
given the growth of membership on Facebook following the Luton demonstration, 
which quickly reached 80,000, and the real push by the EDL leaders to legitimize 
their movement by pointing to the rapidly increasing number of members on 
Facebook and the media exposure they were getting as a result of that growth.  
However, even with all their efforts to present the EDL as a grass-roots movement 
that represented the ideals of the British people, they failed in subsequent 
demonstrations to put boots on the ground in any significant quantity, always falling 
far short of what had been accomplished in Luton, which resulted in diminishing 
media coverage and the return of the EDL to the margins of society.  Given the rapid 
growth of the membership on Facebook it seems odd that the EDL would be unable to 
increase their showing at future demonstrations given the media attention they 
garnered in Luton.  However, putting aside the ZHC hack and the fallout from the 
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Breivik attack which all occurred following the collection period, when one begins to 
look closely at the collection of Facebook traffic following the Luton demonstration, 
patterns begin to emerge that provide an explanation for this phenomenon and 
eventually shows that out of the many there are truly only just the few. 
Having shown that it is possible to collect and segregate for analysis the Facebook 
traffic of the EDL, the findings and analysis provided within this chapter seek to 
address the research questions presented previously pertaining to understanding the 
characteristics of the online communications of the English Defence League on 
Facebook to determine how these findings compare to the speculation regarding 
online participation in extremist social media environments.   The areas investigated 
include measuring the traffic patterns between the group administrators and the 
members; identifying and understanding the impact on traffic of various types of 
messaging used by the EDL on their Facebook page; measuring the response to the 
various types of messaging presented by the administrator; examining the use of URL 
links within the posts and understanding the impact these various links have on the 
overall traffic and determining whether certain root links (YouTube, Facebook, etc.) 
appear more frequently than other links; and most importantly, understanding the 
relationship between being a ‘member’ of the EDL Facebook group and being an 
active participant in the online dialog, and understanding the characteristics of this 
social media traffic to determine the distribution of activity among the active 
members. 
Traffic patterns 
The analysis of traffic during the collection period is facilitated in several ways.  
First, as discussed previously, all posts are coded ‘P’ for primary posts and ‘S’ for 
secondary posts or comments.  By coding all the secondary posts separately it is 
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possible to determine how many comments or secondary posts are associated with 
each primary post.  Secondly, the dates are coded in two ways; the primary posts are 
coded with the date of the primary post and all comments or secondary posts 
associated with that primary post are identified with that same date to show its 
association to the primary post; a second date variable provides the actual date that 
each secondary post/comment was made to provide an indication of the frequency of 
posts over time.  Using these variables it is possible to gain significant insight into the 
traffic patterns as well as the importance of certain posts to the daily traffic. 
The general breakdown of the data collection (Table 6) shows that the 19,312 
primary and secondary posts that were collected during the forty-five day collection 
period is comprised of 239 primary posts, or 1.2 percent of the overall traffic; and 
19,073 secondary posts which accounts for the remaining 98.8 percent, with an 
average of 80 comments or secondary posts per primary post. 
Posts Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Primary 239 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Secondary 19073 98.8 98.8 100 
Total 19312 100 100 
 Table 6: Post frequency 
Daily Traffic Analysis 
As can be seen in the graph contained in Figure 6, the volume of the traffic during 
the collection period varied greatly from day to day.  The days with the highest 
volume of traffic were 9 and 14 February with 1152 comments on eight primary posts 
and 1166 comments on fourteen primary posts respectively.   
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Figure 6: Post Frequency Graph 
 
  The traffic analysis table below (Table 7) shows that the 9 February traffic 
averaged 144 comments per post and the 14 February traffic averaged 83.29 
comments per primary post.  While the primary posts on those days generated the 
most daily traffic, on average they were not equal to the individual primary posts that 
generated the most individual traffic.  On 8 February two primary posts generated 382 
comments for an average of 191 comments per post. 5 March had 666 comments on 
three primary posts for an average of 222 comments per post, and the highest 
comment per post average was on 27 February when two primary posts generated 492 
comments for an average of 246 secondary comments per primary post.  But what 
accounts for these high traffic days and how does one explain the high volume of 
traffic per primary post experienced on the days cited?   
  Date Primary Secondary Total Average 
5-Feb 4 415 419 103.75 
6-Feb 4 592 596 148.00 
7-Feb 5 607 612 121.40 
8-Feb 2 382 384 191.00 
9-Feb 8 1152 1160 144.00 
10-Feb 6 383 389 63.83 
11-Feb 7 318 325 45.43 
12-Feb 9 632 641 70.22 
13-Feb 2 178 180 89.00 
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 Date Primary Secondary Total Average 
14-Feb 14 1166 1180 83.29 
16-Feb 5 410 415 82.00 
17-Feb 3 163 166 54.33 
18-Feb 2 76 78 38.00 
19-Feb 4 162 166 40.50 
20-Feb 9 474 483 52.67 
21-Feb 8 646 654 80.75 
22-Feb 1 140 141 140.00 
23-Feb 5 259 264 51.80 
24-Feb 11 770 781 70.00 
25-Feb 7 517 524 73.86 
26-Feb 3 346 349 115.33 
27-Feb 2 492 494 246.00 
28-Feb 3 235 238 78.33 
4-Mar 9 496 505 55.11 
5-Mar 3 666 669 222.00 
6-Mar 3 150 153 50.00 
7-Mar 3 303 306 101.00 
8-Mar 4 222 226 55.50 
9-Mar 4 465 469 116.25 
10-Mar 10 706 716 70.60 
11-Mar 6 280 286 46.67 
12-Mar 5 701 706 140.20 
     
1
3-Mar 9 600 
60
9 66.67 
1
4-Mar 8 548 
55
6 68.50 
1
5-Mar 1 61 62 61.00 
1
6-Mar 1 100 
10
1 100.00 
1
7-Mar 4 428 
43
2 107.00 
1
8-Mar 7 454 
46
1 64.86 
1
9-Mar 5 230 
23
5 46.00 
2
0-Mar 7 433 
44
0 61.86 
2
1-Mar 5 266 
27
1 53.20 
2
2-Mar 1 105 
10
6 105.00 
 Totals 239 19073 19312 79.80 
Table 7: Daily Traffic Chart 
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Relationship between types of posts and high frequency participation 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, an additional variable was created and 
the posts and URL links were categorized for more specific analysis.  All 239 primary 
posts, which included 48 with URL links, as well as the 235 secondary 
posts/comments that contained URL’s were coded into the following categories: Pro-
EDL; EDL Demonstration/Mobilization; EDL Propaganda; Anti-Muslim; Muslim 
Murder; Muslim Rape; Muslim Pedophilia; Anti-EDL; Anti-Government; and 
Other/Unknown.  An additional compressed variable was also created containing only 
three categories; Pro-EDL, Anti-Muslim, and Other/Unknown.  The coding of these 
variables allowed for a more specific investigation into the impact of any specific type 
of primary post on the overall traffic generation.  An examination of the types of posts 
on any given day provides some insight into what type of primary posts would 
generate the traffic seen on the days that experienced a significant spike in traffic.  
Further, how does this compare with those primary posts that had the highest per post 
average of comments? 
On 9 February there were eight primary posts that generated 1152 comments. 
These eight primary posts can be characterized generally as being comprised of six 
pro-EDL posts and two anti-Muslim posts.  More specifically these can be broken 
down further to see that the six pro-EDL posts were made up of one generally pro-
EDL post, two posts that pertained to demonstration/mobilization, and three posts that 
were deemed to be propaganda.  The two anti-Muslim posts were comprised of one 
generally anti-Muslim post and one post that pertained to Muslim rape where a 14 
year old Muslim girl was raped by her 40 year old cousin.  The primary posts for 9 
February were further examined to discover the specific traffic among these posts on 
that day.   
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The traffic on the 14 February posts which had fourteen primary posts, generating 
1166 secondary posts/comments was generally broken into six pro-EDL posts and 
eight anti-Muslim posts.  The pro-EDL posts were made up of one generally pro-EDL 
post, three demonstration/mobilization posts, and two EDL propaganda posts.  The 
eight anti-Muslim posts were all generally anti-Muslim posts.  The chart specific to 
these two days (Table 8) shows that the traffic per post varied from nineteen 
comments on an anti-Muslim post on 14 February to 334 comments on a pro-EDL 
post on 9 February.  The top two high volume traffic days: 
  Comments Pro-EDL Anti-Muslim Other 
9-Feb 31 1 0   
  97 1 0   
  102 1 0   
  106 0 1   
  144 0 1   
  151 1 0   
  187 1 0   
  334 1 0   
 Total 1152 6 2   
14-Feb 19 0 1   
  41 0 1   
  55 1 1   
  58 1 0   
  59 1 0   
  60 0 1   
  66 1 0   
  70 0 1   
  104 0 1   
  105 0 1   
 
125 1 0   
  126 0 1   
  223 1 0   
 Total 1166 6 8   
Table 8: Chart of High Volume Traffic 
 
Specifically, the pro-EDL post on 9 February that generated 334 comments was a 
demonstration/mobilization post announcing that a particular demonstration in 
Birmingham had been postponed due to conflicts with “football fixates” scheduled for 
221 
the same date. The comments that followed dealt mainly with this decision and the 
desire to have demonstrations in other towns/regions. 
The top three posts on 14 February generated 125, 126, and 223 comments with 
two categorized generally as pro-EDL and one as anti-Muslim.  The specific nature of 
these posts is as follows: the post with 125 comments was determined to be EDL 
propaganda that was focused on a link to an article on Geert Wilders, a very 
prominent anti-Muslim figure in Europe; the post with 126 comments was an anti- 
Muslim post that was disparaging against Muslim’s by questioning who had a “fistful 
of beard”.  Finally, the post with 223 comments was viewed as propaganda since it 
called for members to register and participate on the new EDL website.   
The days with the highest average of comment per post mentioned earlier, 27 
February and 5 March show varied results.  On 27 February there were two posts with 
209 and 283 comments respectively.  Each of these was generally anti-Muslim and 
specifically the post with 209 comments challenged the concept of “moderate 
Muslims” in the UK, and the post with 283 comments centered on the issue of 
Muslims burning poppies on Remembrance Day.    
The traffic on 5 March was made up of three posts with 88, 287, and 291 
comments.  These three posts were all pro-EDL with the 88 comment post being a 
propaganda post that was a thank you to those who participated in the Rochdale 
demonstration, and the posts with 287 and 291 comment were 
demonstration/mobilization posts that sought to promote the upcoming Rochdale 
demonstration. 
Primary Post Type  
As outlined previously, in the aggregate data the primary posts can be divided into 
three main/general categories; Pro-EDL, Anti-Muslim, and Other (Table 9).  Of the 
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239 primary posts within the data set, 153 or 64.0 percent are Pro-EDL posts, 68 posts 
or 28.5% are Anti-Muslim in nature, and the remaining 18 posts (7.5%) are classified 
as other.  It is clear that the majority of the primary posts were for the purpose of 
supporting the EDL mission/narrative.  However, that 28.5% of the primary posts 
were dedicated to anti-Muslim content should be considered as significant given the 
need to develop and demonize Muslims as “the other” or the “foreign devil” (Hoffer, 
1965; Zimbardo, 2007; Jackson, 2011).    
Breakdown of primary posts 
Given that the collection period was during a period of rapid membership growth, 
it is important to understand the specific nature of these primary posts to gain insight 
into what the EDL leadership considered most important to promote the EDL 
presence on Facebook. 
Compressed 
Category 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Pro-EDL 153 64 64 
Anti-Muslim 68 28.5 28.5 
Other 18 7.5 7.5 
Total 239 100 100 
           Table 9: Compressed Categories of Primary Posts 
An examination of all 239 primary posts, as seen in Table 10, of the 64% of  
primary posts that were generally pro-EDL in nature, 47 posts or 19.7% were of a 
general nature, 55 posts or 23% related to demonstration/mobilization, and 21.3% or 
51 posts served as propaganda.  Among the remaining posts 28.6% of the primary 
posts were anti-Muslim in nature with 24.3% being generally anti-Muslim, Muslim 
Rape and Muslim Murder were both at 1.3% with 3 posts each, and Muslim 
pedophilia had four posts for 1.7%.  Finally the 11 Anti-government posts accounted 
for 4.6% of the primary posts and 7 posts that were categorized as other/unknown 
made up the remaining 2.9% of the primary posts.   
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Distribution    
of Primary Posts 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Pro-EDL 47 19.7 19.7 
Demonstration/Mobilization 55 23 42.7 
EDL Propaganda 51 21.3 64 
 153 64  
    
Anti-Muslim 58 24.3 88.3 
Muslim Rape 3 1.3 89.5 
Muslim Murder 3 1.3 90.8 
Muslim Pedophilia 4 1.7 92.5 
 68 28.6  
    
Anti-Government 11 4.6 97.1 
Other/Unknown 7 2.9 100 
 18 7.5  
    
Total 239 100  
Table 10: Distribution of Primary Posts by Category 
Given that each of these primary posts has a string of secondary posts/comments 
following it, how then is this distribution represented in the secondary 
posts/comments? 
Breakdown of Comments 
Even though the data set contains the number of secondary posts/comments 
associated with each primary post, the 19,073 secondary posts/comments were not 
coded by category.  While it should be understood that there are likely a few 
argumentative comments within some strings, it is unlikely that they would prove 
significant to the overall finding or understanding of the traffic generated by any 
particular type of post.  Further, it should be noted that during the collection process it 
was noticed that counter narrative content was often either removed by the 
administrator or deleted by the user.  This is evidenced by references made by users to 
individuals who have made argumentative comments but that user’s name no longer 
appears in the string.   
The general purpose of this analysis is to determine the overall traffic generated 
by each type of primary post.  Therefore, by performing a case summary within SPSS 
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it was possible to determine how many comments existed within the strings pertaining 
to each category.  As seen in Table 11, the distribution of pro-EDL and anti-Muslim 
comments are, by percentage, very similar to those seen among the primary posts.  
One small difference is that the percentage of pro-EDL comments is just over three 
percent lower than the percentage of pro-EDL primary posts, and the anti-Muslim 
comments are nearly three percent higher by volume than that of the primary posts.  
What does this mean?  
Distribution of Comments Count Percent 
  
  Pro-EDL 3108 16.30%
Demonstration/Mobilization 3758 19.70% 
EDL Propaganda 4724 24.77% 
TOTAL 11590 60.77% 
  
  Anti-Muslim 5274 27.65%
Muslim Rape 244 1.28% 
Muslim Murder 245 1.28% 
Muslim Pedophilia 178 0.93% 
TOTAL 5941 31.15% 
  
  Anti-Government 1023 5.36%
Other/Unknown 519 2.72% 
TOTAL 1542 8.08% 
Table 11: Distribution of comments per category 
Since we know the categories of each primary post, as well as the number of 
secondary posts/comments associated with each primary post, it is then possible to 
determine the average number of comments per primary post for each category.  
Table 12 shows the average number of comments per post per category range from a 
low of 66.13 comments per post to a high of 93.0 comments per primary post. 
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Table 12:Breakdown of comments per post by category 
A more detailed examination shows that while the pro-EDL posts generated an 
average of 66.13 comments per post the anti-Muslim posts precipitated a much higher 
90.93 comments per post.  While the highest average of 93.0 was for the anti-
government posts, these limited number of posts and comments accounted for only 
4.6 % and 5.36% of the overall traffic.  It is interesting to note however the amount of 
traffic that was generated by the anti-government primary posts.  This is an area that 
would certainly be worthy of further examination in a longer term study given the 
EDL’s attitude toward what they perceive as the UK government’s role as apologists 
for and facilitators of the “Islamists” within “their” country (Ford, 2010). 
 Most importantly, an examination of the aggregate quantities is very revealing.   
Even though the pro-EDL primary posts far outnumber the anti-Muslim Primary posts 
by 125% (153/68), the number of pro-EDL secondary posts/comments (11,590) is 
only 95% higher than the 5,941 anti-Muslim comments.  This is further reflected in 
the average number of secondary posts/comments per primary post.  While the pro-
EDL posts, in the aggregate, generated 75.75 comments per post, the anti-Muslim 
posts generated a higher 87.37 comments per primary post.  Clearly, in the aggregate 
Categories Comments Primary 
Posts 
Comments 
per Post 
Pro-EDL 3108 47 66.13 
Demonstration/Mobilization 3758 55 68.33 
EDL Propaganda 4724 51 92.63 
Category Total 11590 153 75.75 
    
Anti-Muslim 5274 58 90.93 
Muslim Rape 244 3 81.33 
Muslim Murder 245 3 81.67 
Muslim Pedophilia 178 4 44.50 
Category Total 5941 68 87.37 
    
Anti-Government 1023 11 93.00 
Other/Unknown 519 7 74.14 
Category Total 1542 18 85.67 
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data, the anti-Muslim posts seemed to create more fervor among the users than did the 
pro-EDL posts.  Even though this is an interesting finding, it is overshadowed by the 
sheer volume of pro-EDL traffic and that the EDL propaganda category outpaced the 
specific anti-Muslim category 92.63% to 90.93%.  An examination of the remaining 
anti-Muslim categories shows that the primary posts related to rape, murder, and 
pedophilia are used effectively by the EDL to generate anti-Muslim sentiment.  This 
is evidenced by the high volume of comments per primary post, particularly in the 
cases of murder and rape, the visceral language, and the high frequency of expletives 
found within these comments.  By highlighting the stories related to rapes, murders, 
and pedophilia committed by Muslims in the United Kingdom, the EDL seems to be 
working effectively to characterize the Muslims as ‘the foreign devil”, and the 
comments contained within these posts indicate that the users certainly consider them 
less than human by calling the Muslims, “dirty animals”, “sick filthy dogs”, “dirty 
bloody scumbags”, and many other epithets that use much stronger language.  Again, 
these serve as facilitators toward the development of Muslims as ‘the other’ and the 
us-vs.-them paradigm (Hoffer, 1951; Zimbardo, 2007). 
Further, as seen in the previous chapter, within these comments are repeated calls 
for reprisals against Muslims that range from demands for harsh prosecution and 
deportation, to calls for violence that include one user’s desire to “hang the bastards!”  
One cannot help but consider the impact of such anti-Muslim sentiment and violent 
language, and what influence it may have had in instances of violence against 
Muslims in the UK and further whether it may have influenced Anders Breivik 
toward committing his violent attacks in Norway, particularly given his admission of 
being heavily involved with the EDL and their Facebook page users (Collins, 2011; 
Hughes, 2011).  Investigation into what the real impact exposure to this type of 
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extremist and violent content has on the individual user is another area to be 
considered for future research.   
The role of URL links 
Uniform Resource Locator links allow the administrator to provide the members 
easy access to traditional media stories that appear online and YouTube videos with 
the intent of forwarding a particular position.  A frequency analysis of the variable 
‘link’ shows that there are 288 URL links within the data set (Table 13).   
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
0 19024 99.0 99.0 99.0 
1 288 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 19312 100.0 100.0  
Table 13: Frequency of URL links 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, all the parser was able to identify was 
the existence of a URL link within the post and create a variable that coded no link as 
‘0’ and the presence of a link was coded as ‘1’.   
While one might think that the URL links would be used primarily by the 
administrator, a breakdown of the links (Table 14) shows that only 51 URL links were 
found in the primary posts while the remaining 237 URL links were contained within 
the secondary posts/comments.   
 Link Total 
no yes 
Pri 
P 191 51 239 
S 18838 237 19073 
Total 19029 288 19312 
Table 14: Distribution of URL links 
 
It can be expected that the URL links are provided to further the narrative of the 
group.  As such, it is important to understand just what type of narrative is being 
forwarded within these links.  To perform this analysis, the links were located within 
the data set and coded according to the categories as previously described and now 
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seen in the graph below.  While the coding of the URL links was performed to place 
them into specific categories, these categories were also collapsed to provide a 
general understanding of the flavor of the URL links in the aggregate.  The URL link 
compressed chart (Table 15) shows that of the 288 links, 116 (41%) were generally 
Pro-EDL in nature, 100 links (36%) were Anti-Muslim, and 67 links (23%) were 
other than the previous two.  But how is this reflected in the more specific breakdown 
of categories and between the primary posts and the secondary posts/comments? 
URLTypeComp Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Pro-EDL 118 41 41 
Anti-Muslim 103 35.8 76.7 
Other 67 23.3 100 
Total 288 100   
Table 15: URL type by compressed category 
The breakdown of the URL links, seen in Table 16, shows that out of the 51 URL 
links within the primary posts, 28 were primarily pro-EDL in nature with the majority 
related to demonstration/mobilization and propaganda, while the 19 anti-Muslim links 
were mostly made up of generally anti-Muslim links.   
 
Table 16: Breakdown of URL links in all categories 
It is important to note that the number of URL links in the primary posts in each 
category is exceeded by the number of URL links in secondary posts, with the single 
exception of Muslim rape.  Additionally, the anti-EDL links are found within the 
body of secondary post/comment link with no corresponding primary post link, which 
is to be expected. 
 
URL 
Type 
Pro 
EDL 
Demo 
Mobilization 
EDL 
Propaganda 
Anti-
Muslim 
Muslim 
Rape 
Muslim 
Murder 
Anti-
Gov’t 
Anti-
EDL 
Other 
Unknown TOTALS 
Primary 
Posts 6 10 12 17 1 1 4 0 0 51 
Secondary 
Posts 17 40 33 78 0 6 15 9 39 237 
Total 23 50 45 95 1 7 19 9 39 288 
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URLtype Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Pro EDL 23 8 8 8 
Demonstration/Mobilization 50 17.4 17.4 25.3 
EDL Propaganda 45 15.6 15.6 41 
Anti-Muslim 95 33 33 74 
Muslim Rape 1 0.3 0.3 74.3 
Muslim Murder 7 2.4 2.4 76.7 
Anti-Government 19 6.6 6.6 83.3 
Anti-EDL 9 3.1 3.1 86.5 
Other/Unknown 39 13.5 13.5 100 
Total 288 100 100   
Table 17: Aggregate examination of all URL links 
An examination in the aggregate of the URL links by category (Table 17), which 
includes the primary and secondary posts containing these links, shows that the 
highest volume category was the Anti-Muslim (33.0%), followed by demonstration 
/mobilization (17.4%), and then EDL Propaganda (15.6%).    Collectively, these three 
categories account for nearly two thirds (66.0%) of all the URL links contained within 
the data set.  But how are these, and the other link categories, reflected in the traffic?   
 Since the URL links contained within the secondary posts do not have any 
comments associated within them, it is only possible to examine the traffic generated 
by the primary posts that contain URL links.  As seen in Table 18, the primarily pro-
EDL links generated in total 2,001 secondary posts with the EDL propaganda 
category topping the list with 12 URL links generating 1,089 secondary posts for an 
average of 90.75 comments per link.  The aggregated anti-Muslim posts with 19 links 
generated 1,326 secondary posts with the anti-Muslim links generating 72.47 
comments per link with 1,232 comments on 17 URL links. 
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The Relationship of URL links and periods of heavy traffic 
Using the URL link graph in Figure 7, which shows the volume of traffic along 
the time line of the collection period, it is easy to see that the spikes in URL link 
traffic closely correspond to the spikes in traffic seen in the graph in Figure 8, 
showing the overall traffic analysis.  
Figure 7: Traffic analysis with URL type 
compressed 
 
Figure 8: Overall daily traffic graph 
 
URL Comments Per 
Category Comments # of links 
Average per 
link 
        
Pro-EDL 464 6 77.34 
Demonstration/mobilization 448 10 44.80 
EDL Propaganda 1089 12 90.75 
Category total 2001 28 71.47 
        
Anti-Muslim 1232 17 72.47 
Muslim Rape 50 1 50.00 
Muslim Murder 44 1 44.00 
Muslim Pedophilia 0 0 0.00 
Category total 1326 19 69.79 
        
Antigovernment 233 4 58.25 
Other/Unknown 0 0 0.00 
Category total 233 4 58.25 
        
TOTALS 3560 51 69.81 
Table 18: Comments per primary post with URL link 
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The power of the URL 
One of the main questions pertaining to the URL links contained within the 
primary posts is just how influential they are.  An examination of the top twenty 
primary posts reveals that four of these posts contained URL’s.  In fact the primary 
post with the second highest number of comments per post contained a URL.  Table 
19 provides the breakdown of the top twenty primary posts by number of comments 
and at the bottom the top five primary posts with URL links.  As discussed previously 
the primary post with the most comments (334) was an announcement by the EDL 
administrator that the Birmingham demonstration had been postponed and it did not 
contain a URL.   
User 208096 - The English Defence League has decided to postpone the 
Birmingham demonstration due to certain football fixutes clashing on the 
same dates, we will be giving a new date for it soon and will issue a new 
demonstration for March 19th after discussions by the leadership. (E) 
The primary post that contained the second highest number of comments also did 
not contain a URL and called for the EDL to engage more actively in the political 
process of the UK.  The highest URL primary post, with 294 comments, was an anti-
Muslim post that highlighted the recent attacks by Muslims on innocent non-Muslims 
where four “Whitechapel men slashed a teachers face for teaching other religions to 
Muslim girls” and included a link to a Daily Mail article on the incident.   
User 208096 - Radical Hate Muslims show us all the religion of peace... They 
attack an innocent teacher, just doing his job. The tough guys attacked 4-1, yet 
still needed weapons. The scum are all from East London, one of which is 
from hate central - Whitechapel! (H)4 men slashed teacher's face 'for teaching 
other religions to Muslim girls' www.dailymail.co.uk RE teacher Gary Smith 
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was ambushed by the men as he walked along a road in Mile End, East 
London. It is believed the gang had made two earlier attempts to get at him. 
The second highest URL linked primary post had 275 comments and contained a 
YouTube video dealing with the re-arrest of Tommy Robinson on a section 4 public 
order offense related to the poppy-burning incident.   
User 208096 - Today on March 1st at 15.00hrs Tommy Robinson has been re-
arrested on a section 4 public order offence concerning the Poppy burning 
incident. 
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_5cWwuqk5E&playnext=1&list=PLF91
829307C01530F 
 Tommy was trying to stop hate speech at the time because the British police 
were to afraid to act on behalf of the British public, please see here 
http://englishdefenceleague.org/content.php?236-The-Trial-of-the-Poppy-
BurnersÂ Â Today on March 1st at 15.00hrs Tommy Robinson has been re-
arrested on a section 4 public order offence concerning the Poppy burning 
incident.Scotland Yard Police drove to Luton police station and charged 
Tommy with a section 4 public order offence and he is to apear before 
Magistrates on March 10th (Location to follow)  
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PP Type 
    
 
# of 
comments  Pro-EDL 
Demonstration-
Mobilization EDL Propaganda 
Anti-
Muslim 
 
334 0 1 0 0 
 
319 1 0 0 0 
 
*294 0 0 0 1 
 
291 0 0 1 0 
 
287 0 1 0 0 
 
283 0 0 0 1 
 
280 0 0 0 0 
 
278 0 0 1 1 
 
*275 0 0 1 0 
 
261 0 0 0 1 
 
245 0 0 1 0 
 
234 0 0 1 0 
 
223 0 1 0 0 
 
*222 0 0 1 0 
 
209 0 0 0 1 
 
191 0 2 0 0 
 
*187 0 0 1 0 
 
*186 0 0 1 0 
 
181 0 0 0 1 
 
174 0 0 0 1 
Totals 3951 1 5 8 7 
Table 19: Top 20 primary posts by category 
Impact of URL links on traffic  
While the top twenty primary posts, shown above  in Table 19, contain four posts 
(20%) with URL’s more generally, of the 239 primary posts 51 or 22% of primary 
posts contained URL links, generating 3560 comments or 19% of the overall user 
traffic excluding administrator posts.  At first look this might indicate that the URL 
links had little impact on the overall traffic generation.  However, one must consider 
the overall traffic within the data set and how this compares with the traffic generated 
by the URL links.  As discussed earlier, there are 239 primary posts that generated 
19,073 secondary posts/comments for an average of 79.81 comments per post.  
Within the dataset, there are 191 primary posts that do not have a URL links within 
the primary posts that generated 16,023 comments for an average of 99.61 comments 
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per post.  But when we examine the 48 primary posts that do contain URL links we 
find that they generated 3050 secondary posts/comments for an average of 63.55 
comments per post.    
Number of 
comments 
Number 
of posts 
Percent of 
primary posts 
Average 
posts/comment Percentage of traffic 
19073 239 100.00 79.81 100 
15513 188 0.79 82.52 0.81 
3560 51 0.22 69.81 0.19 
Table 20: Analysis of posts per comment with/without URL links 
As seen in the Table 20, while the 188 secondary posts that do not have URL links 
representing 79% of the primary posts generate 81% of the overall traffic, the 
remaining 22% of the primary posts that do contain URL links only generate 19% of 
the traffic and even fall below the average of posts for comment for the entire data set.  
Therefore, while there is considerable traffic associated with the primary posts that 
contain URL links, it cannot be said that they have any more impact on the traffic 
generation than any other post contained within the body of primary posts.  However, 
further examination of this phenomenon is warranted in the future given that 25% of 
the high traffic posts did contain URL’s. 
Various URL’s 
When considering the development of the parser it was determined that one 
feature would be the inclusion of the root URL for each link (e.g. YouTube.com, 
Facebook.com, etc.).  As such, it was possible to examine how many times each root 
address appeared within the URL links.  As seen below in Table 21, within the 239 
primary posts there were 188 posts with no links accounting for 78.7% of the primary 
posts.  However, within the fifty-one posts that did have links 10%, or 24 links were 
YouTube videos supplied by the administrator followed by seven links to other 
Facebook content.  Table 21 also shows that there were 14 links to news outlets like 
the BBC, the Daily Star, the Guardian and others. 
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URL's in Primary Posts Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
No links 188 78.7 78.7 78.7 
WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 24 10 10 88.7 
WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 7 2.9 2.9 91.6 
WWW.BBC.CO.UK 5 2.1 2.1 93.7 
WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 3 1.3 1.3 95 
WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 2 0.8 0.8 95.8 
WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 2 0.8 0.8 96.7 
WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 2 0.8 0.8 97.5 
WWW.EXPRESS.CO.UK 1 0.4 0.4 97.9 
WWW.MEMRI.ORG 1 0.4 0.4 98.3 
WWW.SPIKED-ONLINE.COM 1 0.4 0.4 98.7 
WWW.THEFIRSTPOST.CO.UK 1 0.4 0.4 99.2 
WWW.TOWERHAMLETS.GOV.UK 1 0.4 0.4 99.6 
WWW.TPUC.ORG 1 0.4 0.4 100 
Total 239 100 100   
Table 21: URL's Within Primary Posts 
 
The traffic generated by these links varies and can be seen in Table 22.  While the 
YouTube videos overall generated the most traffic with twenty-four links resulting in 
1631 comments, the most impactful URL’s were links to news articles.  The two posts 
from the Guardian resulted in 272 comments with an average of 136.0 comments per 
post.  The first Guardian link on 7 February was focused on the hundreds of thousands 
of pounds that were being withdraws from Muslim groups by PM David Cameron 
generating 50 comments.  The second Guardian post on 27 February, receiving 222 
comments, had the headline, “Searchlight poll finds huge support for far right 'if they 
gave up violence'” (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/27/support-poll-
support-far-right).   
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URL's in Primary Posts Frequency Number of 
Comments 
Average 
per post 
Percent of 
URL 
Comments 
No links 188    
WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 24 1631 68.0 45.81% 
WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 7 286 41.0 8.03% 
WWW.BBC.CO.UK 5 312 63.0 8.76% 
WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 3 366 122.0 10.28% 
WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 2 77 38.5 2.16% 
WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 2 272 136.0 7.64% 
WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 2 246 123.0 6.91% 
WWW.EXPRESS.CO.UK 1 42 42.0 1.18% 
WWW.MEMRI.ORG 1 65 65.0 1.83% 
WWW.SPIKED-ONLINE.COM 1 63 63.0 1.77% 
WWW.THEFIRSTPOST.CO.UK 1 23 23.0 0.65% 
WWW.TOWERHAMLETS.GOV.UK 1 79 79.0 2.22% 
WWW.TPUC.ORG 1 98 98.0 2.75% 
Total 239 3560 70.0 100.00% 
Table 22: Comments by URL Type 
 
Table 23, seen below contains the comment frequency for each URL link 
presented from highest to lowest. 
Date Source Link 
Number of 
Comments 
6-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 319 
1-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 275 
26-Feb WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 222 
9-Feb WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 187 
7-Feb WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 186 
22-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 140 
7-Feb WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 122 
7-Mar WWW.BBC.CO.UK 122 
10-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 116 
25-Feb WWW.TPUC.ORG 98 
9-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 97 
13-Mar WWW.BBC.CO.UK 95 
13-Mar WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 94 
21-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 86 
18-Mar WWW.TOWERHAMLETS.GOV.UK 79 
20-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 70 
20-Feb WWW.MEMRI.ORG 65 
14-Mar WWW.SPIKED-ONLINE.COM 63 
9-Mar WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 60 
8-Mar WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 57 
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Date Source Link 
Number of 
Comments 
2-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 50 
7-Feb WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 50 
21-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 46 
20-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 45 
3-Mar WWW.BBC.CO.UK 44 
19-Feb WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 44 
21-Mar WWW.EXPRESS.CO.UK 42 
4-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 38 
25-Feb WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 38 
9-Mar WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 37 
3-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 36 
20-Feb WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 36 
20-Feb WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 33 
9-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 31 
10-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 31 
1-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 31 
20-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 31 
11-Feb WWW.BBC.CO.UK 30 
28-Feb WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 29 
10-Feb WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 28 
4-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 27 
4-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 26 
10-Mar WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 25 
24-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 24 
13-Mar WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 24 
11-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 23 
20-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 23 
24-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 23 
21-Feb WWW.THEFIRSTPOST.CO.UK 23 
24-Feb WWW.BBC.CO.UK 21 
11-Feb WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 18 
 Table 23: Comments per URL Link 
As discussed previously, there are a total of 288 posts/comments in the collection that 
contain URL’s, 51 within primary posts and 237 within the secondary posts.  Table 24 
provides an abridged list that examines those URL’s that appear at least two times 
within data set.  The entire list can be seen in Appendix 5.    Again, YouTube videos 
top the list with 96 links followed closely by Facebook links appearing 87 times 
within the collection.  With the YouTube and Facebook links representing 0.5% each 
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of all traffic, combined they make up 1% of all posts within the dataset.  Again, the 
links to the news outlets appear prominently in the list of URL’s.    
 URL’s in entire data set Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Posts with no link 19024 98.5 
WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 96 99 
WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 87 99.5 
WWW.BBC.CO.UK 21 99.6 
WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 5 99.6 
WWW.CHANNEL4.COM 4 99.6 
WWW.DAILYMAIL.CO.UK 4 99.6 
WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 3 99.6 
WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 3 99.7 
WWW.ANIMALAID.ORG.UK 2 99.7 
WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 2 99.7 
WWW.FLICKR.COM 2 99.7 
WWW.ISRAELNATIONALNEWS.COM 2 99.7 
WWW.TELEGRAPH.CO.UK 2 99.7 
WWW.THERELIGIONOFPEACE.COM 2 99.7 
WWW.THISISDEVON.CO.UK 2 99.7 
All others links 51 100.0 
Table 24: Abridged List of URL's in Collection 
 
Analysis of YouTube Links 
Examination of the YouTube links found within the EDL collection shows that 
there were a total of 96 YouTube videos identified within the primary and secondary 
posts.  Of these, twenty-four were posted by the administrator and seventy-two were 
included in the user comments/secondary posts (Table 25).   
YouTube Videos No Yes Total 
Primary Post 215 24 239 
Secondary Post 19001 72 19073 
Totals 19216 96 19312 
Table 25: YouTube Video's Primary or Secondary 
 
Using the category identification of the URL links, it was discovered that thirty-six of 
the YouTube videos were generally Pro-EDL in nature, thirty-one were Anti-Muslim, 
and twenty-nine were in the other category (Table 26). 
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YouTube Videos 
 Pro-EDL 36 
Anti-Muslim 31 
Other 29 
Total 96 
Table 26: Compressed Categories of YouTube Videos 
More specifically, as can be seen in Table 27 below, the majority of the YouTube 
videos in the general Compressed Pro-EDL category contain twelve Pro-EDL videos 
and Twenty EDL Propaganda videos, while the compressed Anti-Muslim category 
was primarily Anti-Muslim in nature with thirty-one videos, only one video in the 
Muslim Rape category, and three in the Muslim Murder category.  Interestingly there 
were ten videos that were anti-Government in nature, four that were Anti-EDL, and 
fifteen videos that were in the other/unknown group mostly due inactive links. 
YouTube Categories for 
all YouTube Links 
Number of 
videos 
Pro EDL 11 
Demonstration/Mobilization 5 
EDL Propaganda 20 
Anti-Muslim 27 
Muslim Rape 1 
Muslim Murder 3 
Anti-Government 10 
Anti-EDL 4 
Other/Unknown 15 
Total 96 
Table 27: Number of YouTube videos per Category 
Within the twenty- four primary posts that contained YouTube Videos, the 
number of comments per post varied greatly.  Table 28 provides the results of the 
analysis of those videos contained within these primary posts; how many videos were 
in each category, the total number of comments for each category and the average 
number of comments per primary post that contained a YouTube video.  This analysis 
shows that the videos which were generally Pro-EDL in nature received the highest 
number of posts on average per video with 434 comments on five YouTube links with 
an average of 86.80 comments per video.  While the Anti-Government video nearly 
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matched that number with 86.00 comments, there was only one video.  Given the 
restrictions on correlating these finding with individual usage as was done by Conway 
and McInerney (2008), this analysis does seem to indicate that the YouTube videos do 
generate significant traffic, nearly matching the 69.81 comments per post for all 
primary posts that contain URL links. 
YouTube Category for 
videos in Primary Posts 
Number of 
Videos 
Number of 
Comments 
Average 
per video 
Pro EDL 5 434 86.80 
Demonstration/Mobilization 4 107 26.75 
EDL Propaganda 10 745 74.50 
Anti-Muslim 3 209 69.67 
Muslim Rape 1 50 50.00 
Anti-Government 1 86 86.00 
Totals 24 1631 67.96 
        Table 28: Number of comments per Primary post with YouTube Video 
Content analysis    
Performing a content analysis of the primary and secondary posts serves multiple 
purposes.  First it provides a glimpse into the words that are used by the administrator 
and users in high frequency.  Second, it allows for an examination of how the most 
frequently used words by the administrator in the primary posts are reflected in the 
content of the secondary posts/comments.  Using NVivo10, it was possible to perform 
this analysis by segregating the dataset in SPSS into separate primary and secondary 
post datasets and then importing those into NVivo as separate files.  Utilizing the 
word frequency analysis tool, and setting the parameters to look for the top twenty 
five words with three or more letters including root words, then blocking connecting 
words (e.g. and, then, if…), the software provided the desired list.  Below (Image 34) 
is a word tag that reflects the words with the highest frequency among the primary 
posts.  The size of the words is a visual reflection of the prominence of the word 
within the list which can be seen in the tag cloud below.  As is obvious, EDL was the 
most used word with a frequency of 126 within the 239 primary posts.  This is 
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followed by Defence (65), English (64), and League (64), which is a reflection of the 
number of times the administrator made reference to the English Defence League.  
Moving down the list some of the most interesting words that were used frequently by 
the administrator are Muslim and Islam; British; Demonstration; Country; and 
Tommy.  While this list of frequently used words provides an understanding of the 
direction the administrator hoped to move the dialog within the EDL Facebook group, 
what is most important is how these efforts are reflected in the dialog of the user 
secondary posts/comments. 
british country day defence demo demonstration 
edl english forces islamic law league local 
london luton march muslim new news people police poppy 
protest tommy watch  
Image 35: Primary post word cloud- 
As seen in Image 35, the tag cloud of the secondary posts/comments shows that 
EDL is also the most commonly used word in the secondary posts with a frequency of 
2,879.  Analyzing the top twenty five words used in the secondary posts/comments as 
compared to the primary posts (as seen in Table 29), we can see that the use of 
Muslims or Islams which was seen a combined 81 times in the primary posts appears 
3,453 in the secondary posts. What is interesting in these numbers is that while the 
use of EDL by the administrator in the primary posts was used 126 times, the 2,879 
times it is used in the secondary posts represents a ratio of primary to secondary posts 
using EDL of 1to23.  However, the use of Muslim/Islam by the administrator 81 times 
is seen in the secondary posts 3,453 times, with a ratio of 1 to 43. 
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backs britishness coming countrys days demos 
edl englands english fucks good got islams 
knows laws living muslims' never 
peoples racists rights taking thinks timing 
tommy  
Image 36: Secondary post word cloud 
Other words/terms that had significant ratios are country, 1to72; English/British 
with a ratio of 1to23; and finally Tommy, which refers to Tommy Robinson, with a 
ratio of 1 to 28.  But why is this important?   
Primary Posts     Secondary Posts   
Word Count   Word Count 
edl 126   edl 2879 
defence 65   muslims' 2172 
english 64   peoples 2020 
league 64   countrys 1883 
news 51   islams 1281 
muslim 44   fucks 1038 
march 39   good 1016 
islamic 37   coming 889 
british 35   timing 880 
watch 35   letting 862 
day 33   rights 830 
protest 29   english 810 
demonstration 29   tommy 807 
police 29   living 771 
tommy 29   englands 753 
law 28   backs 704 
poppy 28   taking 696 
london 27   never 688 
country 26   britishness 682 
demo 25   days 678 
people 24   racists 667 
forces 23   laws 622 
local 20   demos 611 
members 19   going 599 
year 19   scums 595 
Table 29: Key word frequency analysis 
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Content analysis to determine association with the EDL narrative   
The understanding that there are, within the primary and secondary posts, several 
words that are most frequently used within both, does not really tell the entire story as 
it relates to the acceptance of what can be considered the group narrative by the users.  
If we can accept that the most frequently used words by the administrator in some 
way represents the narrative of the group, it should then be possible to examine 
different categories of users to determine the general virility of that messaging within 
the body of users.  To accomplish this analysis, the body of users was subdivided into 
three groups; first is the body of low frequency users; second is the high frequency 
users; and lastly is the top ten users within the entire group of users.  The designation 
of low and high frequency was determined by considering any user who posted an 
average of once per day or higher within the 45 day collection period would be 
viewed as a high frequency user.   Anyone posting less than once per day, on average, 
during the collection period would be considered a low frequency user.  With this 
understanding, and after performing a frequency analysis of the user traffic, it was 
determined that there were thirty three high frequency users and 4,065 low frequency 
users.  The top ten users were then separated from the body of high frequency users 
due to the wide range of user frequency even among the high frequency users with the 
number one user posting 348 times and the number 33 user posting only 45 times 
during the collection period.  Each of these user groups were segregated into separate 
data sets and those files were placed into NVivo for analysis. 
The first analysis was to examine the average frequency per user within each 
category of the top 25 words used in each category of user.  As can be expected, and 
as seen below, the average word usage frequency per user is significantly higher as 
the body of users gets smaller.  As an example, the most commonly used word/phrase, 
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EDL, is used an average of 0.60 times per user within the low frequency user set of 
4,065 users, and an average of 12.48 times within the body of 33 high frequency 
users, while the top ten users had an average usage of EDL of 19 times per user.  
Similar increases in the average frequency of word usage per user is seen from low to 
high to top ten users.  But, does the difference in the volume of users account for this 
variation?  Do these findings actually mean that the higher frequency users are using 
these words in a higher proportion than the low frequency users, particularly given 
that the word lists do not match from one user set to the other? 
Low 
Frequency 
Users 
(4065) 
      High 
Frequency 
users (33) 
      Top 10 
High 
Frequency 
Users 
    
Word Count Average 
per user 
  Word Count Average 
per user 
  Word Count Average 
per user 
edl 2467 0.6069   edl 412 12.4848   edl 190 19.00 
muslims 1792 0.4408   muslims 380 11.5152   people 188 18.80 
countrys 1692 0.4162   peoples 379 11.4848   muslims 138 13.80 
peoples 1641 0.4037   islam 197 5.9697   racists 91 9.10 
islam 1084 0.2667   countrys 191 5.7879   country 86 8.60 
fucks 930 0.2288   coming 160 4.8485   demos 80 8.00 
good 882 0.2170   racists 153 4.6364   time 74 7.40 
letting 772 0.1899   times 152 4.6061   coming 73 7.30 
coming 730 0.1796   rights 134 4.0606   comments 65 6.50 
english 729 0.1793   demos 134 4.0606   page 65 6.50 
timing 728 0.1791   good 134 4.0606   thing 60 6.00 
tommy 712 0.1752   taking 129 3.9091   posts 60 6.00 
rights 696 0.1712   comments 128 3.8788   reading 60 6.00 
englands 693 0.1705   living 117 3.5455   taking 59 5.90 
living 654 0.1609   day 115 3.4848   day 58 5.80 
backs 608 0.1496   reads 113 3.4242   uaf 58 5.80 
britishness 594 0.1461   thing 110 3.3333   islam 55 5.50 
never 589 0.1449   fucks 108 3.2727   good 53 5.30 
taking 567 0.1395   even 100 3.0303   rights 53 5.30 
days 563 0.1385   page 100 3.0303   february 50 5.00 
laws 538 0.1323   posts 100 3.0303   admins 49 4.90 
scums 535 0.1316   never 99 3.0000   even 49 4.90 
surrender 526 0.1294   uaf 98 2.9697   never 46 4.60 
stands 517 0.1272   backs 96 2.9091   john 45 4.50 
racists 514 0.1264   tommy 95 2.8788   live 44 4.40 
 Table 30: Key word usage by hi/low frequency users 
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Top shared words: 
To make this determination is was necessary to examine the commonly used 
words within each subset of users (see Table 30).  One exception to this list is that the 
word ‘demo’ did not appear in the low frequency user set as it fell below the number 
of commonly used words within this set.  However given that the entire secondary 
post set contained 611 uses, it was simply a matter of subtracting the 134 uses within 
the high frequency group to arrive at a low frequency usage of 477.  As can be seen in 
Table 31, those words that are commonly used within each subset, including the 
commonly used words used within the primary posts show similar percentages as seen 
in Table 30. 
  
Primary 
Posts 
Secondary 
Posts   
Low 
frequency 
users   
High 
frequency 
users   
Top 
10 
users   
Word Count Count 
Average 
per user Count 
average 
per user Count 
Average 
per user Count 
Average 
per user 
                    
EDL 126 2879 0.70 2467 0.61 412 12.48 190 19 
Muslim 44 2172 0.53 1792 0.44 380 11.52 138 13.8 
Islam 37 1281 0.31 1084 0.27 197 5.97 55 5.5 
People 24 2020 0.49 1641 0.40 379 11.48 188 18.8 
Country 26 1883 0.46 1692 0.42 191 5.79 86 8.6 
British 35 810 0.20 729 0.18 0 0.00 0 0 
Tommy 29 807 0.20 712 0.18 95 2.88 0 0 
Demo’s 29 611 0.15 477 0.12 134 4.06 80 8 
Table 31: Common word usage 
However, when one moves beyond just examining the average use of these words per 
user and considers the representation of each user group in the total set of secondary 
users, this increase in average usage becomes more interesting. 
As shown in the chart below, the percentage of usage of the low frequency users, 
who make up 99.2% of all users, does not reflect the power of having more members 
within this cohort.  In every category the percentage of usage of the most commonly 
used words does not equal the percentage of users within the cohort.  Conversely, the 
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percentage of use by the high and highest frequency users is many times greater than 
the numbers they represent within the entire cohort of users. 
 
All 
Secondary Posts 
Low frequency users 
(99.2% of users) 
High frequency users 
(0.81% of users) 
Top 10 users 
(0.25% of users) 
Word Frequency Frequency 
percentage 
of use Frequency 
percentage 
of use Frequency 
percentage 
of use 
EDL 2879 2467 85.7% 412 14.3% 190 6.6% 
Muslim 2172 1792 82.5% 380 17.5% 138 6.4% 
Islam 1281 1084 84.6% 197 15.4% 55 4.3% 
People 2020 1641 81.2% 379 18.8% 188 9.3% 
Country 1883 1692 89.9% 191 10.1% 86 4.6% 
British 810 729 90.0% 81 10.0% 23 2.8% 
Tommy 807 712 88.2% 95 11.8% 27 3.4% 
Demo’s 611 477 78.1% 134 21.9% 80 13.1% 
Table 32: Users vs. usages 
While the high frequency users account for less than one percent (.81%) of all 
users, they account for 14.3% of the use of the phrase EDL, 17.5% of the word 
Muslim, and 21.9% of the usage for Demo’s.  Even more impressive is impact of the 
top ten users.  Making up only one quarter of one percent of the users (10/4098), these 
users account for 6.6% of the use of the phrase EDL, 6.4% of the word Muslim, and 
13.1% of the usage for Demo’s.  As can be seen in Table 32, this high percentage of 
word usage in relation to the size of the high frequency and top ten cohorts is 
consistent down the list of commonly used words.   
Membership vs. Participation 
Continuing with the discussion from the previous chapter of what really 
constitutes membership as it relates to someone ‘liking’ a Facebook page, it is 
important to understand just how powerful or weak the relationship is between 
‘liking’ as it relates to the individual members willingness to participate in the online 
dialog of the group.  Membership, as discussed in the literature review, does not 
necessarily and quite often does not equal identification to the level of active 
participation (Berger & Strathearn, 2013; Hampton et al.,  2012; Wu et al., 2011).  To 
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understand how membership relates to participation within the EDL Facebook group, 
what was needed first was to understand how many individual users actually posted to 
the EDL page during the collection period and compare that to the average number of 
members during the collection period.  As stated previously the average number of 
members during the collection period was 75,000.  To determine the total number of 
users who actually took the time to post to the page during the collection period the 
list of authors who generated the 19,312 posts during the collection period was 
analyzed using SPSS to identify duplicate cases.  From this analysis it was found that 
the 19,312 posts were generated by 4,099 discrete users or 5.46% of the members, 
with 15,213 duplicate cases (Table 33) 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Duplicate Case 15213 78.8 78.8 78.8 
Primary Case 4099 21.2 21.2 100.0 
Total 19312 100.0 100.0  
                Table 33: Number of users 
Therefore, what is revealed is that out of the 75,000 likes/members of the EDL 
Facebook page only 4,099, or 5.46% of the “members”, participated in the online 
dialog accounting for 21.2 percent of the overall first time traffic during the collection 
period.  The remaining 78.8 percent of the traffic was generated by repeat postings to 
the page by those within this 4099 cohort. This is significant given the messaging 
from the administrators regarding the importance of the growing number of members 
on Facebook and the characterization of those members as a cohesive unit.  This 
analysis would support the hypothesis that ‘liking’ a page does not necessarily equal 
adherence to the group ideology to the point of overcoming the obstacles to actually  
engaging in activism even when that participation is as easy as ‘typing’ a post onto a 
Facebook page.  What is most significant about this finding is that it goes beyond the 
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anecdotal discussion of the power of the individual participants engaged in social 
media and provides a statistical understanding of the true nature of participation.   
However, simply stating that the number of actual participants is significantly less 
than the number of members, as indicated by the number of likes, presumes that these 
active users participated at equal levels.  Given what is known about how individuals 
participate at different levels for a variety of reasons, it is only prudent that further 
analysis of these active users be done to further examine user frequency as well as 
factors that might influence participation.  
Identifying “True Believers” 
When examining the collection of EDL posts taken from February 5 through 
March 28 2010, it is easy to be impressed by the volume of traffic, 19,312 posts; and 
while it is a small percentage of the “membership, even the 4,099 users who took the 
time to post to the page during this period seem to have generated a lot of traffic. On 
the surface the social media phenomenon, particularly in the case of the EDL, looks 
successful in attracting membership and creating a cadre of “believers” to the cause.  
But this does not tell the whole story as it relates to the ability of social media to 
promote activist participation.  To determine the true effectiveness of this 
phenomenon the user/author data was further analyzed to examine the frequency of 
each user’s participation within the collection period.  The results of this analysis 
(Table 34) showed that User 208096, who was the administrator for the group, had the 
highest number of posts at 483 or 2.5% of the total number of posts.  Of these, 239 
were the primary posts for the group and the remaining 244 were secondary 
posts/comments.  This was followed by User 160797 with 348 posts accounting for 
1.8% and then User 19460 with 255 posts for 1.3%.  Overall the top ten users in the 
frequency analysis, as shown below, accounted for 9.8% of the traffic.  This is 
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significant given that these top ten users represent 0.25% of the overall users who 
posted to the EDL Facebook page, and only .0133% of the members/likes.   
              USERS Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 208096 483 2.5 2.5 2.5 
160797 348 1.8 1.8 4.3 
19460 255 1.3 1.3 5.6 
30079 198 1.0 1.0 6.6 
30786 124 .6 .6 7.3 
24304 110 .6 .6 7.9 
159446 103 .5 .5 8.4 
29484 91 .5 .5 8.9 
46389 91 .5 .5 9.3 
43519 85 .4 .4 9.8 
45787 82 .4 .4 10.2 
31969 77 .4 .4 10.6 
63721 75 .4 .4 11.0 
53823 72 .4 .4 11.4 
130319 71 .4 .4 11.7 
74186 68 .4 .4 12.1 
30723 67 .3 .3 12.4 
39746 65 .3 .3 12.8 
96803 63 .3 .3 13.1 
47621 62 .3 .3 13.4 
64162 62 .3 .3 13.7 
17948 61 .3 .3 14.0 
118881 58 .3 .3 14.3 
99701 57 .3 .3 14.6 
109172 56 .3 .3 14.9 
54313 55 .3 .3 15.2 
37534 54 .3 .3 15.5 
45871 53 .3 .3 15.8 
78099 53 .3 .3 16.0 
212443 52 .3 .3 16.3 
63378 51 .3 .3 16.6 
65093 50 .3 .3 16.8 
130046 45 .2 .2 17.1 
30450 44 .2 .2 17.3 
Table 34: High frequency users 
  
As you can see, the user frequency begins to drop off rather quickly and continues 
to the point where you find than the average user frequency drops off to an average of 
less than once per day during the forty five day collection period after the thirty-third 
user.  What is significant is that these thirty three users represent less than 1% (.0081) 
of those users who posted to the EDL Facebook page, but they generated 3,297 
secondary posts/comments for a total of 17.3% of the overall member traffic.  But this 
is only a very small part of the overall picture.  When considering this rapid decrease 
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in user frequency with so many users yet to make up the remaining 92.7% of the 
traffic, it is necessary to examine the user frequency from the perspective of how 
many of the remaining users posted any given number of times.  This analysis 
required that the entire user analysis seen partially above be copied into a separate 
dataset and a frequency analysis be performed on the ‘frequency variable’ to 
determine how many users posted any given number of times.  These results, as seen 
below, are very revealing.   
Examining the frequency of postings shows that of the 4099 users (including the 
administrator in Table 35), 1,683 or fully 40% of the users only posted once to the 
EDL Facebook page during the 45 day collection period, accounting for 8.5% of the 
overall traffic; 752 users or 18.3% posted at least twice; and 420 or 10.2% of the users 
posted three times during the 45 day collection period.  Cumulatively, the 2,810  users 
that posted three or fewer times make up 68.6 percent of the users with 22.8% of all 
postings, and those who posted ten times or less accounted for 6.84% or 9,783 posts 
submitted by 3,720 (90.8%) of the users who posted to the EDL Facebook page 
during the collection period.  The obverse side of the traffic coin shows a very 
different pattern.    
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Frequency 
of  Postings 
Number 
of users 
Percent 
of users 
Valid 
Percent 
of users 
Cum. %  
of users 
1 1638 40.0 40.0 40.0 
2 752 18.3 18.3 58.3 
3 420 10.2 10.2 68.6 
4 287 7.0 7.0 75.6 
5 189 4.6 4.6 80.2 
6 138 3.4 3.4 83.5 
7 94 2.3 2.3 85.8 
8 76 1.9 1.9 87.7 
9 66 1.6 1.6 89.3 
10 60 1.5 1.5 90.8 
11 48 1.2 1.2 91.9 
12 37 .9 .9 92.8 
14 37 .9 .9 93.7 
13 30 .7 .7 94.5 
16 25 .6 .6 95.1 
17 23 .6 .6 95.6 
18 20 .5 .5 96.1 
15 16 .4 .4 96.5 
19 11 .3 .3 96.8 
20 9 .2 .2 97.0 
23 9 .2 .2 97.2 
21 8 .2 .2 97.4 
25 8 .2 .2 97.6 
32 8 .2 .2 97.8 
22 7 .2 .2 98.0 
24 6 .1 .1 98.1 
34 6 .1 .1 98.3 
26 4 .1 .1 98.4 
27 4 .1 .1 98.5 
28 4 .1 .1 98.6 
31 4 .1 .1 98.7 
33 4 .1 .1 98.8 
40 4 .1 .1 98.9 
30 3 .1 .1 98.9 
39 3 .1 .1 99.0 
29 2 .0 .0 99.0 
35 2 .0 .0 99.1 
42 2 .0 .0 99.1 
53 2 .0 .0 99.2 
62 2 .0 .0 99.2 
Frequency 
of  Postings 
Number 
of users 
Percent 
of users 
Valid 
Percent 
of users 
Cum. %  
of users 
91 2 .0 .0 99.3 
103 1 .0 .0 99.3 
110 1 .0 .0 99.3 
124 1 .0 .0 99.4 
198 1 .0 .0 99.4 
255 1 .0 .0 99.4 
348 1 .0 .0 99.4 
36 1 .0 .0 99.5 
44 1 .0 .0 99.5 
45 1 .0 .0 99.5 
483 1 .0 .0 99.5 
50 1 .0 .0 99.6 
51 1 .0 .0 99.6 
52 1 .0 .0 99.6 
54 1 .0 .0 99.6 
55 1 .0 .0 99.7 
56 1 .0 .0 99.7 
57 1 .0 .0 99.7 
58 1 .0 .0 99.7 
61 1 .0 .0 99.8 
63 1 .0 .0 99.8 
65 1 .0 .0 99.8 
67 1 .0 .0 99.8 
68 1 .0 .0 99.9 
71 1 .0 .0 99.9 
72 1 .0 .0 99.9 
75 1 .0 .0 99.9 
77 1 .0 .0 100.0 
82 1 .0 .0 100.0 
85 1 .0 .0 100.0 
TOTAL 4099 100.0 100.0   
Table 35: Posting frequency with number of 
users
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The findings from this analysis are truly staggering when considering the 
expectations of the power of social media as a vehicle for social change and mass 
mobilization.  The results show that the EDL traffic is made up primarily of very 
infrequent users during the collection period.  The visualization of user frequency is 
facilitated by the creation of a graph which displays the value of each user’s 
frequency.  As seen in Figure 9, the frequency curve drops off severely in keeping 
with the frequencies seen in the previous chart.    
Figure 9: User frequency graph 
 
The high number of low frequency users, as seen above, supports the hypothesis 
that while there is considerable traffic associated with the EDL Facebook page during 
the collection period, that traffic does not represent a growing cadre of “true 
believers” who support the EDL in any way beyond casually liking the page.  Further, 
it shows that the impact of the small percentage of “members” who chose to post to 
the page and generate the majority of the 19,312 posts that make up the collection is 
not what it appears.  What it does show is a very small group of high frequency users 
who are responsible for generating a considerable portion of the traffic.  This 
253 
realization, coupled with the findings of the disproportionate frequency of word usage 
by the small cohort of high frequency users, demonstrates that the message and the 
image of the EDL was being driven by only a few users, and that this group depended 
on the tacit association of the much larger cohort of low frequency users to create the 
perception of a group much more widely accepted and powerful than they really 
were/are.  This is further reinforced by the fact that only 4099 users took the time to 
post to the page out of the 75,000 (+/-) members, meaning that over 70,000 of those 
who took the time to ‘like’ the EDL Facebook page as a way of showing solidarity 
with the group, were not actively involved in any way within the online dialog of the 
group.  Yet, during this period of rapid growth, the leadership of the EDL was eager 
to point to the number of ‘likes’ as a unit of measure indicating the power and growth 
of the group. 
EDL Post Hack Collection 
On 22 July 2011, due to the previously mentioned attack on the EDL Facebook 
page by the Z Company Hacking Crew (ZHC), the EDL was forced to open a new 
Facebook Page.  Following this devastating hack, the group struggled to rebuild and 
continues to this day to work to rise to the level they had previously.  As of 21 May 
2013, the new EDL page had only been able to recover 21,628 of the nearly 100,000 
“members” as reflected in the number of likes that appear on the post-hack EDL 
Facebook page.  It was determined that it might be interesting to consider the impact 
of this hack on the group following this project.  Therefore, collection of data on the 
new page began on 22 July 2011 and was terminated on 5 November 2011 with the 
same protocols as used previously.  The raw data was parsed using the latest version 
of the parser (V7.0) and the parsed tab-delimited file was placed into Excel then 
imported into SPSS for preliminary analysis. 
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The findings from the preliminary analysis of the Post-hack EDL data are very 
interesting.  The number of “members” during the collection period went from a few 
hundred at the start of the new page to just over 13,000 by the end of the collection 
period.  Even the latest figure represents a loss of 77% of the previous “members” as 
reflected in the number of likes to the page.  The traffic during the 107 day collection 
period consists of 28,213 total posts made up of 763 primary posts and 27,450 
secondary posts.  The total number of users, including the administrator was 3,997 
users.  This is significant as the number of actual users who participated in the online 
dialog is significantly higher as a percentage of members as was seen in the original 
EDL dataset.  This could be viewed as a function of only the most devoted members 
having returned to the group following the Breivik attack and the ZHC hack, but this 
is only conjecture as it should be expected that some users would have changed their 
user name following the event.  Given that user information was being posted by the 
ZHC, and law enforcement was scrutinizing the EDL heavily following the Breivik 
attack, changing ones user name seems a reasonable if not prudent response. 
An examination of the high frequency users from the pre and post hack EDL 
pages provides some illumination of the effect the hack had on “power user” traffic.  
By segregating the high frequency users from the two pages into a separate data set 
and placing the user ID numbers into Excel, it was possible to utilize the “find” 
function to determine the correlation between the two sets of high frequency users.  
As seen below, the EDL post-hack high frequency traffic analysis shows many “new 
members” that were not found in the original data set.  The term “new member” is so 
identified as it is impossible to determine if these are in fact new members or old 
members who have simply changed their user names without engaging in more 
detailed data mining which would most certainly violate the Data Protection Act.   
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High Frequency Number of    Number of postings 
post hack Users postings   in Original dataset 
 *59213 743   0 
192416 555   0 
56112 207   13 
153104 177   0 
30555 171   20 
47866 167   6 
53823 ** 131   72 ** 
38878 130   4 
30576 127   1 
39312 120   7 
30758 119   0 
54180 114   0 
54215 112   11 
37163 110   0 
108836 110   0 
37534 ** 107   54 ** 
* Administrator       
**Appeared in HF User list in Original 
data       
Table 36: Post-hack high frequency users 
As can be seen in the chart above (Table 36), out of the sixteen high frequency 
users in the post hack data set who posted at least once per day in the 107 day 
collection period, only two users (Users 37534 and 53823) appeared in the original 
list of thirty three high frequency users.  Also, seven (44%) of the new high frequency 
user numbers do not appear at all within the original high frequency user list.  Of note 
are the users who were low frequency users in the original collection who became 
high frequency users in the post hack collection.  For example, user 30576’s 
participation increased from once during the original collection period to 127 times in 
the post hack collection.  This phenomenon of increased participation is repeated for 
each user whose number appeared in the original data. 
Examining the original list of high frequency users provides further enlightenment 
into the comparison of the two collections.  The chart in Table 37 includes the list of 
high frequency users from the original forty five day collection period.  Immediately, 
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one can see that that the administrator (user 208096) does not appear in the post hack 
collection, which is a reflection of the post hack administrator (user 59213) not 
appearing in the original data collection.  Unless the administrator of the group 
actually changed following the ZHC hack, it clearly indicates that the user name of 
the administrator was changed in some way.  Of the original thirty three high 
frequency users, nine user numbers (28%) do not appear within the post hack 
collection.  Further, with the exception of users  53823 and 37534 (6% of original 
high frequency users), none of the other users within the original high frequency 
group appear as high frequency users within the post hack data.  Clearly, while some 
of the original high frequency users continued to engage (e.g. 30786, 45787, 30723, 
and 63378), only one user who does not appear as a high frequency user in the post 
hack data actually increased his/her participation.  User 65093 posted fifty times in 
the original set, but increased participation during the post hack collection to ninety 
one posts.  With the exception of these three users (53823, 37534, 65093), the 
remaining thirty high frequency users from the original data set either do not appear in 
the post hack data or significantly reduced their level of participation.  In keeping 
with the research design, it was not possible to examine the actual user name for 
comparison without examining the raw data, which would certainly have been a 
violation of the Data Protection Act.  However, it would be interesting to determine if 
these missing users simply changed their user names or decided to disassociate 
themselves with the group all together. 
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High Frequency users Number of  Number of postings 
Original Data postings Post Hack Data 
* 208096 483 0 
160797 348 0 
19460 255 6 
30079 198 0 
30786 124 67 
24304 110 16 
159446 103 20 
29484 91 8 
46389 91 6 
43519 85 5 
45787 82 68 
31969 77 0 
63721 75 60 
53823** 72 131** 
130319 71 1 
74186 68 0 
30723 67 47 
39746 65 0 
96803 63 6 
47621 62 47 
64162 62 4 
17948 61 0 
118881 58 0 
99701 57 38 
109172 56 0 
54313 55 2 
37534 54 107 ** 
45871 53 39 
78099 53 0 
212443 52 1 
63378 51 47 
65093 50 91 
130046 45 8 
30450 44 24 
* Administrator      
**Appear as HF users in post hack 
 
  
Table 37: Pre vs. post hack high frequency user analysis 
To consider the number of user numbers that appeared within both groups it was 
necessary to isolate the user ID numbers from each, combine them into one variable, 
and then run the “identify duplicate cases” function in SPSS.  The result from this 
analysis, as seen in Table 38, is that when the list of 4,098 user numbers (excluding 
the administrator) in the original group is added to the list of 3,997 user numbers from 
the post-hack collection, the combined 8,095 user numbers contain 1,775 duplicate 
cases.   
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Duplicate Case 1775 21.9 21.9 21.9 
Primary Case 6320 78.1 78.1 100 
Total 8095 100 100 
 Table 38: Combined EDL pre/post hack search for duplicate users 
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Therefore, within the post-hack group, 1,775 user numbers also appear in the original 
collection data, and there are 2,222 new user ID numbers.  Again, it is not possible to 
determine whether these are previous users who simply changed their user name, or 
actual new users without violating the conditions of the research design and the Data 
Protection Act. 
Post Hack User Participation 
As with the original collection data, the analysis of the post hack collection shows 
that there are a small number of high frequency users.  As we saw in the original 
collection, the 4099 users who participated in the dialog contained thirty three high 
frequency users who posted at least once per day during the collection period.  Using 
these same criteria, the post hack collection, which spans 107 days, contains only 
sixteen high frequency users (Table 39).  As compared to the original high frequency 
users who comprised 0.81% of the users yet accounted for 17.3% of the traffic, the 
sixteen post hack high frequency users seen below make up only 0.40% of all users 
and are responsible for 3200 of the 28,213 posts or 11.3% of all traffic.   
User Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
59213 743 2.6 2.6 
192416 555 2 4.6 
56112 207 0.7 5.3 
153104 177 0.6 6 
30555 171 0.6 6.6 
47866 167 0.6 7.2 
53823 131 0.5 7.6 
38878 130 0.5 8.1 
30576 127 0.5 8.5 
39312 120 0.4 9 
30758 119 0.4 9.4 
54180 114 0.4 9.8 
54215 112 0.4 10.2 
37163 110 0.4 10.6 
108836 110 0.4 11 
37534 107 0.4 11.3 
Table 39: EDL post-hack high frequency users 
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Post Hack User Frequency 
The user participation pattern of the post hack EDL Facebook group is much the 
same as was seen in the original collection group; a small number of high frequency 
users and many lower frequency users.  While the percentages found in the post hack 
group are slightly less, the user frequency is still very similar to that of the original 
collection data. 
# of postings # of Users Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 1304 32.6 32.6 
2 596 14.9 47.5 
3 392 9.8 57.3 
4 320 8 65.3 
5 222 5.6 70.9 
6 156 3.9 74.8 
7 147 3.7 78.5 
8 76 1.9 80.4 
9 78 2 82.3 
10 78 2 84.3 
11 60 1.5 85.8 
12 55 1.4 87.2 
13 37 0.9 88.1 
14 42 1.1 89.1 
15 32 0.8 89.9 
16 40 1 90.9 
17 22 0.6 91.5 
18 35 0.9 92.4 
19 27 0.7 93 
20 17 0.4 93.5 
21 8 0.2 93.7 
22 17 0.4 94.1 
23 13 0.3 94.4 
24 21 0.5 94.9 
25 10 0.3 95.2 
Table 40: Post hack frequency analysis (low frequency users to 95%) 
 
As seen in the Table 40, 1304 users, or 32.6 percent of the users only posted once 
to the post hack EDL Facebook page  accounting for 4.61% of all post hack traffic, as 
compared to 40% of the users in the original data set who posted once making up 
8.5% of all traffic.     
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Frequency 
comparison 
Number of 
Users User % of Number of Users    % of  
Number of postings 
original 
data percent Traffic  post hack  percent  Traffic 
Once 1683 40.00% 8.5% 1304 32.60% 4.60% 
Twice 752 18.30%   596 14.90%   
Three times 420 10.20%   392 9.80%   
              
Three times or less 2810 68.60% 22.80% 2292 57.40% 13.00% 
              
Ten times or less 3720 90.80% 50.70% 3369 84.30% 35.90% 
Table 41: EDL pre/post hack low frequency user analysis 
Table 41 provides the results of a comparative analysis of the impact the very 
lowest frequency users in the post hack group had on the overall traffic as compared 
to the users in the original EDL Facebook collection.  As you can see, the percentages 
of low frequency users as well as the percentage of traffic generated by those lowest 
frequency users is significantly less in the post hack EDL group than was found in the 
original collection.   
Figure 10: EDL post hack user frequency graph 
 
Even though the percentages vary from one data set to the other, it is important to 
note that the user frequency graph in Figure 10 appears to be very similar to the 
original user frequency graph.  The sharp decline in user frequency seen above, in the 
post hack EDL traffic, is nearly identical to that seen in the original data set.  It would 
be interesting to perform a more detailed comparative analysis of these two data sets 
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including analysis of URL’s, and the various categories of posts as described in the 
previous chapter.   
Conclusion 
The opportunity to collect, segregate, and analyze the Facebook traffic of the 
English Defence League has, in the end, provided much more understanding than was 
first expected.  Initially, there the effort was undertaken simply to see if it was 
possible to perform these tasks in a meaningful way.  Then, as the research evolved, 
the ability to gain deeper insight into the EDL, the characteristics of the group and 
their use of Facebook became possible.  As seen in the data analysis presented herein, 
the characteristics of the EDL Facebook traffic have provided some interesting 
findings.   
First, it was shown that while the pro-EDL primary posts were presented at over 
twice the frequency as the anti-Muslim posts (153:68), and the aggregate number of 
posts per category were again nearly twice as many for the pro-EDL as for anti-
Muslim (11,590:5,941), it was shown that the anti-Muslim posts generated more 
comments per post from the members with the average number of comments per anti-
Muslim post reaching 87.37 while the pro-EDL posts only generated 75.75 comments 
per post.   
Second, the presence of the URL links within the primary posts and comments 
provided insight into the types of links that were being provided by not only the 
administrator but also within the comments of the users/members.  Of note was the 
fact that while the number pro-EDL administrator posts were nearly double those of 
the anti-Muslim posts, the URL’s contained within the administrator posts were 
nearly evenly divided with 118 pro-EDL links and 108 anti-Muslims links.  The 
number of comments per URL post is also very close with the pro-EDL links 
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generating 71.47 comments per URL post and the anti-Muslim URL posts generating 
69.79 comments per post.   The analysis of the URL’s found within the primary and 
secondary posts showed there was a high percentage of YouTube video links within 
the URL collection with 96 YouTube links found in the 288 posts/comments that 
containing a link.  This represents 34% of all URL links contained within the dataset.  
Further, within the primary posts, YouTube links were found in 24 of the 51 links, for 
a total of 47%, of all URL posts provided by the administrator. 
Next, supporting and adding to the findings from previous chapter where the 
actual dialog of the EDL members was examined, an NVivo search for the most 
frequently used words provided insight into the use of these key words by the 
administrator and the users.  As was seen, the use of these key words by the high 
frequency users was disproportionate to the usage by the low frequency users.  This 
finding provides a base from which further research can be done to consider the 
influence of the administrator driven narrative on the user and how the user might 
adapt this narrative over time and whether the use of key words/phrases by the 
member is an indication of an acceptance of the group narrative.  While this study, as 
a result of the Data Protection Act does not allow for the assessment of each user use 
of these key words, future collection and analysis might prove fruitful in this area. 
Fourth, examination of the pre and post hack collections showed that external 
events did have an influence on the activity of the EDL Facebook page.  The overall 
loss of membership was significant as was the change in traffic patterns.  Many of the 
high frequency users from the pre-hack collection no longer appeared as high 
frequency users in the post hack collection, and some low frequency users were 
somehow driven to increase their participation and became high frequency users in 
the post-hack group.  It is also telling that out of the 3,997 users in the post-hack 
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group, only 1,775 or 45% were found in the pre-hack user list.  As stated previously, 
it is impossible given the constraints of this study to determine if any of these “new 
users” are simply old users who have changed their user names, but even if this is the 
case, the fact that such a change was considered necessary is significant.  Further, the 
impact of the murder of Lee Rigby had the opposite effect with membership 
exploding.  While data collection was not performed other that the increase in 
membership as noted earlier, it is clear that externalities do play a role in social media 
membership and traffic. 
Finally, this study showed that membership in the EDL Facebook page should not 
be viewed as an indicator of the power of this social media outlet.  It was shown that 
out of the average 75,000 ‘members’ that liked the EDL page, only 4,099 users took 
the time to post anything to the page.  Further, it was shown that the activity among 
these 4,099 active users was in no way equally distributed with 40% of the users only 
posting once to the page, never to return within the 45 day collection period and only 
a very small number of users (33) participating at a high rate.   As a result of the 
frequency analysis performed on this collection, the myth associated with the growth 
and power of EDL Facebook page has been debunked.   
As in the movie The Wizard of Oz, the curtain is now drawn back on the EDL.   
As with the Great and Powerful Oz, whose public image as a larger than life 
apparition that had supernatural powers, the EDL wished to be seen as a far reaching 
and powerful grass roots Anti-Muslim anti-immigration movement in the United 
Kingdom that was experiencing phenomenal growth within the collection period.  
However, after drawing back the curtain, the perceived size of the EDL membership 
and the large amount of traffic that was generated on their Facebook page during the 
collection period, is now seen for what it is.  Just like the exposed Wizard of Oz, the 
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illusion of a growing nationwide movement called the English Defence League can 
now be seen metaphorically as nothing more than a small man pushing buttons and 
pulling levers in an attempt to exert influence and power where there really was and is 
none.   
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Additional Support 
Throughout this research project the goal has been to build understanding about 
the English Defence League and their use of Facebook as the primary mode of 
communication within the group.  Additionally, other areas were examined to 
consider the history, leadership, and organizational structure of the group; how 
traditional media covered and characterized the EDL; and whether the comments 
contained within the Facebook traffic were more in line with the media 
characterizations or with the lofty rhetoric of the EDL Mission Statement.  These 
investigations showed that the English Defence League and its leadership do have 
previous connections to far-right groups and that the characterizations in traditional 
print media have sought to perpetuate this image, even after the EDL sought to reject 
all ties to far-right/neo-Nazi extremists.  Examination of the content of the Facebook 
traffic, as presented in Chapter Five, supports in many ways the media claims that the 
EDL is not a human rights group supporting democratic values and inclusiveness.  
The frequency of what could be considered ‘hate speech’, and the fact that these 
comments were not deleted by the administrator and the users who posted these 
comments were not sanctioned or removed from the group supports the perception 
that these comments are a reflection of the broader anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant 
narrative that exists within the EDL.  With all their claims of being against extremist 
Islam, the dialog within the Facebook group suggests there are many members who 
hold far-right extremist views within the EDL.  While these findings were, in 
themselves interesting, the more significant findings came about as a result of the 
quantitative analysis of the EDL Facebook dataset. 
Over the last several years there has been much speculation regarding the 
characteristics of participation in extremist/terrorist social media environments and 
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whether it represents an existential threat to national security.  It has even been 
suggested that visiting such a site for the first time put the user on the track to 
radicalization (Weimann, 2006).  Further, governments have considered the threat of 
this type of activity within online environments to be “too big” to tackle given the 
vast amount of data to be collected and analyzed.  The sheer volume of membership 
in these online environments brought forward concerns about being able to analyze 
this vast amount of data and creating the storage capacity needed to save “evidence.”  
The research on the EDL Facebook page and the findings contained herein offer some 
tangible answers to what were previously either unanswered questions or 
unsubstantiated speculation. 
The findings of this research provide the understanding that the membership 
number, as a reflection of ‘likes’ is not an accurate representation of the body of users 
who actually take the time to participate in the online dialog.  The EDL membership, 
during the collection period rose to over 80,000 yet only 4099 users actually took the 
time to post to the EDL Facebook page.  Using the average of 75,000 users during the 
collection period, the 4099 users who decided to participate in the EDL dialog 
represent less than 6.0% of all users.  Yet even with this number of users who decided 
to engage, the data analysis shows it would be difficult to make a generalized 
statement that this participation would lead to some sort of radicalization toward or 
identification with the EDL narrative (Bartlett & Littler, 2011).  When one considers 
that 40% of all users only posted once to the EDL Facebook page, it would be very 
difficult indeed to consider these individuals as being ‘true believers.’  As we see 
from the data, the body of individuals who could be considered to be fully engaged, as 
a function of their daily participation, is indeed quite small.  If the metric for fully 
engaged participation is an average of one post per day during the collection period, 
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we now know that this cohort is made up of only 0.81% of the active users or 33 
individual users.  Even if this metric is extended to an average of once every other 
day, or at least 23 posts during the collection period, the cohort is only expanded to 49 
individual users or 1.2% of all users.  Clearly, the majority of the traffic generated 
during the collection period seems to have been posted by casual users who cannot be 
considered, based on their participation, ‘true believers’.  This assessment is 
reinforced by the understanding that the small percentage of high volume users 
(0.81% of participants) generated a disproportionate amount of traffic (17.1%) during 
the collection period.  This assessment is reinforced by the content analysis conducted 
in relation to the use of key words by the administrator and how this was reflected in 
the dialog of the users. 
As seen in the key word analysis of the content, this same group of thirty three 
high frequency users, representing 0.81% of all active users, accounted for between 
10.0%-18.8% of the use of these most frequently used words by the administrator.  
This disproportionate use of these high frequency words can be considered as 
representing an identification with and acceptance of the extremist narrative of the 
English Defence League.   
While the use of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by the administrator did not 
represent a majority presence in the primary posts, the amount of traffic they 
generated and the ability to categorize and examine these links proved fruitful.  First, 
it was interesting to note how the increase in URL linked traffic corresponded closely 
with the spikes in overall traffic within the data set.  Second, the number of URL links 
that were devoted to characterizing and reporting negative stories on the Muslim 
“other” or “foreign devil” were, in the aggregate, fully 36.0% of all links contained 
within the primary posts.  That these 19 primary posts, representing 8.0% of all 
269 
primary posts, generated over 1326 secondary posts/comments by the users, and 
accounted for 7.0% of all traffic is of great interest.  It will be interesting, in the 
future, to consider how many of the high frequency users were engaged in this 
negative identity development.  The remaining URL links, associated broadly with 
forwarding the identity of the EDL were not only more numerous, but seemed to be 
more impactful on the dialog. 
Of the fifty-one primary posts that contained URL links, twenty eight included 
pro-EDL URL links.  These twenty eight posts represent 11.8% of all the primary 
posts and they generated 2001 secondary posts/comments which represents 11% of all 
secondary posts/comments.  That these pro-EDL URL linked posts generate 51% 
more traffic than the anti-Muslim URL linked posts shows the pro-EDL linked 
message resonated more strongly with the body of active users.  However, the overall 
body of primary posts reveals a slightly different picture.  As seen in the analysis, of 
the 239 primary posts, 153 were pro-EDL, 68 were anti-Muslim, and 18 were related 
to other topics.  And while the traffic generated by the pro-EDL posts far exceeded 
that of the anti-Muslim posts (11590:5941), the average number of comments per post 
were over ten points higher for anti-Muslim posts.  That the body of primary posts 
that were focused on anti-Muslim issues generated such a large volume of traffic 
again speaks to the effectiveness in creating and perpetuating the idea of the Muslim 
“other.”  The creation of “the other” in online environments, particularly within social 
media is another area of interest for future exploration which will be of great value 
when considering how to counter the development of the us-vs.-them paradigm 
integral to any extremist/terrorist narrative (Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2004; Weimann, 
2006).  
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More generally, but no less interesting, is the frequency of the various root URL’s.    
Of the fifty-one URL’s found within the primary posts, there were twenty-four 
YouTube links which account for 47% of all links and 10.1% of all primary posts.  
Further, the YouTube videos contained within these twenty-four posts generated 1631 
user comments or 8.5% of all traffic.  The YouTube links found within the entire data 
set account for 33.4% of all links contained within the primary and secondary posts.  
Also of note are the eighty-seven Facebook links found within the collection and the 
links to various news outlets.  Within the Primary posts there were fourteen links to 
news sites making up 27% of the URL’s contained within the primary posts 
generating 1,261 comments and accounting for 35.5% of all URL generated 
comments and 6.6% of all user traffic.   
These and other findings were made possible as a result of the collection, 
segregation, and analysis efforts made as a part of this research.  The answers to the 
broader questions presented in the introduction are as follows: 
First, this research shows it is possible to conduct in-depth analysis of social 
media traffic in extremist online environments.  Often times, the reasoning for not 
engaging in this level of investigation was that the data was just too big and there 
were insufficient tools to collect and code the data in a way that might provide 
meaningful findings.  Second, this research effectively addressed the concerns 
regarding protecting the privacy of the individual user, particularly when informed 
consent was neither possible nor practical.   The inclusion of the one way cipher 
within the parsing package allowed for the anonymization of all users with 100% 
consistency, and a level of assurance that the individual user numbers could not be 
reverse engineered to determine the actual user name without considerable effort.  
Such a reverse engineering capability would typically only be available to a large 
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government intelligence agency.  This anonymization facilitated a more detailed 
analysis of the data since privacy concerns related to academic standards to protect 
the research subject and the Data Protection Act were mitigated.  While care was still 
taken to avoid the inclusion of actual user names in conjunction with specific content 
to prevent any inadvertent identification, being able to understand the individual 
participation rates using the discrete user number has proven invaluable.  The security 
of the users was further enhanced by the fact that, as a result of the ZHC hack, all 
Facebook data was lost when the page was shut down.  Finally, the raw dataset, which 
is the only known record of the EDL Facebook traffic during the initial collection 
period and during the hack, which contains the actual user names, will be destroyed 
following the completion and defence of this thesis. 
This research has sought to provide a deeper statistical understanding of the online 
phenomenon, examining more granular issues than what has previously been 
published within this field of study.  
 Simply visiting an extremist site or social media page was the beginning step 
to radicalization.  Now we know this is likely not true.  This is evidenced by 
the 94% of users within the EDL Facebook group that ‘liked’ the EDL page 
but chose to not post even once to the page, and further, that 40% of the users 
who actually took the time to participate in the online dialog only posted once 
during the 45 day collection period.   
 The assumption that liking a Facebook page was equal to active membership 
in the group is now shown to be inaccurate.  Again, less than 6% of all those 
who ‘liked’ the page took time to post within the 45 day collection period for 
the EDL. This is supported by findings from a study of Occupy Wall Street 
which will be reviewed herein. 
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 The groups were made up of thousands of active users who engaged in 
constant dialog within these environments has also been shown to be 
incorrect.  The analysis shows that while there were thousands of users who 
participated in the online dialog, the number of active users is significantly 
smaller than had been previously anticipated.  The number of users who 
participated on average once per day (33 users) represented 0.81% of all users 
who chose to participate by posting to the page.  The value of this 
participation is diminished even further when considered as a percentage of all 
“members.”  The 0.81% becomes 0.05% (0.0005) of the 75,000 “members”.   
 The use of Uniform Resource Locators is seen as a primary vehicle for 
projecting the group narrative.  This analysis does not provide a definitive 
answer to this question.  While the majority of the posts did not contain 
URL’s, they were found in 20% of the primary posts.  And while the 239 
primary posts generated on average 79.8 secondary comments per post, the 
anti-Muslim posts with URL’s averaged 72.47 comments per post, the pro-
EDL URL posts generated 77.34 posts per comment and the EDL propaganda 
URL posts averaged 90.75 comments per post, while all other URL categories 
generated far fewer comments per post.  The preponderance of YouTube 
videos within the URL collection is seen as significant and certainly an area 
deserving of future attention.    
There were, as a result of this research project, three important developments; 
first, was the ability to obtain permission from elements within the UK government to 
allow this research to move forward when it was thought the collection might 
potentially include terrorist material.  Second, was the development of the specialized 
software for the parsing and coding of this large dataset. And third, and certainly most 
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importantly, was the development of a statistically driven understanding of 
participation within this computer mediated communication.   
The development of the specialized software argues strongly for the consideration 
of interdisciplinary partnerships to facilitate greater understanding of new 
phenomenon that are beyond the capabilities of any one field of study.  That this post 
graduate project sought to engage in the collection of such a large body of data was a 
monumental task for a single researcher.  The success of the research was only made 
possible, with the limited human resources and time available, through the 
conceptualization and creation of the specialized parser to identify and code the 
desired content within the collection of EDL Facebook posts.  The functionality and 
reliability of such a tool far exceeds that of any human being.  Just considering the 
time it would have taken to code out each of the posts manually was reduced from 
many months to a mere forty seconds speaks not only to the time saving capabilities 
of such tools, but also to the ability for researchers to collect, code, and analyze data 
in a timely manner so they might present their findings while the issue is still relevant.  
Imagine the impact on any extremist/terrorist movement when it is revealed that they 
are not what they wish everyone to believe them to be.   That this process can now be 
completed in months instead of years makes it even more effective.  The software 
development has made possible the most important finding of the project; the 
realization of a quantitative determination regarding participation in this and other 
online environments.   
It is hoped the findings from this research will promote questions regarding  how 
and what we think about online participation and the effectiveness of social media as 
an avenue for the growth of grass-roots or extremist movements.  That less than 6% of 
the average number of users who claimed to be members of the group, by virtue of 
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liking the EDL Facebook page, actually took any time to post to the page shows the 
weakness of the vehicle.  Further, that such a small percentage of users (0.81%) were 
actively and regularly involved in the ongoing dialog reveals that the body of true 
believers within this online social network was infinitely smaller than the 
administrator was projecting and traditional media was reporting. As mentioned 
earlier, in the much cited study published by DEMOS, Bartlett and Littler (2011) 
state, “We estimate the total size of the active membership (in the EDL) to be between 
25,000-35,000 people (p. 4).”  It is important to note that this estimate is following the 
Anders Breivik attack in Oslo and the substantial setback as a result of the EDL 
Facebook page being hacked by the Z-Company Hacking Crew.  They found that 
“Much of the group’s discourse is online, and events are organized and advertised 
primarily through Facebook and the EDL’s own forum (Bartlett & Littler, 2011, p. 
14).”  They do go on however to point out that “The relationship between hardcore 
members, affiliates, and broader supporters is opaque (14).”  Following their own data 
collection on Facebook participation, Bartlett and Littler (2011) state that, “The high 
percentage of online activism illustrates how important the internet is to the group’s 
identity (p. 18).”  The new understanding, as a result of this project, will hopefully 
generate further research into how this participation and interaction might or might 
not facilitate the development of an online identity or narrative that could lead to 
radicalization toward and identification with an extremist/terrorist agenda.  Such 
understanding should be useful in government efforts to counter terrorism and/or 
violent extremism by separating the casual users within an extremist CMC 
environment from those who have the potential to become violent as a result of this 
identification phenomenon.  But the importance of these findings is also dependent on 
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determining whether the various findings as a result of this research are unique to the 
EDL or if they can be found in other groups as well.   
Examining Occupy Wall Street 
The nexus of traditional and new media 
One of the interesting findings from investigating the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, that offers an avenue for future investigation for the EDL, was a 
preliminary examination of the traffic generation in the first several weeks of the 
Occupy movement.  As the movement began in mid-August, they struggled to 
generate momentum within the larger audience.  This all changed on 1 October 2011.  
During the OWS occupation of and protest on the Brooklyn Bridge on 1 October 
2011, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) decided to show up in force and 
break up the protest.  In doing so, 700 protesters were arrested by the NYPD and the 
traditional media picked up the story as it was occurring and it became the top news 
story of the day (Image 37).   
 
Image 37: The arrest of 700 Occupy Wall Street protesters on 2 October 2011 
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The impact on the OWS Facebook page was immediate.  By the next day the 
traffic generation jumped considerably as did the membership numbers.  First, the 
number of primary posts by the administrator increased significantly.  Second, the  
number of secondary 
posts/comments per post went 
from dozens per day to several 
hundred per day per primary 
post (Figure 11). 
Third, and even more 
impressive, the number of likes 
per post rose from a few posts 
that received a moderate number of likes to many posts getting two thousand likes and 
some to nearly five thousand likes (Figure 12). 
During this same early collection 
period, it was found that of the 
342 primary posts 243 (71.1%) 
contained URL links.  The 
significance of this phenomenon 
is undetermined as this data has 
yet to be examined in the detail 
similar to that of the EDL data.  The Occupy Wall Street data does, however, bring to 
the forefront the question of just how important traditional media is to the potential 
growth of any movement that seeks to use new media as its primary venue for 
recruitment and mobilization.   
Figure 12: Frequency of likes, Occupy Wall Street, 
7/8-12/10/2011 
Figure 11: OWS comments per post 8 August-16 October 2011 
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Progressing through the fall and early winter of 2011 the Occupy Wall Street 
movement was gaining momentum and claiming to be a force for social and political 
change within the United States.  As with the EDL, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) made 
extensive use of Facebook for their communications with the members and for 
disseminating propaganda to facilitate recruitment and mobilization efforts.  During 
this period from 15 August to 15 November 2011, the entire body of administrator 
generated primary posts and affiliated secondary posts/comments on their Facebook 
page were collected in the same manner as was described previously with the EDL.  
Again, since Facebook had gone through some format changes since the original EDL 
traffic was collected, the V7.0 parser was used to account for these changes.  Using 
the V7.0 parser, the OWS raw data was parsed and the data set was created.   
 During the collection period, the average membership, as reflected in the 
number of likes for the group, was 250,000 +/- users.  The number of ‘members’ rose 
rapidly from August to mid-November to exceed 350,000 by the end of the collection 
period with the majority of the ‘likes’ taking place in the first sixty days of the 
collection period.  The data set, once parsed and placed into SPSS, was subjected to 
some of the same analysis as was the EDL data.  The preliminary findings are as 
follows: 
 The total number of posts within the data set was 80,003 primary and 
secondary posts (Table 42). 
 These posts were generated by 12,793 different users (Table 42). 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Duplicate Case 67210 84.0 84.0 84.0 
Primary Case 12793 16.0 16.0 100.0 
Total 80003 100.0 100.0  
Table 42: Occupy Wall Street Post Analysis 
 The percentage of active users as it relates to the number of ‘members’ is 
5.0%. The EDL active users represented 5.56% of the ‘membership’. 
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 There were 594 primary posts by the administrator and 79,409 secondary 
posts/comments from the users.   
 Within this traffic there were 3,567 posts (4.5% of the total) with URL links 
within the text.  Of these 43 (1.2% of those posts with links) were provided by 
the administrator, and 3524 (98.8% of those posts with links) were included in 
the secondary posts/comments. 
 The frequency graph for the Occupy Wall Street data, as seen in Figure 13, is 
almost identical to that seen with the original EDL data and the post hack EDL 
data. 
Figure 13: Occupy Wall Street User Frequency Graph 
 
 There were 4300 users who only posted once to the page accounting for 
33.6% of all active users and 5.4% of the overall traffic. 
 Of the 12,795 users, 11,515 or 90% posted 14 times or fewer and 
accounted for 50.5% of all traffic.   
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 The number of high frequency users that posted on an average of once per 
day during the 90 day collection period was forty-four.  They represented 
0.4% of the users and accounted for 9.1% of the overall traffic of the group 
 The top ten users represented 0.08% of the 12,793 users and accounted for 
4.2% of the overall traffic. 
Recent articles on social media participation provide some support for these 
findings, although even the findings presented regarding Twitter and Facebook 
participation rates are considerably higher than what was seen with the EDL and 
OWS (Barnett 2011; Barnett, 2012). 
The Pareto Principle 
The Pareto Principle, was put forth by Vilfredo Pareto, and dates back to 1906 
(Matties, 2012).  More commonly known as the 80/20 rule, Pareto described land 
ownership/wealth in Italy at the turn of the 20
th
 century, where 80% of the land was 
owned by 20% of the population.  More recently it has become a “rule of thumb” in 
various aspects of business whereby it is postulated that 80% of the work is done by 
20% of the workers, 80% of a business’s revenue comes from 20% of its customers, 
and 80% of the profit comes from 20% of the sales (it can go on to describe many 
more aspects where 80% of the effect is generated by 20% of the participants).  It 
seems, according to studies done by Pew Research (Hampton, Goulet, Marlow, & 
Rainie,  2012), this phenomenon extends to social media as well.  In a recent study of 
Facebook users titled, “Why most Facebook users get more than they give: The effect 
of Facebook ‘power users’ on everybody else”, Pew states that: 
“Our findings suggest that while most Facebook users in our sample were 
moderately active over a one-month time period, there is a subset of Facebook 
users who are disproportionately more active. They skew the average.  These 
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power users, who, depending on the type of content, account for 20%-30% of 
Facebook users in our sample.(Hampton et al.,  2012, p. 12)  
These findings are made even stronger when examining the user characteristics within 
the second most popular social media venue, Twitter.   
Researchers at Yahoo!, conducted an analysis of Twitter traffic generated from 
July 28, 2009 to March 10, 2010 (223 days) which equaled five billion tweets.  The 
researchers chose to examine tweets that contained URLs as they were found to 
“provide a much richer source of variation than is possible in the typical 140 character 
tweet providing a data set of 260 million tweets (Wu et al., 2011, p.3). What they 
determined was: 
“Based on this classification, we find a striking concentration of attention on 
Twitter-roughly 50% of tweets consumed are generated by just 20,000 elite 
users.” (Wu et al., 2011, p. 1) 
And within the conclusions: 
In particular, we find that although audience attention has indeed fragmented 
among a wider pool of content producers than classic models of mass media, 
attention remains highly concentrated, where roughly 0.05% of the population 
accounts for almost half of all posted URLs.” (Wu et al.,  2011, p. 9) 
But are these findings, and the Pareto Principle, reflected in the analysis of the EDL 
data? 
Examining the frequency data on the EDL Facebook page during the 45 day 
collection period we find that 80% or 3,286 users accounted for 34% of all user traffic 
(6495 comments).  The remaining 20% or 813 users accounted for 12,817 posts which 
is 66% of all traffic.  While it seems that the 80/20 phenomenon is more like 66/34, 
this simple analysis does not tell the real story.  Digging further, it is important to note 
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that the thirty three high frequency users mentioned in the last chapter, who made up 
only 0.81% of all users (less than one percent), generated 17.1 percent of all traffic.  
As a result, out of the data set of 19,312 posts, the 3,297 that were posted by the 33 
high frequency users (0.81%) actually represents 25.8% of the user traffic generated 
by the top 20% of users that accounted for 66% of all traffic (3,297/12,817).  With 
this, it seems fair to say that even within the 20% that produce the majority of the 
traffic (66%), particularly in the case of the EDL, there exists an even smaller body of 
‘high power users’ that are driving the dialog.  
Conclusion 
It is clear that the findings of this research contradict the anecdotal speculation on 
participation in online environments particularly where extremists/terrorists are 
involved; speculation that seems to exaggerate the size of the group and impact of 
these communications on the ‘members’.  This realization suggests that it is much less 
difficult to collect and analyze such activity than has been believed until now.  
Additionally, it has been shown that interdisciplinary efforts are valuable when 
seeking to solve what are perceived as difficult research problems.  The decision to 
seek a software solution to the monumental task of sorting and coding the various 
collections proved invaluable for several reasons.   
First, was the time savings that were realized by using the automated parser.  The 
months that were saved by using the parsing software as opposed to hand coding the 
data was magnified by being able to utilize this same technology on the supplemental 
data sets that were used herein to substantiate the primary findings of this research.  
Second, the automated parser allowed for an expansion of the number of variables 
that could have been coded by hand.  The original coding plan was to have user, 
primary/secondary post, date, and presence of URL variables.  The parser allowed for 
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the identification of other data that was placed in variables as well as the inclusion of 
the entire posts in a variable for preliminary content analysis.  Third, and very 
importantly, the reliability of the parser far exceeded the capability of a human coder.  
The software does not fatigue, make transposition errors, or misidentify items for 
coding.  This reliability is so important when dealing with such a large data set.  
Finally, the realization that such a tool can be developed for research specific use 
serves as a challenge for other researchers to consider what might be possible if they 
consider the research design without the traditional limitations and reach out to 
colleagues in other disciplines to get answers to what are become increasingly hard 
research questions. 
The practical outcome of this research and supplemental investigations, and the 
resultant US Patent number 8,838,834 titled Threat Identification and Mitigation in 
Computer Mediated Communication, Including Online Social Network Environments, 
has proven to be of great interest to various entities both in the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  As an academic, this researcher is cognizant of the need to avoid 
any appearance of being a tool of any government agency or office.  However, given 
the current threats posed by violent extremists, any knowledge that might help in 
countering these threats seems appropriate.  There is, in fact, a strong desire to seek 
answers through substantive research to help solve problems related to extremist and 
terrorist participation in social media and other computer mediated communications, 
particularly when such activity might lead to violence.  While this may be distasteful 
to some academic purists, the actions of terrorists and extremists who continue to 
target and kill innocent men, women, and children, only reinforces the need to seek 
those answers and find the much needed solutions.   
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Following the attacks of 9/11, 7/7, and now the rise of the Islamic State, the 
security paradigm has changed and with the advent of social media and other 
computer mediated communication, the need to understand and the ability to identify 
threats within these environments should be considered a priority.  As research in this 
area advances, the hopes are twofold.  First, that it will result in a broader 
understanding of the online phenomenon where it relates to extremist and terrorist 
participation in CMC environments toward the goal of combating this activity and 
identifying the threats that exist within them to more effectively provide for the safety 
and security of the country. And secondly, that by refining the techniques used in this 
research we will be able to improve the success rate of interdiction, and raise the 
opportunity cost of being an extremist or terrorist such that the cost of 
extremist/terrorist participation will become too high due to the increased probability 
of being identified.  With this, the handle on the faucet of extremist 
radicalization/participation will begin to close and the flow of extremists and terrorists 
will be diminished to the point that such activity will become like drops in a bucket, 
toward eventual extinction.  This is a lofty goal to be sure, but it is certainly one 
worthy of diligence and persistence. 
Future Research and Final Thoughts 
Clearly, as suggested earlier, the efforts put forth and the lessons learned as a 
result of this research project provide many additional avenues for future research on 
the existing dataset as well as on similar data that has been and will be collected.  As 
presented herein, the Occupy Wall Street data, which is considerably larger than the 
EDL set, provides an exceptional opportunity to investigate additional trends in social 
media associated with political or grass roots movements.  Further, prior to engaging 
in extensive analysis of this data, the findings from the EDL research regarding word 
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usage, URL usage, and user frequency will be reviewed and used to make 
modifications to the parser.  The potential for having the parser ‘look for’ the key 
words and phrases, automatically categorize the URL links, and examine patterns 
within the user traffic is certainly worth pursuing.  That these ‘look for’ variables 
could then be included within the data set as a result of the automated parsing process 
will even further reduce the time needed to move from collection to analysis.  This 
capability would be most useful as the data sets get larger, as was seen with the OWS 
set with over 80,000 posts. 
Word frequency coupled with user frequency.  
Further development of parsing and/or analytic capabilities will be investigated to 
combine the word frequency analysis with individual user frequency of these words to 
facilitate a more accurate reflection of “who is saying what”.  While this project 
sought purposefully to avoid individual analysis to ensure compliance with the 
research design as presented in the UTREC application and the UK Data Protection 
Act, being able to anonymize the users in a way that prevents the reverse engineering 
of the user names will allow for more individualized analysis toward developing a 
deeper understanding of the characteristics of individual participation within these 
online environments.  If one can accept that the use of key words and phrases is an 
indicator of radicalization or acceptance of the group narrative, understanding how 
this process develops over time could be invaluable.  Following this trend, identifying 
those times when key words or phrases are used more often will allow for the 
investigation of any content or potential facilitators the individual was exposed to 
within the CMC stream that may be precipitating this reaction by the user. The most 
important characteristic of this participation will be the evaluation of participation 
over time.  Again, while this project purposefully avoided analyzing individual 
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characteristics of participation other than a gross number of posts, it is an area that is 
of considerable interest and will become a focus of further investigative efforts on the 
EDL, OWS, and future datasets.  An important component of this analysis will be to 
search for key content or exposure that might help explain increases in participation 
over time and look for catalysts that might explain this increased participation.  Such 
findings might help explain how group identities are developed in CMC environments 
and if there are any shared characteristics among the users that might make them 
susceptible to this phenomenon. 
Within this same context, it will be important to understand the influence of the 
high frequency users in the development of this narrative.  Is this development the 
exclusive purview of the administrator or are there other users who can be identified 
as facilitators of this narrative?  This analysis will also be useful toward 
understanding the development of the group identity and the demonization of “the 
other” within the CMC stream.  These analyses are crucial to gauging the impact of 
the online content, which content has the largest and most consistent response, and 
what influence these phenomena have on the individual user/member toward 
identification with the extremist narrative and potential engagement in extremist 
activity or violent extremism.  
Full stream investigation 
Groups where primary posts are provided by users other than the group 
administrator are of considerable interest.  In social media or other CMC groups 
where non-administrator users are allowed to provide primary posts, the opportunity 
to further understand the dynamic of the group is presented.  Such a group will also 
allow for a more in-depth development of social network analysis.  By examining 
which users provide the most impactful primary posts, as measured by the number of 
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comments to those posts, and then evaluating which users participate in these strings 
will enhance the understanding of this area of research.  This analysis is possible 
using the existing parsing software.  Once the data set is coded, social network tools 
can be used to develop more specialized data sets for network analysis which can then 
be tied with other variables including word usage and participation over time.  
Understanding how the users interact with each other will assist in identifying 
facilitators within the group dynamic. 
Understanding the role of traditional media  
As discussed previously, there is good anecdotal evidence to support the idea that 
online social movements like the EDL, OWS, and the Arab Spring were facilitated by 
traditional media.  Further, there exists a question as to whether these movements 
would have been able to gather the huge number of online supporters without 
traditional media bringing the movement into millions of households via radio, print, 
and television.  This seems an interesting avenue for further investigation and would 
require a much longer study that would involve not only movements that seem to 
resonate with the public, but also groups that fail to acquire any traction due to the 
lack of traditional media coverage or that fall out of favor due to waning coverage. 
To accomplish this task, a formal research design will be needed including a 
budget to support the research team, the development of new research tools, and to 
conduct the investigation, analysis, and complete the final report.  It is likely that this 
project could include a broader goal to administer a questionnaire during national 
efforts in the United States or the European Union to measure individual participation 
in online movements and what role traditional media and new media played in 
facilitating that initial engagement. 
287 
Reading the Jihadi’s mail and/or mind 
One of the primary hopes for the future is to gain access to the social media or 
CMC traffic of an existing terrorist group for analysis.  Being based in the United 
States, the previously discussed concerns over the UK Terrorism Acts are mitigated 
and by informing Federal agencies of these activities, this research can be done 
without fear of arrest or prosecution.  Beginning in the fall of 2013 this researcher was 
provided access to translated Jihadi CMC traffic via a subscription to the Site 
Intelligence Group’s ‘Jihadi Threat Monitoring Service’.  Access to this information 
has solidified the need for a collection and analysis protocol to understand this CMC 
traffic.  While the research design is still being developed, the intent is to examine 
jihadi communication just prior to and for a period following the dates of significant 
drone or air strikes by the United States on al Qaeda and its affiliates.  There is great 
speculation as to the real impact of these attacks on the psyche of the various jihadi 
movements and this research will provide insight into how these attacks are 
perceived.  Additionally, it will be important to understand how the jihadis are using 
these attacks and their CMC communications to highlight collateral damage (the 
death of innocent civilians) to build or maintain indigenous support for their efforts.  
This researcher is unaware of any published work in this area and hopes to begin 
collection toward both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of this phenomenon 
following the completion of this thesis.  
Final thoughts 
Coming full circle, it is important to consider whether the questions first posited in 
this project have been answered and what do they tell us about the value of social 
media when engaging in collective action or political activism.  Certainly, it has been 
shown that it was indeed possible to conduct this research in a responsible and legal 
288 
way.  The collection and presentation protocols allowed for the protection of the 
identities of the research subjects and the engagement with the CTIRU allowed the 
project to move forward without any substantive legal concerns.  And the analysis of 
the EDL, the subsequent post hack, and OWS online collections provided findings 
that will hopefully facilitate further research into social media as a driver and 
potential force-multiplier of extremist action. 
What became evident from the research is that the problem of activism vs. 
slacktivism is alive and well in the offline activities of the EDL, and even more so 
within the virtual realm.  That only 5.5% of the members took the time to participate 
in the online dialog supports the idea that many feel that simply clicking “Like” is 
engaging in activism (Morozov, 2011; Shirky, 2008).  Further, that only thirty-three 
users, 0.87% of those who actually posted to the page, could be viewed as what 
Hoffer (1951) calls “true believers” supports the ideas set forth by scholars that the 
online phenomenon provides weak ties due to the ease with which members 
can/cannot participate without repercussions (Morozov, 2011; Shirky, 2008).   The 
use of URL links and YouTube videos was found to be of interest with certain 
categories of videos generating significant traffic, and the analysis of the various 
categories of posts showed an organized effort to promote the agenda of the group and 
characterize Muslims as the other or the foreign devil.   
The ability to recreate the findings of this research with other data was essential to 
the validity of this work.  The observations made regarding participation within the 
Occupy Wall Street group, which was nearly three times larger than the EDL were 
significant.  With a member participation rate of approximately 5.5%, which mirrors 
that of the EDL, there is support for the idea that social media, and particularly 
Facebook, may not be the powerhouse for activism that some have suggested.  This 
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analysis where N=all has provided the quantitative analysis that is much needed in 
this field and provides substance to the anecdotal evidence regarding Facebook 
participation that has been provided in the literature previously.   
The analysis of social media and other big data is a growing field of research and 
it is hoped that this paper will be seen as an early example of responsible practices.  In 
this vein, future efforts will involve working to develop interdisciplinary projects 
between social science and computer science/engineering that will enhance the 
analytical capabilities of the research while continuing to protect the individual user 
who becomes the subject of this research.  One of the fascinating outcomes of this 
project has been realizing the capabilities of software products that are specifically 
designed to facilitate social science research, when working in concert with computer 
scientists.  This interdisciplinary effort is a benefit, not only to the social scientist, but 
this researcher has found that the computer scientists benefit greatly when they are 
exposed to social science concepts and begin to think outside the box of 0’s and 1’s 
(binary code) and work to incorporate some of these lessons learned into the design of 
these new tools.  Likewise, it was found that engaging with computer scientists can be 
useful in the future when considering the development of new research designs and 
analytic tools.  Particularly in the area of countering extremism and terrorism, given 
the use of social media and other CMC’s by these groups, the collaborative efforts of 
social scientists and computer scientists will likely prove invaluable.  Further, as 
social media and other CMC come to permeate various aspects of our lives, the ability 
to understand the impact of those communications on the individual areas of interest 
and the research subjects becomes more important. 
With this in mind, the need to be diligent in the protection of individual civil 
liberties cannot be lost.  From user identity protection to understanding the demands 
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academic investigation in the area of social media places on the researcher; continued 
work is needed in this area.  An examination of marketing research in the area of 
social media makes one very aware of what type of data mining is possible outside the 
academic realm and research subjects should be protected when academics engage in 
this type of investigation.  This issue becomes more difficult when studying extremist 
or terrorist groups.  As this research has shown, simply being a ‘member’, by virtue of 
liking a page, does not seem to make one an active member.  Care should be taken 
when seeking to identify ‘members’ of an extremist group as one should not mistake 
infrequent participation for active engagement and identification.  When 
anonymization can be guaranteed, this type of investigation into extremist activity in 
CMC environments can be useful toward identifying the patterns of participation and 
engagement that lead to extremist activity and violent extremism and in doing so 
facilitate protecting the public good and enhancing both individual and national 
security. 
As this thesis was being finalized, terrorist acts by the Islamist State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) including the beheading of a British aid worker, and the knowledge that 
there were hundreds of UK citizens who had traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight with 
ISIS prompted Prime Minister Cameron to speak about the need for tougher anti-
terrors laws in the shadow of the ISIS threat to the homeland specifically and more 
generally the threat posed by extremism.  In his comments to Parliament on 1 
September 2014 he stated:  
 
“As I’ve said all along, this is not a knee-jerk response or sweeping, blanket 
changes that would be ineffective,” he said. “It’s not about just new powers, 
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but about how we tackle extremism in all forms. … We will in the end defeat 
this extremism.”(FoxNews.com, 1 September 2014) 
One wonders if his comments were pertaining only to Islamist extremism or if 
tackling “extremism in all forms” will extend to the far-right extremism that is 
personified by the English Defence League.   
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Appendix 1 - UTREC Approval 
 
 
 
International Relations School Ethics Committee 
 
14 February 2010 
Ted Reynolds  
 
 
Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the <name> 
School Ethics Committee meeting on the <date>.  The following documents were 
reviewed: 
 
1. Ethical Application Form    27/01/10 
2. Participant Information Sheet    n/a 
3. Consent Form     n/a 
4. Debriefing Form     n/a 
5. External Permissions     n/a 
6. Letters to Parents/Children/Headteacher etc…  n/a 
7. Questionnaires      n/a 
8. Enhanced Disclosure Scotland and Equivalent   n/a 
(as necessary) 
 
The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this 
study from an ethical point of view.   Please note that where approval is given by a 
School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for 
UTREC. 
 
Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two 
years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.   
 
Ethics Reference No:   
Please quote this ref on all 
correspondence 
IR 6129 
Project Title: Understanding Vulnerabilities to Extremism in the UK and the 
Influence of the Internet 
Researchers Name(s): Teddy Reynolds, Dr. Tristan Henderson and Dr. Saleem 
Bhatti, Department of Computer Science, University of St. 
Andrews. 
Supervisor(s): Roger MacGinty 
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You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been 
completed.  If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year 
validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and 
to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will 
need to re-apply. 
 
Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this 
study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately 
to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where 
appropriate. 
 
Approval is given on the understanding that the ‘Guidelines for Ethical Research 
Practice’ (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) 
are adhered to. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr. J.S. Murer 
Convenor of the School Ethics Committee          
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Appendix 2 - EDL Mission Statement 
EDL MISSION STATEMENT 
(1) HUMAN RIGHTS: Protecting And Promoting Human Rights 
The English Defence League (EDL) is a human rights organisation that exists to protect the 
inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives 
of non Muslims. It also recognises that Muslims themselves are frequently the main victims of 
some Islamic traditions and practices. The Government should ensure the individual human 
rights of members of the Muslim community to openly criticise Islamic orthodoxy, to challenge 
Islamic community leaders without fear of retribution, to receive full equality before the law 
(including equal rights for Muslim women), and to leave Islam if they see fit and to do so 
without fear or censure. Muslims have the right to demand reform of their religion to make it 
more relevant to the needs of the modern world, including the need to fully respect other 
groups in society without fear of retribution. It calls upon the Government to repeal legislation 
that prevents effective freedom of speech that is essential if the human rights abuses that 
sometimes manifest themselves around Islam are to be stopped. 
The EDL believes that radical Islam has a stranglehold on British Muslims. It keeps them 
fearful and isolated, especially the women that it encases in the Burqa. It misrepresents their 
views, stifles freedom of expression, and radicalises their children, whilst continually doing a 
discredit to those who do wish to peacefully co-exist with their fellow Britons. 
 
 
(2) DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: Promoting Democracy And The Rule Of Law 
By Opposing Sharia 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that “sharia is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of democracy”. We have seen in recent years a great deal of 
accommodation with sharia norms based on the premise that sharia rules can be simply 
attached to our existing traditions and customs. In reality sharia is an alternative to our legal, 
political, and social systems. Encouragement of halal food, Islamic courts, and the demand to 
respect Islam are all aspects of sharia designed to undermine our established way of life on 
the road to the crystalisation of the full sharia alternative. Sharia law makes a fundamental 
distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and the EDL will never allow this sort of 
iniquitous apartheid system to take root in our country. The EDL will therefore oppose sharia 
appeasement in all its forms. 
(3) PUBLIC EDUCATION: Ensuring That The Public Get A Balanced Picture Of Islam 
A central part of the EDL’s mission is public education. The British political and media 
establishment have, for a long time, being presenting a very sanitised and therefore inaccurate 
view of Islam shaped by the needs of policy makers rather than the needs of the public. This 
has acted as a barrier to informed policy making and made the solution of real problems 
impossible. In pursuing this self defeating and destructive policy, the Government has 
effectively been acting as the propaganda arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The EDL is committed to a campaign of public education to ensure that all aspects of Islam 
that impact on our society are brought into the open so that they can be debated in an open 
and honest way. It believes that only by looking at all the facts can society be most effectively 
and humanly governed. If there are aspects of Muslim tradition that encourage the activities of 
Islamic radicals and criminals then these need to be properly addressed without fear of 
accusations of racism or xenophobia. The public must have a more balanced and less sanitised 
view of Islam that allows it to ensure that decision makers are held to account for their policy 
making choices, choices that affect the harmony and security of the nation. 
The EDL promotes the understanding of Islam and the implications for non Muslims forced to 
live alongside it. Islam is not just a religious system but a political and social ideology that 
seeks to dominate all non-believers and impose a harsh legal system that and rejects the 
democratic process. It runs counter to all that we hold dear within our British liberal, 
democracy. 
(4) RESPECTING TRADITION: Promoting The Traditions And Culture Of England While At 
The Same Time Being Open To Embrace The Best That Other Cultures Can Offer 
The EDL believes that English Culture has the right to exist and prosper in England. It 
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recognises that culture is not static and that over time natural change takes place and other 
cultures make contributions that make our culture stronger and more vibrant. However, this 
does not give license to policy makers to deliberately undermine our culture and impose non-
English cultures on the English people in their own land. If people migrate to this country then 
they should be expected to respect our culture, its laws, and traditions and not expect their 
own cultures to be promoted by agencies of the state. The best of their cultures will be 
absorbed naturally and we will all be united by the enhanced culture that results. 
The EDL is therefore keen to draw its support from all races, all faiths, all political and 
lifestyle persuasions. Under its umbrella all people in England, whatever their background, or 
origin can stand united in a desire to stop the imposition of the rules of Islam on non believers. 
In order to ensure the continuity of our culture and its institutions, the EDL stands opposed to 
the creeping Islamisation of our country because that presents itself as an undemocratic 
alternative to our cherished way of life. 
Our armed forces stand up and risk their lives every day in order to protect our culture and 
democratic way of life. They, also, are inclusive of all England’s diversity and are a shining 
example of what a people can achieve in unity. The EDL is therefore committed to opposing 
any and all abuse that our men and women in uniform are subjected to and will campaign for 
legal remedies to ensure that those working within these important institutions are not exposed 
to abuse or aggression from within our country. 
(5) INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK: Working In Solidarity With Others Around The World 
The EDL is keen to join with others who share its values, wherever they are in the world, and 
from whatever cultural background they derive. It believes that the demand for sharia is global 
and therefore needs to tackled at a global as well as national level this demand is never 
realised. The EDL will therefore have an international outlook to enhance and strengthen its 
domestic efforts.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
16
 EDL Facebook information, accessed 31 January 2011. 
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Appendix 3 - Authorization Letter From ACPO/CTIRU 
 
 
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
 
10 Victoria Street, London, SW1H 0NN.  
Tel: (020) 7084 8993/Fax (020) 7084 8841 
Mob: 07738 648 712 
Email: jayne.snelgrove@acpo.pnn.police.uk 
Website: www.acpo.police.uk 
 
Head of the Counter Terrorism Internet referral Unit 
Detective Chief Inspector Jayne Snelgrove 
 
 
 
Date 7th June 2010 
 
 
Mr Ted Reynolds 
Department of International Relations 
University of St. Andrews 
 
Dear Mr Reynolds, 
 
It was good to meet with you recently and to discuss in more detail the nature of 
your research. The subject of the research for your PHD – ‘The collection and 
analysis of Facebook and Twitter activity associated with extremist groups to 
understand the potential radicalising effects of these social networking sites’ is of 
significant interest not only to myself and my team but will undoubtedly prove 
useful for the development of  future strategy in this area. 
 
If my understanding is correct you are seeking to extract current and historical 
activity from Facebook and Twitter using computer specialists. Once the collection 
period is complete you will analyse posts on these social networking sites 
associated with extreme Islamist as well as far right ant-immigrant / anti- Muslim 
extremist groups. The aim is to understand the influence that sites associated 
with extremist groups have on individual participants and whether this influence 
is a result of social interaction online or a more systematic progression related to 
exposure to supplemental online content linked with comments posted on 
Facebook and Twitter. 
 
As discussed this is a significant piece of research that will increase our 
understanding of the radicalisation process, particularly how it can occur on-line. 
As Head of the Counter Terrorism Internet referral unit I am keen to be a 
beneficiary of this work and am pleased to support the work by yourself and your 
team as part of St Andrew’s University. However as we also discussed this 
research has its difficulties and it is important that you and your team take every 
precaution to ensure you do not fall foul of UK Terrorism Law.  
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Your research overview provided to me on 14th May clearly demonstrates that 
you and your team are aware of the legality of the research that you are 
considering and the overview actually quotes the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2006 with 
respect to the possession and dissemination of terrorist publications. You have 
sensibly engaged with UK Police via me to ensure that your research is 
understood and that those agencies working in this area are informed of your 
work which I will ensure takes place. I would recommend that you also make sure 
you are fully cognisant of the Terrorism Act 2000 and I would particularly refer 
you to Sec 57 & 58 that relate to the possession of articles connected to acts of 
terrorism and the collection or making a record of information of a kind likely to 
be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism or to possess a 
document of record of this type. 
 
After reading your research proposal which includes a detailed description as to 
how you are going to collect, analyse and dispose of the data from these 
extremists sites I am satisfied that as long as you and your team, which includes 
the research team from the Computer Science Department headed by Professor 
Saleem Bhatti and Dr. Tristan Henderson, and your supervisors Dr. Roger Mac 
Ginty and Dr. Jeffrey Murer, remain within these parameters that you will not be 
in breach of the Law. Although I am not able to give an assurance that you would 
not be prosecuted if a breach of the Terrorism Act was considered to have taken 
place by you or your team. However UK law enforcement is in the business of 
reducing the risk to the UK from Terrorism and where the use of Terrorism 
legislation is necessary it would be for that purpose. We are not seeking to 
prosecute those undertaking legitimate research projects that are likely to assist 
our efforts in the longer term.  
 
You should however also bear in mind when you share the findings, the possibility 
of contravening Sec 1 & 2 of TACT 2006 as these offences may be committed if 
an individual is shown to have been reckless – this is where someone is aware of 
the risk but takes it unreasonably. You should therefore consider ways to 
measure any risks associated with presenting or sharing your findings.   
 
I hope that both our teams can benefit from a mutually supportive relationship 
over the period of your research and that this will also build on an already strong 
relationship that UK CT policing has with St Andrews. If I can be of anymore 
assistance please let me know and I look forward to working with you over the 
forth coming months. 
 
Good luck with the project 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Jayne Snelgrove 
 
Cc:  
 
Assistant Chief Constable John Wright, ACPO National Coordinator Prevent 
 
Dr. Roger MacGinty, Department of International Relation St Andrew’s University 
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Appendix 4 – Articles per day 
 
Date Frequency 
10-AUG-2009 2 
11-AUG-2009 4 
12-AUG-2009 1 
13-AUG-2009 3 
14-AUG-2009 3 
15-AUG-2009 1 
16-AUG-2009 1 
17-AUG-2009 1 
18-AUG-2009 1 
20-AUG-2009 1 
21-AUG-2009 1 
22-AUG-2009 3 
23-AUG-2009 1 
24-AUG-2009 3 
26-AUG-2009 3 
27-AUG-2009 2 
28-AUG-2009 2 
30-AUG-2009 2 
03-SEP-2009 3 
04-SEP-2009 4 
05-SEP-2009 2 
06-SEP-2009 22 
07-SEP-2009 27 
08-SEP-2009 12 
09-SEP-2009 4 
10-SEP-2009 2 
11-SEP-2009 8 
12-SEP-2009 11 
13-SEP-2009 13 
14-SEP-2009 18 
15-SEP-2009 3 
16-SEP-2009 4 
17-SEP-2009 6 
18-SEP-2009 12 
19-SEP-2009 2 
20-SEP-2009 4 
21-SEP-2009 2 
22-SEP-2009 4 
23-SEP-2009 4 
24-SEP-2009 2 
25-SEP-2009 2 
26-SEP-2009 1 
27-SEP-2009 1 
28-SEP-2009 1 
29-SEP-2009 3 
04-OCT-2009 2 
05-OCT-2009 3 
07-OCT-2009 4 
08-OCT-2009 3 
09-OCT-2009 1 
10-OCT-2009 5 
11-OCT-2009 14 
12-OCT-2009 6 
13-OCT-2009 3 
14-OCT-2009 1 
15-OCT-2009 2 
16-OCT-2009 1 
17-OCT-2009 1 
18-OCT-2009 17 
19-OCT-2009 4 
20-OCT-2009 2 
21-OCT-2009 2 
22-OCT-2009 1 
23-OCT-2009 1 
24-OCT-2009 1 
25-OCT-2009 8 
26-OCT-2009 2 
27-OCT-2009 3 
29-OCT-2009 2 
30-OCT-2009 1 
31-OCT-2009 3 
01-NOV-2009 3 
02-NOV-2009 5 
03-NOV-2009 1 
04-NOV-2009 3 
05-NOV-2009 1 
08-NOV-2009 3 
09-NOV-2009 1 
13-NOV-2009 5 
14-NOV-2009 2 
15-NOV-2009 7 
16-NOV-2009 3 
17-NOV-2009 2 
19-NOV-2009 2 
21-NOV-2009 1 
23-NOV-2009 3 
25-NOV-2009 2 
26-NOV-2009 1 
27-NOV-2009 2 
28-NOV-2009 1 
01-DEC-2009 1 
02-DEC-2009 1 
03-DEC-2009 4 
05-DEC-2009 6 
06-DEC-2009 6 
07-DEC-2009 3 
09-DEC-2009 3 
12-DEC-2009 1 
13-DEC-2009 2 
14-DEC-2009 1 
15-DEC-2009 1 
16-DEC-2009 1 
19-DEC-2009 1 
20-DEC-2009 1 
22-DEC-2009 1 
30-DEC-2009 1 
02-JAN-2010 1 
04-JAN-2010 1 
06-JAN-2010 2 
07-JAN-2010 1 
08-JAN-2010 1 
09-JAN-2010 1 
10-JAN-2010 1 
11-JAN-2010 7 
13-JAN-2010 1 
14-JAN-2010 3 
18-JAN-2010 1 
21-JAN-2010 3 
22-JAN-2010 2 
23-JAN-2010 3 
24-JAN-2010 2 
25-JAN-2010 6 
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26-JAN-2010 5 
27-JAN-2010 3 
28-JAN-2010 1 
29-JAN-2010 1 
30-JAN-2010 2 
04-FEB-2010 1 
05-FEB-2010 1 
09-FEB-2010 1 
10-FEB-2010 2 
11-FEB-2010 1 
17-FEB-2010 2 
18-FEB-2010 4 
19-FEB-2010 5 
20-FEB-2010 4 
21-FEB-2010 2 
23-FEB-2010 1 
25-FEB-2010 1 
27-FEB-2010 2 
01-MAR-2010 3 
03-MAR-2010 1 
04-MAR-2010 2 
05-MAR-2010 9 
06-MAR-2010 19 
07-MAR-2010 2 
09-MAR-2010 1 
10-MAR-2010 2 
11-MAR-2010 2 
12-MAR-2010 2 
13-MAR-2010 1 
14-MAR-2010 1 
15-MAR-2010 2 
16-MAR-2010 1 
17-MAR-2010 3 
19-MAR-2010 2 
20-MAR-2010 4 
21-MAR-2010 11 
22-MAR-2010 7 
23-MAR-2010 4 
24-MAR-2010 1 
25-MAR-2010 4 
26-MAR-2010 1 
28-MAR-2010 3 
29-MAR-2010 1 
30-MAR-2010 5 
31-MAR-2010 1 
01-APR-2010 3 
02-APR-2010 2 
03-APR-2010 4 
04-APR-2010 9 
05-APR-2010 4 
06-APR-2010 1 
08-APR-2010 1 
09-APR-2010 1 
11-APR-2010 1 
13-APR-2010 1 
14-APR-2010 1 
18-APR-2010 4 
22-APR-2010 1 
23-APR-2010 7 
24-APR-2010 3 
26-APR-2010 2 
27-APR-2010 1 
29-APR-2010 2 
30-APR-2010 1 
01-MAY-2010 1 
02-MAY-2010 2 
03-MAY-2010 1 
04-MAY-2010 4 
05-MAY-2010 1 
06-MAY-2010 3 
09-MAY-2010 1 
15-MAY-2010 4 
16-MAY-2010 2 
18-MAY-2010 1 
19-MAY-2010 2 
20-MAY-2010 4 
24-MAY-2010 2 
25-MAY-2010 4 
26-MAY-2010 1 
27-MAY-2010 3 
28-MAY-2010 1 
29-MAY-2010 7 
30-MAY-2010 3 
31-MAY-2010 7 
01-JUN-2010 4 
02-JUN-2010 3 
03-JUN-2010 5 
04-JUN-2010 3 
05-JUN-2010 3 
06-JUN-2010 2 
07-JUN-2010 5 
08-JUN-2010 4 
11-JUN-2010 1 
12-JUN-2010 2 
13-JUN-2010 1 
16-JUN-2010 4 
17-JUN-2010 3 
18-JUN-2010 2 
19-JUN-2010 1 
20-JUN-2010 1 
21-JUN-2010 5 
22-JUN-2010 1 
23-JUN-2010 1 
24-JUN-2010 2 
25-JUN-2010 1 
26-JUN-2010 1 
27-JUN-2010 1 
30-JUN-2010 1 
02-JUL-2010 2 
04-JUL-2010 2 
07-JUL-2010 1 
09-JUL-2010 1 
10-JUL-2010 1 
11-JUL-2010 1 
13-JUL-2010 2 
14-JUL-2010 2 
16-JUL-2010 2 
17-JUL-2010 1 
18-JUL-2010 6 
19-JUL-2010 5 
20-JUL-2010 1 
21-JUL-2010 4 
22-JUL-2010 2 
23-JUL-2010 1 
26-JUL-2010 2 
28-JUL-2010 2 
29-JUL-2010 4 
03-AUG-2010 3 
06-AUG-2010 1 
07-AUG-2010 2 
09-AUG-2010 1 
10-AUG-2010 1 
13-AUG-2010 2 
17-AUG-2010 1 
18-AUG-2010 3 
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19-AUG-2010 3 
20-AUG-2010 3 
21-AUG-2010 5 
22-AUG-2010 6 
23-AUG-2010 4 
24-AUG-2010 1 
25-AUG-2010 2 
26-AUG-2010 2 
28-AUG-2010 11 
29-AUG-2010 11 
30-AUG-2010 14 
31-AUG-2010 4 
01-SEP-2010 1 
03-SEP-2010 1 
05-SEP-2010 2 
08-SEP-2010 2 
12-SEP-2010 5 
13-SEP-2010 5 
14-SEP-2010 2 
15-SEP-2010 3 
17-SEP-2010 2 
19-SEP-2010 2 
23-SEP-2010 1 
24-SEP-2010 9 
25-SEP-2010 2 
27-SEP-2010 3 
29-SEP-2010 4 
30-SEP-2010 1 
03-OCT-2010 1 
04-OCT-2010 3 
05-OCT-2010 8 
06-OCT-2010 3 
07-OCT-2010 6 
08-OCT-2010 5 
09-OCT-2010 7 
10-OCT-2010 9 
11-OCT-2010 6 
12-OCT-2010 5 
13-OCT-2010 1 
15-OCT-2010 2 
16-OCT-2010 3 
19-OCT-2010 1 
21-OCT-2010 1 
22-OCT-2010 2 
23-OCT-2010 2 
25-OCT-2010 12 
26-OCT-2010 4 
27-OCT-2010 2 
28-OCT-2010 2 
29-OCT-2010 2 
30-OCT-2010 1 
31-OCT-2010 2 
01-NOV-2010 6 
02-NOV-2010 2 
03-NOV-2010 2 
04-NOV-2010 4 
05-NOV-2010 3 
09-NOV-2010 2 
10-NOV-2010 3 
11-NOV-2010 3 
12-NOV-2010 12 
13-NOV-2010 13 
14-NOV-2010 5 
15-NOV-2010 2 
16-NOV-2010 2 
17-NOV-2010 1 
19-NOV-2010 5 
20-NOV-2010 15 
21-NOV-2010 5 
22-NOV-2010 4 
23-NOV-2010 6 
24-NOV-2010 1 
25-NOV-2010 2 
26-NOV-2010 2 
27-NOV-2010 11 
28-NOV-2010 4 
29-NOV-2010 36 
30-NOV-2010 6 
01-DEC-2010 2 
03-DEC-2010 1 
04-DEC-2010 1 
05-DEC-2010 3 
06-DEC-2010 1 
07-DEC-2010 3 
08-DEC-2010 3 
09-DEC-2010 1 
11-DEC-2010 2 
12-DEC-2010 4 
13-DEC-2010 34 
14-DEC-2010 25 
15-DEC-2010 9 
16-DEC-2010 2 
17-DEC-2010 1 
18-DEC-2010 3 
19-DEC-2010 4 
20-DEC-2010 3 
22-DEC-2010 2 
23-DEC-2010 5 
24-DEC-2010 1 
26-DEC-2010 2 
27-DEC-2010 2 
28-DEC-2010 1 
29-DEC-2010 1 
30-DEC-2010 2 
02-JAN-2011 2 
04-JAN-2011 3 
05-JAN-2011 4 
06-JAN-2011 1 
08-JAN-2011 3 
09-JAN-2011 1 
10-JAN-2011 3 
11-JAN-2011 1 
12-JAN-2011 2 
14-JAN-2011 1 
15-JAN-2011 3 
16-JAN-2011 2 
19-JAN-2011 12 
20-JAN-2011 1 
21-JAN-2011 7 
22-JAN-2011 1 
23-JAN-2011 4 
24-JAN-2011 1 
26-JAN-2011 4 
31-JAN-2011 5 
02-FEB-2011 2 
03-FEB-2011 3 
04-FEB-2011 6 
Total 1321 
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Appendix 5 – EDL Mission Statement 
 
EDL MISSION STATEMENT 
(1) HUMAN RIGHTS: Protecting And Promoting Human Rights 
The English Defence League (EDL) is a human rights organisation that exists to 
protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam’s 
encroachment into the lives of non Muslims. It also recognises that Muslims 
themselves are frequently the main victims of some Islamic traditions and practices. 
The Government should ensure the individual human rights of members of the Muslim 
community to openly criticise Islamic orthodoxy, to challenge Islamic community 
leaders without fear of retribution, to receive full equality before the law (including 
equal rights for Muslim women), and to leave Islam if they see fit and to do so without 
fear or censure. Muslims have the right to demand reform of their religion to make it 
more relevant to the needs of the modern world, including the need to fully respect 
other groups in society without fear of retribution. It calls upon the Government to 
repeal legislation that prevents effective freedom of speech that is essential if the 
human rights abuses that sometimes manifest themselves around Islam are to be 
stopped. 
The EDL believes that radical Islam has a stranglehold on British Muslims. It keeps 
them fearful and isolated, especially the women that it encases in the Burqa. It 
misrepresents their views, stifles freedom of expression, and radicalises their 
children, whilst continually doing a discredit to those who do wish to peacefully co-
exist with their fellow Britons. 
(2) DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: Promoting Democracy And The Rule 
Of Law By Opposing Sharia 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that “sharia is incompatible with 
the fundamental principles of democracy”. We have seen in recent years a great deal 
of accommodation with sharia norms based on the premise that sharia rules can be 
simply attached to our existing traditions and customs. In reality sharia is an 
alternative to our legal, political, and social systems. Encouragement of halal food, 
Islamic courts, and the demand to respect Islam are all aspects of sharia designed to 
undermine our established way of life on the road to the crystalisation of the full 
sharia alternative. Sharia law makes a fundamental distinction between Muslims and 
non-Muslims and the EDL will never allow this sort of iniquitous apartheid system to 
take root in our country. The EDL will therefore oppose sharia appeasement in all its 
forms. 
(3) PUBLIC EDUCATION: Ensuring That The Public Get A Balanced Picture Of 
Islam 
A central part of the EDL’s mission is public education. The British political and 
media establishment have, for a long time, being presenting a very sanitised and 
therefore inaccurate view of Islam shaped by the needs of policy makers rather than 
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the needs of the public. This has acted as a barrier to informed policy making and 
made the solution of real problems impossible. In pursuing this self defeating and 
destructive policy, the Government has effectively been acting as the propaganda arm 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The EDL is committed to a campaign of public education to ensure that all aspects of 
Islam that impact on our society are brought into the open so that they can be debated 
in an open and honest way. It believes that only by looking at all the facts can society 
be most effectively and humanly governed. If there are aspects of Muslim tradition 
that encourage the activities of Islamic radicals and criminals then these need to be 
properly addressed without fear of accusations of racism or xenophobia. The public 
must have a more balanced and less sanitised view of Islam that allows it to ensure 
that decision makers are held to account for their policy making choices, choices that 
affect the harmony and security of the nation. 
The EDL promotes the understanding of Islam and the implications for non Muslims 
forced to live alongside it. Islam is not just a religious system but a political and 
social ideology that seeks to dominate all non-believers and impose a harsh legal 
system that and rejects the democratic process. It runs counter to all that we hold 
dear within our British liberal, democracy. 
(4) RESPECTING TRADITION: Promoting The Traditions And Culture Of England 
While At The Same Time Being Open To Embrace The Best That Other Cultures Can 
Offer 
The EDL believes that English Culture has the right to exist and prosper in England. 
It recognises that culture is not static and that over time natural change takes place 
and other cultures make contributions that make our culture stronger and more 
vibrant. However, this does not give license to policy makers to deliberately 
undermine our culture and impose non-English cultures on the English people in their 
own land. If people migrate to this country then they should be expected to respect 
our culture, its laws, and traditions and not expect their own cultures to be promoted 
by agencies of the state. The best of their cultures will be absorbed naturally and we 
will all be united by the enhanced culture that results. 
The EDL is therefore keen to draw its support from all races, all faiths, all political 
and lifestyle persuasions. Under its umbrella all people in England, whatever their 
background, or origin can stand united in a desire to stop the imposition of the rules 
of Islam on non believers. In order to ensure the continuity of our culture and its 
institutions, the EDL stands opposed to the creeping Islamisation of our country 
because that presents itself as an undemocratic alternative to our cherished way of 
life. 
Our armed forces stand up and risk their lives every day in order to protect our 
culture and democratic way of life. They, also, are inclusive of all England’s diversity 
and are a shining example of what a people can achieve in unity. The EDL is 
therefore committed to opposing any and all abuse that our men and women in 
uniform are subjected to and will campaign for legal remedies to ensure that those 
working within these important institutions are not exposed to abuse or aggression 
from within our country. 
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(5) INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK: Working In Solidarity With Others Around The 
World 
The EDL is keen to join with others who share its values, wherever they are in the 
world, and from whatever cultural background they derive. It believes that the 
demand for sharia is global and therefore needs to tackled at a global as well as 
national level this demand is never realised. The EDL will therefore have an 
international outlook to enhance and strengthen its domestic efforts. 
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Appendix 6 – List of URL Links in Data Set 
URL links in entire dataset Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Posts with no link 19024 98.5 98.5 98.5 
WWW.YOUTUBE.COM 96 0.5 0.5 99 
WWW.FACEBOOK.COM 87 0.5 0.5 99.5 
WWW.BBC.CO.UK 21 0.1 0.1 99.6 
WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK 5 0 0 99.6 
WWW.CHANNEL4.COM 4 0 0 99.6 
WWW.DAILYMAIL.CO.UK 4 0 0 99.6 
WWW.DAILYSTAR.CO.UK 3 0 0 99.6 
WWW.THESUN.CO.UK 3 0 0 99.7 
WWW.ANIMALAID.ORG.UK 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.APOSTATESOFISLAM.COM 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.FLICKR.COM 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.ISRAELNATIONALNEWS.COM 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.TELEGRAPH.CO.UK 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.THERELIGIONOFPEACE.COM 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.THISISDEVON.CO.UK 2 0 0 99.7 
WWW.1001INVENTIONS.COM 1 0 0 99.7 
WWW.AOLNEWS.COM 1 0 0 99.7 
WWW.ASIAONE.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.AXCIS.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.BIRMINGHAMMAIL.NET 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.BIRMINGHAMPOST.NET 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.CHEATSGURU.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.CITY-JOURNAL.ORG 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.COVERITLIVE.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.DISABILITYSECRETS.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.EADT.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.EBAUMSWORLD.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.EDP24.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.ENGLISHFORUMS.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.EXPRESS.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.FAITHFREEDOM.ORG 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.FEARANDHOPE.ORG.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.FRIENDSSHELTER.COMWE 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.GETREADING.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.GOOGLE.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.INTERNATIONALFREEPRESSSOCIETY.ORG 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.IPETITIONS.COM 1 0 0 99.8 
WWW.ISLAM-INSIDE.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.JPOST.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
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WWW.JUSTGIVING.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.LANCASHIRETELEGRAPH.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.LAWFULREBELLION.ORG.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.LIBERTARIANREPUBLICAN.NET 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.LIVELEAK.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.LYNNNEWS.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.MARKSQUOTES.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.MARYLANDTHURSDAYMEETING.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.MEATTRADENEWSDAILY.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.MEMRI.ORG 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.MUSLIMSAGAINSTCRUSADES.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.OXFORDMAIL.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.POINTDEBASCULECANADA.CA 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.PRESSTV.IR 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.REFUGEECOUNCIL.ORG.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.SHOEBAT.COM 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.SOCIALISTWORKER.CO.UK 1 0 0 99.9 
WWW.SPIKED-ONLINE.COM 1 0 0 100 
WWW.STANDUPAMERICANOW.ORG 1 0 0 100 
WWW.THEBLAZE.COM IN AMERICA:HTTP: 1 0 0 100 
WWW.THEFIRSTPOST.CO.UK 1 0 0 100 
WWW.THEJAKARTAPOST.COM 1 0 0 100 
WWW.TIME.COM 1 0 0 100 
WWW.TOWERHAMLETS.GOV.UK 1 0 0 100 
WWW.TPUC.ORG 1 0 0 100 
WWW.WBIR.COM 1 0 0 100 
WWW.WESTERNYOUTH.ORG 1 0 0 100 
Total 19312 100 100   
 
